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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Capital Punishment-Death Penalty As Presently
Administered Held Unconstitutional.-Two petitioners were found guilty
of rape and a third was found guilty of murder.' In each case, the question of
whether the death penalty should be imposed was left to the discretion of the
jury and in each case, petitioner was sentenced to death. On a consolidated
appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgments insofar as they
ordered the petitioners to be put to death. The Court held that the death penalty
as it presently exists violates the Constitution's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments contained in the eighth amendment and made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendent. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[e]xces-
sive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." 2 While this clause received "very little debate" at the
time of its proposed adoption,3 there is general agreement that it was intended
by the framers to bar the imposition of inherently torturous forms of punish-
ment.4 It is also generally agreed5 that the framers did not consider death to be
such a punishment.6 The historical background of the clause thus presented a
solid obstacle to those who sought to use it as a vehicle for the abolition of
capital punishment.7
The cruel and unusual punishments clause was practically ignored by the
1. Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969) (murder) ; Jackson v. State, 225
Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969) (rape); Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App.
1969) (rape).
2. The words of the eighth amendment were taken almost verbatim from the English Bill
of Rights of 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 10, at 69 (1689); see Granucd, 'Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839, 840 (1969).
3. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910).
4. Granucci, supra note 2, at 841-42; see Powell v. Texas, 392 US. 514, 531-32 (1968);
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134 (1878). See also, S. Rubin, The Law of Criminal
Correction 367-69 (1963). The framers of the American Constitution may have misinterpreted
the English clause which was designed to prohibit unauthorized punishments and those that
were excessive in proportion to the offense. Granucci, supra at 859-65.
5. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (separate opinion); see Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1878).
6. "[T]he punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life." In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) ; see Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (concurring opinion). This view receives further support from
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, which forbid deprivation of life
"without due process of law." See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 418-19 (1972) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
7. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 336-41 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Supreme Court until 1878.8 In that year, it was held in Wilkerson v. Utah that
public execution by shooting was not a cruel and unusual punishment.10 Twelve
years later in In re Kemmler," the Court, in dictum,12 condoned electrocution
as a permissible mode of punishment, noting that while this punishment was
unusual, it had been adopted for a humane purpose and was therefore not cruel. 1
Subsequently, in O'Neil v. Vermont,' 4 the Court shifted its attention from the
acceptability of the punishment itself to the question of the necessity of some
proportionality between the punishment and the crime.1' In a strong dissent,
which foreshadowed future developments,' 6 Justice Field stated that the imposi-
tion of an excessively harsh punishment for a comparatively minor offense
violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.' 7
Perhaps the case that was most influential in freeing the clause from its
historical shackles was Weems v. United States,18 in which a punishment con-
sisting of an imaginative combination of hard labor and loss of civil rights1' was
held to violate the clause. At a number of points, the Weems Court made it
clear that in deciding whether or not a punishment is cruel and unusual, the test
to be applied is broader than whether the Founding Fathers had this type of
punishment in mind when they drafted the clause. After stating its belief that
"ca principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
8. In one of the few pre-1878 cases to deal with the cruel and unusual punishments clause,
the Supreme Court held that it did not apply to the states. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 'U.S.
(5 Wall.) 475, 479-80 (1867).
9. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
10. Id. at 135. The opinion stated: "Difficulty would attend the effort to define with
exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual
punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture,...
and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to
the Constitution." Id. at 135-36.
11. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
12. The Court reaffirmed its prior holding that the cruel and unusual punishments clruse
was not applicable to the states. Id. at 446; see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 323 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring); McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891).
13. 136 U.S. at 447. But cf. Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 1268,
1338-39 (1968).
14. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
15. Id. at 331. O'Neil had been sentenced to fifty-four years in prison in the event that he
could not pay a fine for the illegal sale of alcoholic beverages. The Court affirmed, holding
that the eighth amendment did not apply to the states. Id. at 332.
16. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786
(4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
17. 144 U.S. at 338-40; see id. at 371 (Harlan & Brewer, JJ., dissenting).
18. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The crime was fraudulent alteration of United States government
cashbooks.
19. Weems was sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor with chains at his ankles and loss
of all marital, guardianship, and property rights. He was also required to notify surveillance
authorities of any change in his domicile and to submit to periodic inspections. Id. at 358,
364-66.
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which gave it birth," 20 the Court added that the cruel and unusual punishments
clause "may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becames enlightened by a humane justice."2 -
It followed from the Weems rationale that the death penalty could be cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of the Constitution in spite of the fact
that the Founding Fathers had not considered it to be so.
Another major decision involving the cruel and unusual punishments clause
was not handed down until 1947. In that year, the Court, in Lidsiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 2 approved the sending of a prisoner to the electric chair
for a second time, the first execution having failed due to a mechanical difficulty.
The Court based its decision on the accidental nature of the incident, emphasizing
that the eighth amendment protects against intentionally inflicted cruel punish-
ments.ns In Trop v. Dulles,24 a 1958 case, the challenged punishment was inten-
tionally inflicted, and the Court was given an opportunity to apply the Weems
rationale. Explicitly relying on that case,25 the Court held that denationalization
was an unconstitutional punishment, even for wartime desertion. The thrust of
the Trop decision was on the inherent cruelty of statelessness as a punishment
and its unanimous rejection by civilized nations.20 The Court felt that no crime
was so heinous as to warrant its infliction.- 7 To quiet any feeling that similar
reasoning could be used to strike down the death penalty, the Court went out of
its way to state that the death penalty was not unconstitutional, because it,
unlike denationalization, was a traditional and accepted mode of punishment. -s
Nevertheless, the Court seemed to strengthen the arguments against the death
penalty when it went on to say that "[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man." -9 In his dissent, Justice
Frankfurter understandably found it difficult to fathom how the Court could
find denationalization more offensive to human dignity than execution.ao
20. Id. at 373.
21- Id. at 378.
22. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
23. "The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty in-
herent in the method of punishment.. . .There is no purpose to inffict unnecessary pain
nor any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution." Id. at 464.
24. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
25. Id. at 100-01.
26. Id. at 102.
27. Id. at 101-02.
28. The court stated, "At the outset, let us put to one side the death penalty as an index
of the constitutional limit on punishment Whatever the arguments may be against capital
punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment
-and they are forceful-the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and,
in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept
of cruelty. But it is equally plain that the existence of the death penalty is not a license to the
Government to devise any punishments short of death within the limit of its imagination."
Id. at 99.
29. Id. at 100.
30. Id. at 125.
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The contradictions in Trop were not resolved by the two most recent cases
on cruel and unusual punishment considered by the Supreme Court-Robinson v.
California3' and Powell v. Texas.8 2 In Robinson, the Court struck down a Cali-
fornia statute making it a crime to be addicted to narcotics. In applying the cruel
and unusual punishments clause to a state for the first time,83 the Court said
that its meaning must be determined "in the light of contemporary human knowl-
edge," 3 4 thus lending more support to the view of the clause as an evolving
standard. In Powell, the Court held that the standard had not evolved to such
a point that it would render punishment for the crime of public drunkenness
cruel and unusual.3, Other recent cases, 6 however, have relied heavily on the
progressive interpretation of the clause, and the California Supreme Court has
gone so far as to declare the death penalty unconstitutional under its state
constitution.37 While it can thus be said that the courts have become more liberal
in their construction of the cruel and unusual punishments clause during the
last hundred years, the decision handed down by the Supreme Court last term in
Furman v. Georgia8 still represents an abrupt and drastic departure from
precedent.
To determine what the Court actually held in Furman is an onerous task in
its own right. 9 The nine separate opinions issued by the Court can be divided
into three groups for the purpose of simplification. The first group consisted of
Justices Brennan and Marshall who stated that capital punishment in itself
amounts to a cruel and unusual punishment and can never be inflicted without
violating the Constitution.40 Their reasons for arriving at such a conclusion
differed considerably, however. The basis of Justice Brennan's opinion was the
inherent barbarity of the death penalty which, he felt, offended human dignity.4
On the other hand, at the core of Justice Marshall's opinion was what he con-
31. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
32. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
33. Applicability of the clause to the states had been assumed in Louisiana ex rel Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
34. 370 U.S. at 666.
35. 392 U.S. at 532-33.
36. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889-91 (1963) (dissenting opinion);
Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 971 (8th Cir.
1968).
37. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, application for a
stay of judgment denied, 405 U.S. 983 (1972).
38. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
39. The Court's decision was stated in a per curiam opinion as follows: "The Court holds
that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 408 U.S. at
239-40. Hereinafter when the opinions of the individual justices are cited, all footnotes are
omitted.
40. Id. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring).
41. See text accompanying notes 52-56 infra. Justice Brennan also based his opinion on
the arbitrariness and excessiveness of the death penalty and on its rejection by contemporary
society. He related these factors to his central concept of human dignity. 408 U.S. at 305.
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sidered to be the excessiveness of capital punishment- its failure to serve any
socially useful purpose.42 This is a more limited rejection of the death penalty
than Justice Brennan's since it relies on the introduction of extrinsic factors and
seems to suggest that the death penalty would be constitutional if it were ever
proven that its existence benefited society.
The second group, constisting of Justices Stewart, White, and Douglas, stated
that the imposition of the death penalty could be unconstitutional under some
circumstances and that such circumstances existed in these cases, as well as in
most other capital cases. 43 Specifically, what these Justices found repugnant to
the Constitution was the arbitrary manner in which they felt the death penalty
was being inflicted. Justice Stewart espoused the theory that an arbitrarily
inflicted death penalty was inherently cruel,44 while Justice White emphasized
that its arbitrariness and infrequency of imposition rendered the death penalty
virtually useless for any purpose4 5 Justice Douglas equated arbitrary infliction
with a denial of equal protection and stated that equal protection requirements
were implicit in the cruel and unusual punishments clause.40
The third group consisted of the dissenters-Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist.4 7 They were in virtual agreement in claiming
that the majority had ventured too far into the domain of the legislature and
had placed personal feelings above their sense of judicial duty.4 8
The meaning of the Furnan decision may be clarified through a more detailed
examination of some of the arguments advanced by the various justices. The
classical argument for declaring any punishment to be violative of the eighth
amendment is that it is inherently cruel and barbarous.4 9 The modem form of
this argument as it relates to capital punishment is that the death penalty, while
not considered barbaric at one time,5" must be considered so at present in view of
the much greater value placed on human life by modem society."' Justice
Brennan espoused this view, pointing to the incredible severity of the death
penalty as compared with any other contemparary form of punishment. 2 His
42. See text accompanying notes 79-81 infra. Justice M[arshall also saw capital punishment
as unconstitutional because "it is morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at
this time in their history." 408 U.S. at 360.
43. Id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring); id. at
240-57 (Douglas, 3., concurring).
44. See text accompanying note 89 infra.
45. See note 95 infra and accompanying text.
46. See text accompanying notes 96-98 infra.
47. 408 U.S. at 375-405 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id. at 405-14 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) ; id. at 414-65 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48. See text accompanying notes 109-12 infra.
49. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) and text accompanying note 4
supra.
50. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
51. Weems, of course, held that such evolving standards were constitutionally relevant.
217 U.S. at 378. But see McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (separate
opinion), emphasizing the framers' acceptance of the death penalty.
52. "Death is today an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality,
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contention is supported by the existence of special procedural protections in
capital cases, 53 both in the past and at present, and by the paramount importance
attached by defense attorneys to the avoidance of the death penalty.54 For
Brennan, the cruel and unusual punishments clause essentially protects "the
dignity of man." 55 The death penalty offends that dignity, he stated, because it
"treat [s] members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with
and discarded."56 Choosing not to brood over human dignity, the dissenters in
Furman concluded that there are punishments that are more barbarous than the
infliction of death as such57 and, in so doing followed a long line of precedent
including Kemmler58 and Trop.59 Despite such legal precedent, it may truly be
questioned whether there is any punishment which exceeds death itself in
barbarity in the mind of the prisoner who, after all, must undergo the punish-
ment.60
Another argument supporting the position that the death penalty is uncon-
stitutional per se asserts that capital punishment "has been almost totally re-
jected by contemporary society."' Justices Brennan and Marshall saw an
and in its enormity. No other existing punishment is comparable to death in terms of physical
and mental suffering." 408 U.S. at 287. It has been found that even modern, "humane"
methods of execution result in physical torture. See Comment, The Death Penalty Cases,
56 Calif. L. Rev. 1268, 1338-42 (1968). In addition, the condemned man may be subjected to
torturous mental suffering. Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890); Note, Mental Suffering Under
Sentence of Death: A Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 57 Iowa L. Rev. 814 (1972). In
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950) (dissenting opinion), it was noted that "the onset of
insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not a rare phenomenon." Id. at 14.
53. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (special jury requirements); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (concurring opinion) (procedures generally) ; Buto v. Illinois,
333 U.S. 640, 674 (1948) (right to counsel) ; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932) (right to counsel); cf. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955); Stein v. New
York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (1953), overruled, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) ; Andres v.
United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752 (1948).
54. "As all practicing lawyers know, who have defended persons charged with capital
offenses, often the only goal possible is to avoid the death penalty." Griffin v. Illnois, 351 U.S.
12, 28 (1956) (Burton & Minton, JJ., dissenting).
55. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958), quoted in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. 408 U.S. at 272-73. Brennan goes on to say: "The calculated killing of a human being
by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity." Id.
at 290.
57. "[Capital punishment) is not a punishment such as burning at the stake that every-
one would ineffably find to be repugnant to all civilized standards." 408 U.S. at 385 (1972)
(Burger, C. J., dissenting).
58. 136 U.S. at 447. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
59. 356 U.S. at 99. See notes 24-30 supra and accompanying text.
60. Cf. Commonwealth v. Elliott, 371 Pa. 70, 79-80, 89 A.2d 782, 787 (1952) (dissenting
opinion).
61. 408 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall stated that "the average
citizen would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense of justice." Id. at
[Vol. 41
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historical trend toward absolute abolition of the death penalty.6- This trend is
relevant in view of the holding in Weems that public opinion serves to clarify
the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishments clause'03 and in view of the
fact that such a trend accentuates the cruelty of the executions that continue
to take place.3 Popular rejection of the death penalty is by no means a foregone
conclusion, however. Capital punishment has recently been approved by a ma-
jority of the people in public referenda in several states65 Although it may be
argued that referenda and public opinion polls are meaningless in this context,
because people are generally uninformed on the shortcomings of capital punish-
ment,66 such an argument lends no support to the contention that capital punish-
ment is totally rejected by contemporary society. Justice Powell cited recent
federal legislation providing for the death penalty for certain crimes 7 as further
evidence that the death penalty is not "virtually unanimously repudiated and
condemned by the conscience of contemporary society.108
In view of the strong antipathy toward capital punishment prevalent in many
circles, it would seem that the death penalty has some redeeming qualities which
have enabled it to withstand the onslaughts of those who would abolish it. One
of these qualities is its efficacy in giving retribution to those who have committed
abominable acts. According to Justice Stewart, retribution is essential to the
preservation of the social order and its essentiality stems from the very nature
of man.69 Retribution, however, is no longer a popular goal of punishment.
369. See also Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96 (6th Cir.), cert, denied 355 U.S. 834
(1957); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 344 U.S.
838 (1952).
62. 408 U.S. at 295-99 (Brennan, J., concurring) ; id. at 333-42 (Marshall, J., concurring);
see Black, The Crisis in Capital Punishment, 31 'Ad. L. Rev. 289, 303 (1971) ("The ecumeni-
cal movement of history is strongly and unambiguously against the retention of capital
punishment.").
63. 217 U.S. at 378.
64. "In the United States, even before the recent judicial stays, capital punishment had
become vestigial-a token payment, as it were, to some sinister lurking creditor, made at
fearful cost to a few." Black, supra note 62, at 303.
65. Justice Powell cited referenda in Oregon (1964), Colorado (1966), Mlassachusetts
(1968), and Illinois (1970). 408 U.S. at 438-39. Following the Furman decision, a public
opinion poll showed that the people of California overwhelmingly favored the retention of
the death penalty. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1972, at 67, col 3. In a recent nationwide Gallup poll,
579 of those surveyed favored the death penalty for murderers, the highest figure in almost
twenty years. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1973, at 6, col 4.
66. 408 U.S. at 361-62 (Marshall, J., concurring).
67. Presidential Assassination Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1970); Congressional Assassina-
tion Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1970); Aircraft Piracy Statute, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1970).
68. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 21, Aikens v. California, 406 US. 813 (1972), quoted
in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 441 (Powell, J., dissenting). justice Powell noted that
juries returned over one thousand death sentences during the 1960's. 403 U.S. at 441.
69. 408 U.S. at 308. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart remarked: "The instinct
for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration
of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society
governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unnilling or unable
19731
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Justice Marshall described retribution as "purposeless vengenance,"70 a vestige
of a more primitive stage of our history.71 Those who take Marshall's view
emphasize that other goals of punishment now occupy the paramount position
once held by retribution,"2 and assert that retribution is an indefensible ground
for the execution of a human being.73
A penal goal more generally accepted than retribution is deterrence, 74 and
one would suppose that the death penalty is a more effective deterrent than any
other punishment a prospective criminal faces. Strangely, however, the available
statistics do not bear this out.75 "[T]here is no clear evidence in any of the
figures that the abolition of the death penalty has ever led to an increase in the
rate of homicide or that its restoration has ever led to a fall."70 Although a num-
ber of studies have been made, their results are largely inconclusive; the only
basis for asserting that capital punishment is a superior deterrent remains an
intuitive one.77 In view of the lack of any conclusive evidence that capital
punishment has a greater deterrent effect than its less gruesome counterparts,
theories have been advanced to explain why the prospect of death should not be
expected to deter a murderer any more than the prospect of a life behind bars.
The crux of these theories is that the last thing a murderer thinks about, if he
is capable of thinking about anything at all at the time of the murder, is the
price he will pay for his crime.78 This is, of course, sheer speculation, but
speculation rather than knowledge dominates this area.
to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds
of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law." Id. Chief Justice Burger added
that "[t]here is no authority suggesting that the Eighth Amendment was intended to purge
the law of its retributive elements . . . ." Id. at 394. Justice White assumed the existence of a
need for retribution. Id. at 311.
70. Id. at 363.
71. See id. "Retaliation, vengeance, and retribution have been roundly condemned as
intolerable aspirations for a government in a free society." Id. at 343; see Reichert, Capital
Punishment Reconsidered, 47 Ky. L.J. 397, 399 (1959).
72. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
73. Reichert, supra note 71, at 399.
74. A third major purpose of sentencing, rehabilitation, is obviously not advanced by the
death penalty. A fourth purpose, isolation of dangerous individuals, does not require It. See
generally J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 297-309 (2d ed. 1960).
75. Hart, Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52
Nw. U.L. Rev. 433, 456 (1957).
76. Id.; see 408 U.S. at 349-53 (Marshall, J., concurring).
77. Hochkammer, The Capital Punishment Controversy, in Capital Punishment 68 (J.
McCafferty ed. 1972) ; see Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 Calif L. Rev. 1268, 1275-92
(1968). The Furman decision will probably spawn a fresh supply of statistics.
78. 408 U.S. at 354-55 n.125 (Marshall, J., concurring). "[M]urder is committed to a
very large extent either by persons who, though sane, do not in fact count the cost, or are so
mentally deranged that they cannot count it." Hart, supra note 75, at 459. There are excep-
tions to the rule. Soon after the Furman decision, an armed bank robber threatening to
kill his hostages was quoted as saying: "The Supreme Court will let me get away with this.
• . . There's no death penalty. It's ridiculous. I can shoot everyone here, then throw my
gun down and walk out and they can't put me in the electric chair." N.Y. Times, Aug. 23,
1972, at 45, col. 3. .
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The disagreement concerning whether capital punishment should be used as
a vehicle of retribution and the confusion over its value as a deterrent give rise
to the more general question of whether capital punishment does have any
legitimate penal purpose. Justice Marshall argued that it does not and that it
is therefore unconstitutional, independently of its inherent cruelty or its general
unpopularity, because it is excessive.79 Excessiveness for Marshall transcended
the narrow concept of disproportionality between crime and punishment s ° and
encompassed all situations where the punishment inflicted simply furthered no
end.8' Marshall's conception of excessiveness as it relates to the eighth amend-
ment was practically an original one,8 2 and Chief Justice Burger did not hesitate
to point this out, asserting that "[t]he Eighth Amendment ...was included
in the Bill of Rights to guard against the use of torturous and inhuman punish-
ments, not those of limited efficacy. ' 's3 Not only did the Chief Justice attack
the view that the cruel and unusual punishments clause is concerned with "social
utility"8 4 but he felt that under such a view, all punishments would be con-
stitutionally suspect as no more of a deterrent than some lesser punishment.
The courts, the Chief Justice concluded, would be unable to deal with questions
such as these.8 5 If Marshall's own test of excessiveness is indeed unworkable,
it is difficult to see how the death penalty can be considered excessive under
the traditional test, i.e., disproportionality, in view of the current restriction of
the death penalty to cases involving the most serious of crimes.80
The per se unconstitutionality of the death penalty, espoused so vigorously by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, was not even considered by the three other
concurring justices. As Justice Stewart phrased it, "[t]he constitutionality of
79. 408 U.S. at 331. Marshall relied on the entire eighth amendment: "It should also be
noted that the 'cruel and unusual' language of the Eighth Amendment immediately follows
language that prohibits excessive bail and excessive fines. The entire thrust of the Eighth
Amendment is, in short, against 'that which is excessive." Id. at 332 (italics omitted). But
see note 4 supra and accompanying text.
80. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 338-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting); see Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
81. Marshall's excessiveness approach resembles the "irrationality" argument used to strike
down laws under fourteenth amendment substantive due process. See Packer, Making the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1074 (1964).
82. Most cases that have stricken down punishments as excessive have involved dis-
proportionality. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 US. 889 (1963) (dissenting opinion);
Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 US. 942 (1972), (holding
that the death penalty is excessive for rape where the rapist did not threaten or endanger
the life of his victim).
83. 408 U.S. at 391.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 396.
86. "Since today the death penalty is rarely imposed for crimes in which human life is
in no way threatened, the Supreme Court could well hold the proportionality requirement
to be valid without solving the truly important problems of capital punishment which are
of current concern." Comment, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment-From Wrker-
son to Witherspoon and Beyond, 14 St. Louis U.LJ. 463, 472 (1970). See also C. Tiedeman,
A Treatise on the Limitations of Police Power in the United States § 11, at 21-22 (1886).
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capital punishment in the abstract is not, however, before us in these cases."18 7
Justices White and Douglas agreed,8 8 choosing to limit their opinions to the
constitutionality of the death penalty as it is presently administered. The con-
clusion they reached lay at the heart of the Furman decision and was best
expressed by Justice Stewart:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders
in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been
imposed.... I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot
tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this
unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.8 9
The death penalty was thus found unacceptable because it was inflicted arbi-
trarily, as evidenced by the extremely low rate of executions in proportion to
the number of cases where the death penalty was available.00 Although Justice
Burger argued that the low rate is attributable to careful juries,90 a recent study
has indicated that juries do not follow rational patterns in imposing the death
sentence.9 2 This is exemplified by the case of Furman himself, who took the life
of another under circumstances which were not exceptionally horrible or out-
rageous.
3
The relationship between arbitrary punishments and the cruel and unusual
punishments clause is not entirely clear. Justice Stewart's "struck by lightning"
analogy seemed to suggest that an arbitrary punishment is unconstitutional by
virtue of its very nature.94 Justice White adopted a more practical view. He
87. 408 U.S. at 308. Earlier in his opinion (408 U.S. at 306), Justice Stewart cited
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring), which stated that "[the Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it'" and that "[tihe Court will not 'formulate a rule
of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.'" Id. at 346-47.
88. Justice White stated: "That question [the per se constitutionality of the death
penality] is not presented by these cases and need not be decided." 408 U.S. at 311. Justice
Douglas likewise does not reach the broader question. Id. at 257.
89. Id. at 309-10 (footnotes omitted).
90. "When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which
it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily.
Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system." Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
91. "The very infrequency of death penalties imposed by jurors attests their cautious and
discriminating reservation of that penalty for the most extreme cases." Id. at 402.
92. Note, A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-Degree-Murder Cases, 21 Stan.
L. Rev. 1297 (1969). The study also indicated that the juries did follow some irrational
patterns; for instance, they were more lenient with white collar workers than with blue
collar workers. Id.
93. The evidence established that Furman killed his victim in the course of committing
a felony (burglary) but did not establish that he did so intentionally. Furman v. State, 225
Ga. 253, 254, 167 S.E.2d 628, 629 (1969).
94. See text accompanying note 89 supra. But cf. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126,
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believed that an arbitrary punishment neither satisfies society's need for retribu-
tion nor acts as an appreciable deterrent.05 Justice Douglas took the most daring
approach, asserting that "the basic theme of equal protection is implicit in
'cruel and unusual' punishments" and that any arbitrarily imposed punishment
necessarily violates equal protection. 0 The reasoning behind this view is that
one who is arbitrarily chosen to receive the punishment is not receiving the
same protection as one in the same position who is arbitrarily not chosen. The
argument becomes dearer when members of an identifiable group tend to be
burdened with a particular penalty. Justice Douglas felt that the poor, the black,
and the underprivileged were saddled with the death penalty, while rich whites
were virtually exempt.9 7 The apparent weakness in his position is that these
"persecuted minorities" are the very people who commit most capital crimes.
There is statistical evidence, however, that blacks, at least, have been dis-
criminated against in death sentencing solely on the basis of race. 8 In reply to
this, Justice Powell argued that discrimination which may have existed in the
past does not justify the elimination of all present death sentences, since it does
not prove discrimination in these particular cases.09 Discrimination in a given
case, however, is not susceptible to proof.100
Arbitrariness in infliction of the death penalty has not come about through
135-36 (1903), where the Court said: "[t]hat for other offenses, which may be considered
by most, if not all, of a more grievous character, less punishments have been inflicted does
not make this sentence cruel Undue leniency in one case does not transform a reasonable
punishment in another case to a cruel one."
95. 408 U.S. at 311-12. "[Its imposition would then be the pointless and needless
extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernable social or public
purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and
cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 312. The resem-
blance to Justice Marshall's "excessiveness" argument for the per se abolition of capital
punishment is unmistakable. See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra. See also 403 U.S. at
303-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
96. 408 U.S. at 249; cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 341 (1942) (disparate
punishments for similar crimes).
97. 408 U.S. at 255-56. "A law that stated that anyone making more than $50,000 would
be exempt from the death penalty would plainly fall, as would a law that in terms said that
blacks, those who never went beyond the fifth grade in school, or those who made less
than $3,000 a year, or those who were unpopular or unstable should be the only people
executed. A law which in the overall view reaches that result in practice has no more
sanctity than a law which in terms provides the same." Id. at 256 (footnote omitted). A law
which is fair on its face may be administered in such fasion as to amount to a denial of equal
protection. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). Justice Marshall also saw
capital punishment as an instrument of discrimination. 408 U.S. at 363-66.
98. Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey 1907-1960, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 18-21 (1964);
see Bennett, The Death Penalty, in Capital Punishment 145 (J. McCafferty ed. 1972).
99. 408 U.S. at 450; see id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d
138 (8th Cir. 1968).
100. Justice Powell did not suggest another way to demonstrate such discrimination,
although he stated that if discrimination were found, "a constitutional violation might be
established." 408 U.S. at 449.
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some insidious defect in our criminal justice system. On the contrary, arbitrari-
ness is mandated by our laws-laws that provide no definite standards for
determining whether one convicted of a capital offense shall live or die but
which simply leave the question to the jury. 01 In McGautla v. California,'"° the
Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not
militate against the practice of leaving the question of whether to impose the
death penalty "to the untrammeled discretion of the jury'1103 and even sug-
gested that this was the most desirable method.10 4 McGautha, however, was
decided strictly on due process grounds;' 05 Furman demonstrated that what is
not a violation of due process may nevertheless be cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The dissenters saw the Furman holding as an attack upon the jury sys-
tem 06 insofar as it divested the jury of the power to "express the conscience
of the community on the ultimate question of life or death."''1 ° They also
raised the possibility that the decision would cause the return of the mandatory
death penalty which, the Court has implied, may be the only constitutional form
of capital punishment. 08 That, of course, would be the epitome of irony.
In the face of these multiple assaults upon the constitutionality of the death
penalty, the dissenters in Furman relied most heavily on one fundamental argu-
ment-that the question of whether capital punishment should be eliminated is
a legislative rather than a judicial one.109 Stare decisis, they claimed, dictates
adherence to the traditional case by evaluation of penalties as opposed to the
101. "tOlf the nearly 4,000 executions in this country since 1930 no more than ten
percent have been for crimes which carry a mandatory death penalty." Bedau, The Courts,
the Constitution and Capital Punishment, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 201, 204.
102. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
103. "[We find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion
of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything
in the Constitution." Id. at 207.
104. "For a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate factors in this elusive area could
inhibit rather than expand the scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would
ever be really complete." Id. at 208.
105. The grant of certiorari was limited to the question of whether a death sentence
imposed at the absolute discretion of the jury violated the due process clause. McGautha v.
California, cert. granted, 398 U.S. 936 (1970), aff'd 402 U.S. 183 (1971). In Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Court held that it violated due process to leave the defen-
dant's fate to a jury from which all those with any qualms about capital punishment had
been systematically excluded. While striking down the "hanging jury," the Court approved
of the discretionary death penalty in general. Id. at 519-20.
106. 408 U.S. at 402 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
107. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
108. justice Powell noted that existing statutes that provide for mandatory death
sentences (e.g., Rhode Island's statute for murder by a life prisoner) are not struck down by
the Court's holding. 408 U.S. at 417 n.2. justice Blackmun saw the Furman holding as
dictating an elimination of the element of mercy from any acceptable capital punishment
statute. Id. at 413. In effect, the dissenters were accusing the apparently more liberal majority
of encouraging regressive legislation.
109. See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 383, 396 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
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elimination of an entire class of punishments with one fell swoop. °10 The Furman
decision appeared to them to be in callous disregard of well established principles
of judicial restraintll"--"not an act of judgment, but rather an act of will." ' "-
To argue, as the dissenters have done, that the majority's decision has
usurped the function of the legislature is to miss the point entirely. The cruel
and unusual punishments clause is a shifting standard molded by the moral
values of contemporary society 113 It may come about that the legislature will
provide for a penalty that is in fact cruel and unusual in order to serve what
it feels are the ends of society. Yet the Constitution expressly condemns the
imposition of such punishment, notwithstanding that the legislators and even
the people are willing to impose them. It is therefore the function of the Court
to determine whether the penalty has touched upon the prohibition of the
clause.1 14
What Furman has held is that the death penalty has become cruel and unusual
under a set of circumstances which give rise to the inference of arbitrary inflic-
tion. As to the constitutional status of capital punishment in the absence of
these circumstances, all that Furman tells us is that four justices"5 would sus-
tain the death penalty and two would not."0 The future of capital punish-
ment, then, should hinge on the reactions of justices Douglas, Stewart, and
White to statutes that provide a mandatory death penalty for a strictly limited
class of crimes; 117 the passage of such laws seems almost certain." 8 Although
110. See id. at 430-31 (Powell, J., dissenting). But see id. at 329-30 (Marshall, J., con-
curring).
111. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 128 (1958) (dissenting opinion); Blodgett v. Holden,
275 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). "[W]hile unconstitutional exercise of
power by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial
restraint, the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint."
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
112. 408 U.S. at 468 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 US. 86
(1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
114. "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officils
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
115. Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist.
116. justices Brennan and MAarshall.
117. Statutes providing for a death sentence imposed by a jury acting under guiding
instructions seem less likely because of the difficulty of formulating proper instructions.
However, even if such statutes were enacted, their effect would be similar to that of statutes
providing for a mandatory death penalty, since in either case the death penalty would be
imposed under a rigidly prescribed set of circumstances. See generally McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
118. The Florida legislature has recently passed a law reinstating capital punishment for
premeditated murder, felony murder, child rape, and the sale of heroin resulting in death.
"The bill also requires that a jury will issue an advisory sentence of life or death and a
circuit judge will then approve or reverse the jury's recommendation." N.Y. Times, Dec. 2,
1972, at 21, cols. 4-5. Since it does not provide for a mandatory death penalty, the constitu-
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the general tenor of Justice Douglas' opinion and his strong liberal inclination
suggest that he would reject a mandatory death penalty, the same cannot be
said of Justices Stewart and White. On the contrary, their repeated statements
in Furman that they are not ruling on the constitutionality of capital punish-
ment per se as well as their acceptance of the goal of retribution lead one to
believe that they would not hold a mandatory death penalty unconstitutional.
Of course, such a decision by either one of them would probably result in the
return of the death penalty 19 along with a definitive statement by the Court
that death is not cruel and unusual punishment, at least within the meaning of
the eighth amendment.
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Neither Statement of Reasons nor
Administrative Hearing Required Before Nonrenewal of Nontenured
Teacher's Contract.-Plaintiff, hired by Wisconsin State University as an
assistant professor for one academic year, was notified by the university president
that he would not be retained for the subsequent academic year. Since he was not
tenured' he was offered neither reasons for his nonretention nor an opportunity
for a hearing. Plaintiff then brought an action in a federal district court under
section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code,2 alleging that his nonretention was
occasioned by his criticism of the university administration and consequently that
it was in violation of his constitutional rights. This constitutional claim was never
decided because the district court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, held that minimal procedural due process required both a state-
ment of reasons and a hearing3 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
plaintiff was not entitled to these safeguards because he had not "shown that he
tionality of this law is highly questionable. It also appears likely that the death penalty will
soon be reinstated for certain federal crimes. See N.Y. Times. Jan. 5, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
119. A resolution recommending a mandatory death penalty for specified offenses was
recently approved by the National Association of Attorneys General. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7,
1972, at 30, col. 4.
1. Law of Jan. 6, 1966, ch. 497, § 1, [19661 Wis. Laws 779, as amended, Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 37.31 (Supp. 1972). Under the statute then in force tenured teachers were entitled to a
statement of charges and a bearing, but no similar protection was afforded a probationary
teacher. In fact, Board of Regents Rules specifically provided that no reasons or review need
be given in the case of nonretention of a probationary teacher. See Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566-68 n.4 (1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress."
3. Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 806 (7th
Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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was deprived of liberty or property protected by the Fourteenth AmendmenL"4
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Tenure statutes which have been enacted in most states usually provide that
after a public school teacher has been employed on probation for a specified
number of years, he is entitled to tenure and thereafter can be dismissed only for
cause. The term "cause" itself implies the availability of procedural safeguards to
establish cause.6 Probationary teachers, however, are often afforded no procedural
safeguards.Y
Some states provide a hearing for a probationary teacher who is dismissed in
the middle of a school year. A New York court, however, held that a school
teacher could be dismissed without a formal hearing before the expiration of his
probationary period.8 Other states require no procedures other than timely notice
prior to the end of the school year.9 Some states require that a statement of rea-
sons be given to the probationary teacher,10 but this requirement is not meant to
imply that justification of the reasons must also be given.1 ' Other states have
4. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 US. 564, 579 (1972).
5. For a listing of tenure statutes see Note, Non-Tenured Teachers and Due Process:
The Right to a Hearing and Statement of Reasons, 29 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 100, 100-01 n.2
(1972). See also Frakt, Non-Tenure Teachers and the Constitution, 18 U. Kan. L. Rev. 27,
28-32 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Frakt].
6. See Shurtleff v. United States, 189 US. 311, 314 (1903); Reagan v. United States, 182
U.S. 419, 425 (1901) ; Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1159 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 US. 843 (1969).
7. See, e.g., note 1 supra.
8. Butler v. Allen, 29 App. Div. 2d 799, 287 N.YS.2d 197 (3d Dep't 1968). New York law
provides that a probationary teacher can be dismissed at any time during his probationary
period by a majority vote of the board of education, upon a recommendation from the
superintendent of schools. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 2573(1)v 3012(1) (Mcinney Supp. 1972).
However, an interesting situation has arisen in New York City. Due to the decentralization
of the city's school system, greater procedural safeguards were needed for the protection of
probationary teachers. A New York court called attention to the fact that termination of a
probationary teacher resulted in revocation of his teaching license. Before decentralization,
the dismissal of a teacher prevented him from obtaining employment in any of the city
schools, so the revocation of his teaching license was a redundant act. However, after
decentralization, if a teacher were dismissed by one district, he could still be reemployed by
any of the other community districts provided he had a license. Therefore, the revocation of
his license now deprived the teacher of a substantial interest. Accordingly, the court held
he was entitled to a full hearing to protect this interest. Greenwald v. Community School Bd.,
69 Misc. 2d 238, 329 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
9. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 38.83 (1967); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189:14-a (1964);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3319.11 (Page 1972).
10. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-259 (1956); IlI. Ann. Stat. ch. 122, § 24-11 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1972); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 342.513 (1971).
11. The Arizona statute was interpreted by that state's highest court as meaning that
although a nonretention notice was invalid without a statement of reasons, such a statement
only had to be general in scope in order to give the teacher a notice of his inadequacies. The
court made it clear that the school board would not have to demonstrate that good cause
existed for the termination. School Dist. v. Superior Ct., 102 Ariz. 478, 433 P.2d 28 (1967).
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adopted informal safeguards. Nevada, for example, provides that a teacher be
advised of the reasons for the recommendation of nonretention and be given an
opportunity to reply prior to formal school board action. 12 The Alaska statute en-
titles a probationary teacher to a statement of reasons and an informal hearing,18
but prior to an amendment in 1968, the probationary teacher was entitled to the
same full hearing as the tenured teacher.14 Connecticut requires not only a state-
ment of reasons and a hearing with a right to counsel but also access to adminis-
trative reports in the teacher's record. 5 The California statute mandates a
statement of reasons and an opportunity for a hearing at which cause must be
shown for the nonretention decision. 16 Though no formal tenure system has been
legislated in Delaware and Washington, both states require that a statement of
reasons and a hearing be given all nonretained teachers.17
The various state statutory schemes have sought to strike a balance between
the teacher's interest in retaining his job or knowing the reasons for his non-
retention, and the school board's interest in having extensive discretion in re-
hiring or not rehiring probationary teachers with a view toward maintaining a
high quality faculty. But when and under what circumstances must a nonretained
teacher be accorded a hearing or at least a statement of reasons for his dismissal?
When do the procedural safeguards of due process of law become his as of right?
The U.S. Supreme Court in Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy"8 dealt
not with a state school teacher but with a cook in a food concession on a military
installation who was denied a security clearance and thereby deprived of access
to her place of employment. The Court held that she was not entitled to a hear-
ing respecting the reasons for the denial of a security clearance' 0 because she
was deprived of the right to work at but one specific job and was not deprived
of "the right to follow a chosen trade or profession. °20 The Court, applying a
12. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 391.3197 (1971).
13. Alaska Stat. § 14.20.175 (1970).
14. Id. (ed. comment), § 14.20.180 (ed. comment).
15. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 10-151, 10-151a (Supp. 1973). See Drown v. Portsmouth
School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971), for a
discussion of the advisability of providing the teacher with access to these reports.
16. Cal. Educ. Code § 13443 (West 1969). In construing this code provision, the Supreme
Court of California recently decided that a probationary teacher facing dismissal must be
accorded an opportunity at an "administrative hearing to present evidence tending to show
that he was dismissed not for reasons stated in the accusation but for the exercise of con-
stitutional rights, [and that this] evidence must be received substantively and findings must
be made concerning it." Bekiaris v. Board of Educ., 6 Cal. 3d 575, 592, 493 P.2d 480, 491,
100 Cal. Rptr. 16, 27 (1972).
17. Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, §§ 1410, 1413 (Supp. 1970); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 28A.67.070 (1970).
18. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
19. Id. at 897-98.
20. Id. at 895-96. The Cafeteria Workers case represented a departure from the decision In
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), where the Court held that an aeronautical engineer
was entitled to a full-blown hearing because "the revocation of security clearance . . . has
seriously affected, if not destroyed, his ability to obtain employment in the aeronautics field."
[Vol. 41
CASE NOTES
balance test, concluded that her interest in keeping one specific job was not
sufficient to outweigh contravening governmental security interests.2'
This balancing test was greatly emphasized in teacher nonretention cases in
three different circuits, 22 with different results in each case. In Orr v. Trinter 2a
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a probationary teacher's
interest in receiving a statement of reasons and a hearing respecting his non-
retention was outweighed by the school board's interest in discretionary hiring
practices.2 4
In Drown v. Portsmouth School District,1 the First Circuit required a state-
ment of reasons, but not a hearing. The court considered at length the competing
interests of the teacher and the school board. It noted that a statement of reasons
could give the teacher an opportunity to convince the school board that its de-
cision was based on mistaken facts, or it could provide him with evidence that
his dismissal was in violation of his constitutional rights. This statement could
also inform him of his shortcomings for subsequent self-improvement, or could
possibly even serve as a recommendation to a future employer, where for e-xample,
the stated reasons cited the teacher as too innovative.2 0 The court concluded that
the slight administrative burden imposed upon the school board in furnishing a
statement of reasons and affording the teacher access to evaluation reports was
outweighed by the enumerated interests of the probationary teacher.-
Id. at 492. The Greene case was distinguished by the Cafeteria Workers Court on other
grounds, 367 U.S. at 889-90; but it could also have been distinguished on the ground of
opportunity for similar employment. Id. at 898-99 & n.10. For a comparison of these two
cases, see Comment, Constitutional Problems in the Nonretention of Probationary Teachers,
1971 U. Ill. L.F. 508, 509-11.
21. 367 U.S. at 895-96. This balancing test requires that a determination of "what pro-
cedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action." Id. at 89S.
22. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 403 U.S. $64
(1972); Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128, 135 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40S U.S. 943 (1972);
Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1184-88 (Ist Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 972 (1971).
23. 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
24. 444 F.2d at 135.
25. 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
26. Id. at 1184-85.
27. Id.; see Frakt, supra note 5, at 52. However, the fear has been expressed that a state-
ment of reasons will lead inevitably to a defense of these reasons before various administrative
panels and courts. Kahn & Solomon, Untenured Professors' Rights to Reappointment, 20
Clev. State L. Rev. 522, 531 (1971). This argument can be rebutted by the experience of the
many states that have enacted statutes requiring a statement of reasons. See, e.g., note 10
supra and accompanying text. The American Association of University Professors was con-
cerned that a nonretention notice with a statement of reasons would be confused with a dis-
missal for cause and erode the distinction between tenured and probationary teachers.
Nevertheless, it "concluded that the reasons in support of the faculty member's being
informed outweigh the countervailing risks." Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure,
1973]
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On the other hand, the court, again balancing interests, refused to mandate a
hearing. Administrators might be inclined to tolerate incompetent, or marginally
competent, teachers rather than encounter the expense and discomfort of a
hearing. And they might be unwilling to hire innovative teachers who could be
the cause of future trouble. 28 The court stated that, although a teacher's allega-
tion of a violation of constitutional rights would not be adequately answered by a
statement of reasons, the teacher, unburdened by double hearings,29 would have
adequate recourse to the federal courts.
In Roth v. Board of Regents, 0 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the district court's determination that the balancing test required a hear-
ing as well as a statement of reasons.31 The district court had found that the
plaintiff's interest in his teaching position was greater than the corresponding
interest of the cook in the Cafeteria Workers case. 2 It had also decided that the
government's interest in authoritarian control of its military bases was greater
than a state's interest in authoritarian control of its schools.83 It further ruled
that a nonretention decision could not be made on a "basis wholly unsupported
in fact, or on a basis wholly without reason."3 4 This language was adopted by the
American Ass'n of Univ. Professors Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of
Faculty Appointments, 56 A.A.U.P. Bull. 21, 23 (1970).
28. 435 F.2d at 1186. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressed a similar
concern that the requirement of a hearing "would nullify the probationary system, whose
purpose is to provide the school board a short-term test period during which the fledgling
teacher may be examined, evaluated, and, if found wanting for any constitutional reason, not
rehired." Thaw v. Board of Pub. Instr., 432 F.2d 98, 100 (6th Cir. 1970); accord, Roth v.
Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (Duffy, J.,
dissenting); Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128, 134-35 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
943 (1972); Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1160 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969); Note, Non-Tenure Teachers: Procedural Rights Upon Dismissal,
3 Loyola ULJ. 114, 131 (1972).
29. 435 F.2d at 1186-87. However, action subsequent to termination might be too little
to protect the teacher's interests. See Van Astyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and
Professors, 1970 Duke L.J. 841, 858 [hereinafter cited as Van Alstynel. Professor Van
Alstyne's reasoning is that court litigation may be too costly for the individual teacher, and,
the inherent delay in judicial proceedings may prevent him from resuming his duties at the
same institution since a final judgment may not be reached until years after the teacher has
been separated from his position. Id. at 859-60. However, there is precedent for the proposi-
tion that the teacher could get a temporary court injunction staying the nonretentlon until
final judgment in the § 1983 action. Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565, 566 (1st Cir. 1971); see
Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1335 (1972).
30. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
31. Id. at 809.
32. Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972, 978 (W.D. Wis. 1970), aft'd, 446 F.2d
806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The court also felt that "non-retention by
one university or college creates concrete and practical difficulties for a professor In his
subsequent academic career." Id. at 979.
33. Id. at 978.
34. Id. at 979. The court noted that the basis for dismissal did not have to be as severe
as the standard of "cause" for tenured teachers and the courts would "be bound to respect
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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit35 in affirming the district court's decision.
The underlying issue of whether, in fact, the plaintiff had been illegally dismissed
because of his exercise of the right of free speech had not been litigated in the
district court.30 6 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit suggested, as an additional
reason for requiring a pre-termination hearing, that "it serves as a prophylactic
against non-retention decisions improperly motivated by exercise of protected
rights." 37
The Supreme Court has heretofore ruled that a teacher cannot be dismissed
because of his exercise of constitutional rights38 unless it can also be shown that
his comments or actions substantially interfere with the orderly operation of the
school3 9 A violation of this rule would undoubtedly give the teacher a right to
an action under section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code; 40 however, the
question remained whether it would also entitle him to an administrative hearing
as of right upon a mere allegation of such a constitutional violation."
In Freeman v. Gould Special School District,+s the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit stated that since the plaintiff teachers had failed to prove racial
discrimination in their termination, there was no federal question remaining in
their contention that they were arbitrarily denied due process under the four-
teenth amendment. 43 The applicable Arkansas statute" provided no safeguard
other than notice a specified time before nonretention; there was no requirement
of a hearing as of right. The court reasoned that "[absent civil service or tenure]
provisions a public employee has no right to continued public employment, except
insofar as he may not be dismissed or failed [sic] to be rehired for impermissible
constitutional reasons, such as race, religion, or the assertion of rights guaranteed
by law or the Constitution." 45
The court cited the need for school board discretion, which was recognized by
state statute, and concluded, contrary to the Seventh Circuit in Roth, that absent
bases for non-retention enjoying minimal factual support and bases for non-retention sup-
ported by subtle reasons." Id.
35. 446 F.2d at 808.
36. 310 F. Supp. at 983.
37. 446 F.2d at 810; cf. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 944 (5th Cir. 1970).
38. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 US. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Slochower v. Board
of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 US. 183 (1952). The
Shelton and Keyishian decisions were specifically concerned with the situation of nontenured
teachers whose contracts were not renewed because of their exercise of first and fourteenth
amendment rights.
39. See Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)
(plaintiffs were students, not teachers); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 US. 563, 572-73
(1968); Frakt, supra note 5, at 32; Van Alstyne, supra note 29, at 848-54.
40. See note 2 supra.
41. See text accompanying notes 73-76 infra.
42. 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 US. 843 (1969).
43. Id. at 1156-57.
44. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1304(b) (Supp. 1971); see 405 F.2d at 1160 n.6.
45. 405 F.2d at 1159.
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the civil rights issue there was no general due process right under the fourteenth
amendment on a claim of arbitrary nonretention.40
In Jones v. Hopper,47 the Tenth Circuit ruled that a teacher had a right of
action under section 1983 only if he had been deprived of guaranteed "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Federal Constitution and laws."' 48 The
plaintiff had maintained that he was deprived of his right of "expectancy to
continued employment"4 9 when he was allegedly not retained for a third year
because of his exercise of free speech. The court, however, held that any ex-
pectancy right must arise from the conditions of previous appointment; and the
plaintiff had no such right in this case because he was hired without a contract
under a statutory provision which vested complete discretion in the college board
of trustees to deny reemployment to teachers.60 The court cited the need for such
discretion and concluded that the exercise of this discretion could not constitute
a violation of section 1983r1 in the absence of "unreasonable conditions ... im-
posed upon the granting of public employment."r' 2
The "expectancy of reemployment" concept was further developed in two
Fifth Circuit decisions. In Ferguson v. Thomas,53 it was applied to require a
statement of reasons and a hearing for a nonretained professor who had been
employed at the same institution for nine years on one-year contracts with no
tenure provisions. The expectancy was created by the prevailing practices of the
institution which required a demonstration of cause for the nonretention of such
a professor.54 In Lucas v. Chapman,", the court held that continuous employ-
ment for eleven years on short-term contracts was sufficient to give a teacher the
"necessary expectancy of reemployment that constituted a protectible interest."5 0
With its decisions in Board of Regents v. Roth,5 7 and the companion case of
Perry v. Sindermann,5 8 the Supreme Court has now eliminated some of the con-
fusion resulting from the conflicts among the circuits. In Roth, the Court dis-
carded or avoided the Cafeteria Workers balancing test,19 changing the emphasis
46. Id. at 1160-61.
47. 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970).
48. 410 F.2d at 1326.
49. Id. at 1327.
50. Id. at 1328-29.
51. Id. at 1329.
52. Id. at 1328. The court stated that no "unreasonable conditions" were alleged In the
case. Id. Apparently the court would require that explicit conditions be imposed upon the
"granting" of employment. The mere allegations of an unconstitutional termination that were
made in this case were not considered sufficient to establish jurisdiction under § 1983, absent
a protectible interest in continued employment. See notes 64-66 & 73-76 infra and accompany-
ing text.
53. 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
54. Id. at 856.
55. 430 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1970).
56. Id. at 947.
57. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
58. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
59. See note 21 supra.
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from the relative weights of the interests involved to the very nature of the
interests themselves. 60 Mr. Justice Stewart reasoned that an individual is entitled
to procedural due process protection of his interests only "if the interest is
within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property."a A
weighing of interests would be appropriate only to determine the form of a
hearing once it has been determined that a hearing is required.02
The Court then concluded that the plaintiff's interest in retention for the next
school year was neither a "liberty" nor "property" right under the fourteenth
amendment. His liberty had not been infringed since he suffered neither a serious
attack on his reputationa nor a loss of subsequent employment opportunities."
He had no property right in retention because the terms of his employment gave
him none. The Court stated that protectible "[p ] roperty interests . . . are not
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits." 5
60. 408 U.S. at 570-71. This shift in emphasis enabled the Court to avoid a decision on
whether or not the professional and economic interests of a teacher in retaining his position
are greater than the interests of a school board in maintaining complete discretion over the
appointment and retention of its faculty members. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying
text
61. 408 U.S. at 571. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 US. 471, 481 (1972); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
62. 408 U.S. at 570 & n.8. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), wherein
the Court held that the flexibility of due process "is in its scope once it has been determined
that some process is due; it is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural
safeguards call for the same kind of procedure."
63. 408 U.S. at 573. The Court maintained that one would have a due process right to a
hearing if his reputation were attacked. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 US. 433 (1971)
(poster identifying people as excessive drinkers) ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)
(disqualification of members of "communist-front" organizations from state employment
when no distinction was made between innocent and knowing activity). Similarly, in joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), it was held that due process
forbade the designation of organizations as communist without first affording these organiza-
tions notice and a hearing. Id. at 143 (Black, J., concurring), 165-72 (Frankfurter, J, con-
curring), 186 (Jackson, J., concurring) (separate opinions). See United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303, 316-18 (1946) (withholding of pay upon a Congressional finding of disloyalty
without the due process guarantee of judicial trial). See also Cumming v. Missouri, 71 US.
(4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866) (bill of attainder).
64. The Court stated that there was no direct state action to prevent plaintiff from finding
other employment as a teacher within the state. 408 U.S. at 573-74. A state could not exclude
a person from an entire "occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (footnote omitted). But the respondent was only
excluded from one position and the Court reasoned that "[i]t stretches the concept too far to
suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job but
remains as free as before to seek another." 408 US. at 575. See note 20 supra; Freeman v.
Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1159 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
65. 408 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
The plaintiff, however, had no contractual or statutory provision nor any
university policy or rule that gave him a property interest in retaining his job.00
The facts in the Roth case were thus readily distinguishable from those in Sinder-
mann where the plaintiff was employed in the state university system for a period
of ten years under explicit "rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered
by state officials, that may [have justified] his legitimate claim of entitlement
to continued employment absent 'sufficient cause.' ,7 Sindermann, therefore,
had a property interest in reemployment similar to that of a tenured teacher who
could only be dismissed for cause, and consequently was entitled to the due
process requirement of a hearing.08 Mr. Justice Stewart made it clear, however,
that the expectancy of reemployment rule adopted by the Fifth Circuit 0 could
not be sustained on a merely subjective basis, but could be sustained only when
the expectancy is nurtured by the institution's rules and policies."
The basic issue of whether a nonretained teacher is entitled to a statement of
reasons and a hearing is in many cases complicated by accompanying allegations
that the termination was occasioned by adverse reactions to the teacher's exercise
of constitutional rights.71 Even though a nontenured teacher is not entitled to a
66. Id. at 578. Roth's employment contract contained no renewal provision. The Wiscon-
sin tenure statute gave him no property interest in reemployment. See note 1 supra. The
Court cited its opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), wherein a welfare recipient
was held to be entitled to a hearing before his benefits could be terminated. These benefits
were considered the property of the qualified recipient because he was entitled to them by
statute. Id. at 262. See generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (termination of
unemployment compensation); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (denial of tax exemp-
tion). Similarly, the Court held that a tenured professor could not be summarily dismissed,
but instead was entitled to a "proper inquiry" to show the inconsistency of continued employ-
ment with a real interest of the state. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559
(1956).
67. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972). The Court cited the tenure guide-
lines adopted by the Coordinating Board of the Texas College and University System which
provided in part that "'[bjeginning with appointment to the rank of full-time instructor or
a higher rank, the probationary period for a faculty member shall not exceed seven years,
including within this period appropriate full-time service in all institutions of higher educa-
tion.'" Id. at 600 n.6.
68. Id. at 602-03. By recognizing the possibility of Sindermann's proving a property inter-
est in his teaching position, the Court served to undermine still further the holding that
"[government employ is not 'property' . . . . We are unable to perceive how It could be
held to be 'liberty'. Certainly it is not 'life'." Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 57 (D.C. Cir.
1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). This case was one of the
modem foundations for the so-called "right-privilege" distinction which asserted that govern.
ment employ was merely a privilege, not a right, and so was not protected by procedural due
process standards. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968), for a discussion of how this distinction
has been gradually eroded.
69. See notes 53-56 supra and accompanying text.
70. 408 U.S. at 603.
71. E.g., Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 1970). This allegation was
also made in the Roth and Sindermann cases. On the other hand, the Orr case (444 F.2d at
pretermination hearing in the absence of a protectible "liberty" or "property"
interest, he does have an action under section 1983 when he presents a clear issue
of nonretention "as a reprisal for the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights. '7 2 The issue of whether either Roth or Sindermann had, in fact, been
illegally dismissed because of their exercise of free speech had not been litigated
in either district court. Therefore, the basic issue of an illegal dismissal in viola-
tion of the first amendment was not before the Court. Nevertheless, the Court
made it clear7h that both circuits were in error in suggesting that a pre-termi-
nation hearing was required simply by virtue of allegations that the nonretention
decisions were predicated upon their exercise of free speech rightsY4
The Rotk Court stated that one may be entitled to a hearing before a state
can directly infringe upon his first amendment interest.75 There must, however,
be a direct infringement upon these interests, such as by "a seizure of books or an
injunction against meetings. Whatever may be a teacher's rights of free speech,
the interest in holding a teaching job ... is not itself a free speech interest.'70
Mr. Justice Douglas, however, ever conscious of personal liberty and first
amendment freedoms, argued that since government cannot "[condition] renewal
of a teacher's contract upon surrender of First Amendment rights,"77 a teacher
alleging that a nonrenewal decision was made in violation of these rights should
be entitled to a hearing and a statement of reasons so that his rights may in fact
be protectedYs Even apart from first amendment rights, a teacher's liberty
interests in renewal should still entitle him to procedural safeguards since
"[n] onrenewal can be a blemish that turns into a permanent scar and effectively
limits any chance the teacher has of being rehired as a teacher, at least in his
State."79
Mr. Justice Marshall would extend the concepts of "liberty" and "property"
still further to hold that "every citizen who applies for a government job is en-
titled to it unless the government can establish some reason for denying the
employment."80 Thus, it appears that both dissenting Justices believe that due
134), as well as the Drown case, (435 F.2d at 1183), involved no collateral free speech issues.
In the Freeman case, the issue of racial discrimination was dropped on appeal. 405 F2d at
1157.
72. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 943 (Sth Cir. 1970), ad, 408 US. 593 (1972);
see Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 263-64 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 US. 589, 60S-06 (1967);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 US. 360, 380 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instr., 368 U.S. 278,
288 (1961); Torcaso v. Watins, 367 US. 488, 495-96 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952).
73. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (dictum); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 599 n.5 (dictum).
74. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
75. 408 U.S. at 575 n.14.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 583 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see note 75 supra and accompanying text.
78. Id. at 585.
79. Id.; see note 64 supra for the majority's discussion.
80. 408 US. at 588 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall was persuaded that the
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process should require a statement of reasons and a hearing in all nonretention
cases.
In resolving the Roth case, the Court was faced with a statutory system8
under which the state legislature had deliberately vested extensive discretion in
the school boards for rehiring probationary teachers.82 The Court was unwilling
to rewrite, by judicial fiat, state tenure statutes. Thus, tenure statutes, teaching
contracts, and academic hiring practices and procedures remain in the province
of state legislatures and state administrators, as the Court was ready to recog-
nize.83
It is now likely that the Supreme Court will leave subsequent problems in this
area to the decisions of the state courts. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger, concurring
in Sindermann and Roth, argued that federal courts should abstain from deciding
whether a teacher is entitled to a prior hearing until the state courts can
determine whether he has a property interest under an ambiguous state law. 84
Teachers will continue to be entitled to access to the federal courts in all
nonretention cases when the dismissal is in violation of a constitutional right or
is a clear abrogation of "property" or "liberty" interests. But a nonretained
teacher must first establish one of these claims in order to state a federal cause
of action. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently affirmed the
dismissal of a teacher's complaint for failure to allege sufficient facts to establish
a "liberty" or "property" interest under the Roth and Sindermann standards.88
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
dismissal of a claim on the ground that the circumstances of the teacher's employ-
ment for 29 years were sufficient to state a "property" claim under the fourteenth
amendment. 86 But it is apparent that a teacher will not be able to state a federal
claim on the mere ground that his nonretention was arbitrary.8 7
The Roth Court chose to avoid a further federal entrenchment into an area
that is better left to the discretion of the states and the universities themselves.
State legislatures are in a better position to assess the effects of their own tenure
requirement of procedural safeguards for applicants as well as for present employees would
not be too burdensome upon the government because reasons could readily be given where
they actually existed. Furthermore, he argued that giving reasons would, in fact, aid govern.
mental functions by helping to prevent slipshod or erroneous decisions. Id. at 591-92.
81. Law of Jan. 6, 1966, ch. 497, § 1, [19661 Wis. Laws 779, as amended, Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 37.31 (Supp. 1972).
82. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 567 (1972).
83. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
84. 408 U.S. at 604 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
85. Lipp v. Board of Educ., No. 71-1912 (7th Cir., Nov. 27, 1972). The teacher had
alleged the failure to provide him with a copy of an unfavorable efficiency report violated
his due process rights under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 2.
86. Johnson v. County School Bd., No. 71-1590 (4th Cir., Nov. 20, 1972). Unfortunately,
the court appears to have misread the Roth Court's determination of what constitutes a
protectible interest in "liberty." Id. at 8-9. Mere employment for a long period of time would
not establish a "liberty" interest in the absence of an attack on one's reputation or the loss
of subsequent employment opportunities. See notes 63-64 supra.
87. See notes 34-35 & 46 supra and accompanying text.
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systems. The issue of academic freedom should not only inure to the benefit of
teachers, but should also safeguard university and school governing boards from
unnecessary governmental interference with the use of discretion in maintaining
a quality faculty. State legislatures are in a position to check excesses of such
discretion in the state school systems; and the rather recent advent of labor
unions upon the academic scene will have a mitigating effect on administrative
abuses which may be found in both public and private institutions. There is no
real reason why there should be greater procedural safeguards for teachers than
for secretaries, accountants, or any other employees who are not given con-
tractual job security. Remedies are available for violations of constitutional rights
and the deprivation of "liberty" and "property" interests. But apart from these
circumstances, there is room for discretion and for diversified systems of educa-
tion. There is no compelling reason for the federal courts to interfere.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the Roth decision is also significant
because of its recognition of conceptual boundaries in the determination of what
is "property" and what is "liberty" as those terms are used in the fourteenth
amendment. The present Court appears to be unwilling to expand the scope of
those terms beyond the informal guidelines established by precedentPs Although
the Court has not attempted a precise definition of liberty and property, it has
demonstrated an intent to construe those terms more narrowly than they have
been interpreted in the past. Therefore, the decision contains implications that
the Court in the future may tighten the reins on the further expansion of indivi-
dual rights under the fourteenth amendment.
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Racial Discrimination by Private
Club Held Not State Action Despite State Issued Liquor License and
Accompanying Regulations.-Plaintiff, a Negro, entered the dining room and
bar of defendant Moose Lodge, the Harrisburg chapter of the national fraternal
organization, as the guest of a member. Defendant's employees refused to serve
plaintiff solely on the basis of his race.' He then brought an action- for injunctive
88. 408 U.S. at 572. See notes 63-66 supra and accompanying text.
1. The Constitution of the Supreme Lodge, to the provisions of which local chapters
were bound, required that: "The membership of the lodges shall be composed of male
persons of the Caucasian or White race . . . not married to someone of other than the
Caucasian or White race . .. ." Irvis v. Scott, 318 F. Supp. 1246, 1247 (LD. Pa. 1970),
rev'd sub nom. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). The district court found that
local chapters "accordingly maintain a policy and practice of restricting membership to the
Caucasian race and permitting members to bring only Caucasian guests on lodge premises,
particularly to the dining room and bar." Id. Further, the court found as a fact that plain-
tiff had been refused service "solely because he is a Negro." Id.
2. Plaintiff originally complained to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Committee which
held that the dining room of Moose Lodge was a "place of public accommodation" within
the meaning of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. fit. 43, § 953 (1961),
and that defendant Lodge had been guilty of unlawful discrimination. 318 F. Supp. at 1247.
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relief under the provisions of section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code,3
alleging that since the lodge had been issued a liquor license by the state Liquor
Control Board4 and was subject to its extensive regulations,5 racial discrimina-
tion by it constituted state action in violation of the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause.0 A three-judge district court, convened at plaintiff's
request under section 2281 of Title 28, United States Code,7 invalidated the
club's liquor license.8 On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States re-
versed in a 6-3 decision, holding that the Control Board's license and regulatory
scheme did not "sufficiently implicate" the state in the lodge's discriminatory
policies so as to constitute state action and an equal protection violation.9
Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
It was early established that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment offers no recourse against wholly private acts.10 As the Supreme
The Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County reversed the Commission on appeal, con-
eluding that the dining room was not a "place of public accommodation" under the provi-
sions of the aforementioned act. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm. v. Loyal Order of
Moose (C.P. Dauphin County, Mar. 6, 1970) (unreported).
3. Section 1983 provides in part: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
shall be liable to the party injured in [a] ... suit in equity .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
4. The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board exists as "an independent administrative
board" by the terms of Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 2-201 (1969). Its discretion with respect to
the issuance of club liquor licenses is outlined in Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 4-404 (1969).
5. See generally Pennsylvania Liquor Code, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, §§ 1 et seq. (1969).
6. The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that: "No State shall... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1.
7. Section 2281 provides that injunctive relief "restraining the enforcement, operation or
execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the
enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an administrative board
or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge
thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application
therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges .... 1" 28 U.S.C. § 2281
(1970).
8. 318 F. Supp. at 1251-52.
9. The Court did restrain enforcement of § 113.09 of the Regulations of the Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board (June 1970 ed.) which required that "every club licensee shall adhere
to all the provisions of its constitution and by-laws." Id. The Court found appellee "entitled
to a decree enjoining the enforcement of § 113.09 of the regulations promulgated by the
.. . Control Board insofar as that regulation requires compliance by Moose Lodge with
provisions of its constitution and bylaws containing racially discriminatory provisions."
Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972).
10. In the 1875 case of United States v. Cruikshank the Supreme Court declared: "The
fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws; but this provision does not . . . add any thing to the
rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another." 92 U.S. 542, 594-55
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Court noted in the Civil Rights Cases:"1 "It is State action of a particular char-
acter that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the sub-
ject-matter of the amendment." - Despite strong feeling against this limitation
on the scope of the amendment's guarantees,' 3 the requirement of a finding of
state action has persisted.'4 Nonetheless, the dimensions of the state action con-
cept are as yet unsettled.15
Perhaps the most obvious form of state action is that involving the conduct
of state officials. In the 1879 case Ex Parte Virginia'0 the Supreme Court refused
to invalidate the indictment of a county court judge who had been accused of
excluding blacks from jury lists made out by him.17 In so doing it established
(1875). See also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882); Virginia v. Rives 100 US.
313, 318 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 US. 303 (1879).
11. 109 US. 3 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases consisted of five separate challenges to
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (1875), consolidated into a single appeal. The
Supreme Court declared the Act unconstitutional because it compelled "privately owned
and operated facilities" to cease discrimination. Allowing the Act to stand, the majority
reasoned, would empower Congress to enact laws governing the conduct of individuals re-
gardless of whether they act in any type of official capacity. 109 US. at 13-14.
12. Id. at 11.
13. In his famous dissenting opinion Justice Harlan declared that "I cannot resist the
conclusion that the substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have
been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26
(1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Harris, 106 US. 629 (1882)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); R. Carr, Federal Protection of Civil Rights 36 (1947); H. Flack,
Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment (1908); Watt & Orlikoff, The Coming Vindication
of Mr. Justice Harlan, 44 ]lL L. Rev. 13 (1949).
14. See Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 US. 163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth.,
365 US. 715 (1961).
15. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth., 365 US. 715 (1961); Wlliams v. United
States, 341 US. 97 (1951); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). See generally P. Kauper,
Civil Liberties and the Constitution 127-68 (1962); Abernathy, Expansion of the State
Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 Cornell L. Rev. 375 (1958); Barnett,
What is "State" Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments of
the Constitution?, 24 Ore. L. Rev. 227 (1945); Karst & Van Alstyne, Comment: Sit-Ins and
State Action-Mr. justice Douglas, Concurring, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 762 (1962); Lewis, The
Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083 (1960); Schubert, State Action and the
Private University, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 323 (1970); Silard, A Constitutional Forecast:
Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 Colum. L. Rev.
855 (1966); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 Texas L. Rev. 347 (1963).
16. 100 US. 339 (1879).
17. Since the acts in question also violated state law, it was further established that
any act of a state official was state action regardless of his motives or the nature of the act.
"There can be no doubt at least since Ex Parte Virginia, that Congress has the power to
enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of au-
thority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with
their authority or misuse it." Monroe v. Pape, 365 US. 167, 171-72 (1961) (illegal search by
police held to be under color of state law); Williams v. United States, 341 US. 97 (1951)
(private detective's beating of suspects held to be state action because he had been issued a
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the principle that "[wihoever, by virtue of public position under a State gov-
ernment... denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the
constitutional inhibition .... ",18
State action has also been found by the Court where persons or entities,
though formally comprising no part of state government, perform a governmen-
tal function. Thus in Nixon v. Condon"9 the Court in 1932 held that state party
executive committees, although not official state agencies, had become "organs
of the State itself, the repositories of official power."20 The exclusion by them of
blacks from party primaries was, therefore, a denial of equal protection.2 '
Another area in which state action has been found to exist is in respect of
private persons who perform no public function but whose action is fostered or
encouraged by the state. Thus in Peterson v. City of Greenville22 a city ordi-
nance requiring segregated lunch counters was held unconstitutional since by
virtue of it the state had "effectively determined that a person owning, managing
or controlling an eating place .. segregate his white and Negro patrons.1 2 In
Lombard v. Louisiana,24 following the reasoning of the Peterson case, speeches
by a mayor and superintendent of police against "sit-ins" were said to have the
force of an ordinance, and state action was thus predicated upon this official
coercion of private discrimination.2 5
special police officer's badge); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (ballot-box
stuffing by primary officials was state action).
18. 100 U.S. at 347. As a result of this reasoning those bodies whose action would now
constitute state action were greatly extended. See, e.g., Hamilton v. University of California
Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (education board); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles,
227 U.S. 278 (1913) (municipal corp.); Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S.
20 (1907) (tax board); Reagan v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894) (public
service comm'n). See also Henry v. Greenville Airport Comin'n, 279 F.2d 751 (4th Cir.
1960).
19. 286 U.S. 73 (1932). The result in this case was the same as in Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927), in which the Texas legislature had passed a statute that expressly
prohibited Negroes from voting in primaries. The statute was declared unconstitutional.
Id. at 541.
20. 286 U.S. at 84-85.
21. Id. at 89. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), strengthened the Condon rea-
soning by deciding that whenever a state has "taken affirmative action designed to make
private discriminations legally possible" the fourteenth amendment has been violated. Id.
at 375. In that case, pursuant to an initiative and referendum an article had been added to
the California state constitution giving private parties the right to sell or lease property
with complete discretion. The Supreme Court felt that the law would "significantly on-
courage" private discrimination and involve the state therein to such an extent as to con-
stitute state action. Id. at 381. See also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949).
22. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
23. Id. at 248.
24. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
25. Id. at 273-74. Three situations that often overlap into more than one category of
state action are: state financial aid to private institutions (Norris v. Mayor & City Council
of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948) ; state aid other than money to private lnstltu.
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In 1961 the Supreme Court added to the already great body of case law on
the subject of state action its landmark decision in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority.?0 In Burton racial discrimination by a private restaurant
which leased its premises from an agency of the state of Delaware was held
violative of the equal protection clause.2 7 An extensive review of the facts led
the Court to conclude that the state had "so far insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be consid-
ered to have been so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment."20 Declining to "fashion and apply a precise formula for
recognition of state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause," -O the
Court, speaking through Justice Clark, observed that "[o)nly by sifting facts
and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true significance."30
This reluctance to announce a rule was not lost on critics of the Court's ap-
proach.31 Indeed, Justice Harlan, dissenting, declared that it "seems to me to
leave completely at sea just what it is in this record that satisfies the require-
ment of 'state action.' "32 However, to those who wished the demise of the state
action limitation itself, the Burton result was deemed a great step forward.m
Of particular note in Burton is the terminology employed. In reaching its de-
cision the Court did not use the words "state action" but spoke instead of state
"involvement" and "interdependence.1 34 To its equal protection vocabulary the
Court added still another term, "entwinement", in the 1966 case of Evans v.
Newton.3 5 There it was held that a park30 which had for many years been
tions (Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 981 (1950)); and state inaction (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Smith v.
Ilinois Bell TeL Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926) ; Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir.
1943)).
26. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See generally Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957); Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-
A Case Without Precedent, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1458 (1961); Lewis, supra note 15, at
1101-02; Williams, supra note 15, at 382-84.
27. 365 U.S. at 726.
28. Id. at 725.
29. Id. at 722.
30. Id; accord, Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). "The constitutional com-
mand for a state to afford 'equal protection of the laws' sets a goal not attainable by the
invention and application of a precise formula. This Court has never attempted that im-
possible task." Id. at 556.
31. See St. Antoine, Color Blindness but not Myopia, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 993, 1005-06
(1961).
32. 365 U.S. 715, 728 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 15.
34. 365 U.S. at 725.
35. 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
36. The tract of land on which the park was situated had been devised to the Mayor
and City Council of Macon, Georgia with the instruction that it be segregated. After it
19731
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public did not lose its public character by the substitution of private for public
directors-thus it could not be open "for white people only."3 7 Speaking for
the majority Justice Douglas noted: "Conduct that is formally 'private' may
become so entwined with governmental policies... as to become subject to the
constitutional limitations placed upon state action." 38
The three-judge district court in Irvis relied heavily on the Burton case in
reaching its conclusion that the discriminatory policy of the defendant Lodge
was indeed unlawful.89 After considering the "uniqueness" and "all-pervasive-
ness" 40 of the regulatory scheme imposed upon the Lodge by the licensing
authority, the Court felt that "[a]s in Burton the state has 'insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence' with its club licensees .. . . 41 It also noted
that "[i] t would be difficult to find a more pervasive interaction of state author-
ity with personal conduct."42
The idea of discerning in a license the basis, at least in part, for a finding of
state action--or of Burtonesque "interdependence" and "interaction"-was not
novel to the court's decision. The same had been intimated by the first Justice
Harlan dissenting in the Civil Rights Cases43 and had been proposed explicitly
by Justice Douglas in several decisions.44 However, no court had ever found
state action from the mere issuance of a license of any kind.43 Recognizing this,
the district court in Irvis emphasized that an accompanyment of the liquor li-
cense issued to Moose Lodge had been "[t]he unique power which the state
enjoys in this area, which .. .has been exercised in a manner which reaches
intimately and deeply into the operation of the licensees." 40
The Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument. While recognizing
was concluded that the city could not maintain the facility on a segregated basis, and the
park opened to persons of all races, suit was brought to have title to the devise transferred
to private trustees who could then carry out the terms of the trust. 382 U.S. at 297-98.
37. Id. at 301.
38. Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
39. 318 F. Supp. at 1251-52.
40. Id. at 1248. "We believe the decisive factor is the uniqueness and the all-pervasiveness
of the regulation . . . ." Id. For a listing of the various regulations see id. at 1249-50.
41. Id. at 1251.
42. Id. at 1250.
43. 109 US. 3, 26 (1883). Here, Justice Harlan declared that "railroad corporations,
keepers of inns, and managers of places of public amusement are agents or instrumentalities
of the State ... ." Id. at 58.
44. See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 176 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring). "I do
not believe that a State that licenses a business can license it to serve only whites . .. ."
Id. at 184. See also Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 274 (1962) (Douglas, J., con-
curring).
45. See Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959); Madden
v. Queens County Jockey Club, Inc., 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697, cert. denied, 332 U.S.
761 (1947); State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E,2d 295 (1958). See generally P. Freund,
On Law and Justice 17-18 (1968); Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 S.C.
Rev. 101; 47 Va. L. Rev. 105, 115 (1961); 46 Va. L. Rev. 123, 127 (1960).
46. 318 F. Supp. at 1250.
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the pervasiveness of the State Board's scheme the Court nevertheless felt that
it did not "sufficiently implicate" the state in the discriminatory policies of the
Lodge so as to constitute state action.4 7
In reaching a result opposite to that of the district court, the Supreme Court
nevertheless relied for the most part upon the same precedent, i.e., the Burton
case. In so doing, it thus substantiated to some degree Justice Harlan's reserva-
tions as to the uncertainty of the Burton Court's holding.48 Following literally
Burton's reliance on "sifting facts and weighing circumstances" for discovery of
state involvement, the Court found the facts and circumstances surrounding the
Irvis case to be distinguishable. 49 Whereas, it concluded, the restaurant in
Burton had been public and located in a public building, Moose Lodge was "a
private social club in a private building 5 0 More importantly, the state in the
instant case did not enjoy with the Lodge the "symbiotic relationship" which
had obtained between lessor and lessee in Burton.51
As was pointed out in Burton:
It cannot be doubted that the peculiar relationship of the restaurant to the parking
facility in which it is located confers on each an incidental variety of mutual benefits.
Guests of the restaurant are afforded a convenient place to park their automobiles.
. . . Similarly, its convenience for diners may well provide additional demand for
the Authority's parking facilities. Should any improvements effected in the leasehold
... become part of the realty, there is no possibility of increased taxes being passed
on to it since the fee is held by a tax-exempt government agency. Neither can it be
ignored... that profits earned by discrimination not only contribute to, but also are
indispensible elements in, the financial success of a governmental agency.5 2
The Court in Irvis felt that absent such relationship the State was not "in any
realistic sense a partner or even a joint venturer in the club's enterprise53 and
that therefore the equal protection clause had not been violated. r4
In reaching its conclusion, the Court also denied that an effect of the quota
which the Control Board had established with respect to liquor licenses issued
in the Harrisburg area had been to award the Lodge a limited monopoly on liquor
dispensation.5 5 It was this contention which formed the crux of Justice Douglas'
47. 407 US. at 177.
48. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
49. 407 U.S. at 175.
50. Id. The case did not discuss what precisely is meant by the "private club" classifica-
tion. In Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) the Court decided that advertising practices of
a so-called 'private club' as well as its great membership rendered it a public facility. See also
United States v. Northwest La. Rest. Club, 256 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. La. 1966); 15 Vill. L.
Rev. 466 (1970).
51. 407 US. at 175.
52. 365 US. at 724.
53. 407 US. at 177.
54. Id. at 178-79.
55. Id. at 177. The Court declared: "The limited effect of the prohibition against obtaining
additional dub licenses when the maximum number of retail licenses allotted to a munici-
pality has been issued, when considered together with the availability of liquor from hotel,
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dissenting opinion. According to Douglas, since the license quota had long been
filled, this "state-enforced scarcity" of licenses had the effect of discouraging
formation of non-discriminatory clubs 0 and in turn of "putting the weight of
... [the state's licenses] behind racial discrimination. 0 7 Furthermore, the par-
ticular character of the license in question had the effect of distinguishing Moose
Lodge from the other clubs "not in the public domain."5 8 With this note Justice
Douglas made explicit a problem which, although not mentioned specifically in
the majority opinion, must be viewed as underlying any appraisal of the extent
of state action in this case: that of encroachment upon the right of association
which is guaranteed by the first amendment. 0 Perhaps the Irvis Court feared
that a practical consequence of affirming the district court's decision would be
a hampering of the operations of many private associations. It may have felt
further that no limiting of the opinion to its peculiar facts could have avoided
the establishment of a dangerous precedent.
If anything, the Irvis decision testifies to the continuing vitality of the state
action requirement."0 A more complex problem lies in ascertaining its effect upon
the meaning of state action. The state in Irvis was not sufficiently implicated in
Moose Lodge's discriminatory policies because it was not with it a "partner" or
"joint-venturer". While these terms probably do not envision a literal partner-
ship or joint venture-such not having been apparent in Burton, the relied upon
precedent-very little else may be said about them other than that they con-
template the existence at least of a "symbiotic relationship". What is a "sym-
biotic relationship"? Burton, we are told, is an example of one; Irvis is not.0 1
Perhaps the most concrete conclusion to be drawn from the Irvis case is that the
trend toward liberalization of state action which was so remarkable in the years
of the Warren Court has, for the moment, been halted.
restaurant, and retail licensees, falls far short of conferring upon club licensees a monopoly
in the dispensing of liquor in any given municipality or in the State as a whole." Id.
56. Id. at 182-83. The situation discouraged non-discriminatory clubs, or any club, from
forming since without a liquor license any "fraternal organization would be hard pressed
to survive." Id. at 183.
57. Id. at 183. See Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960);
P. Kauper, supra note 15, at 162-63; Karst & Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 775.
58. 407 U.S. at 180.
59. Moose Lodge was characterized as a "private" club. This is important because once
its nature had been determined to be private the first amendment's freedom of association
attached and all interferences became suspect. This is the so-called "reverse presumption of
constitutionality." United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 129 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
It should be noted that in a rehearing the Pennsylvania court reclassified the Lodge as a
"public accommodation" because of its policy of admitting guests. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 12,
1972, at 27, col. 2.
60. 407 U.S. at 172-73. After the Burton decision it was at least possible to view the
state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment as gone. See generally Williams,
supra note 15.
61. It has been ventured that indeed a "symbiotic relationship" did exist as between the
State of Pennsylvania and its licensee, Moose Lodge; see The Supreme Court, 1971 Term,
86 Harv. L. Rev. 52, 73-74 (1972). However, any such relationship was certainly not
commensurate in extent with that which existed in Burton.
[Vol. 41
CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Sex-Based Discrimination in Sec-
tion 712(b) of the Family Court Act Held Unconstitutional.-AMrs. Ethel
A. filed a petition in New York Family Court alleging that her sixteen-year-old
daughter, Patricia, a high school drop-out and suspected drug user,1 was a
Person in Need of Supervision, generally referred to as PINS, pursuant to
section 712(b) of the Family Court Act.2 If Patricia had been a male, the
family court would not have had jurisdiction over the matter since the PINS
statute gives the court jurisdiction over males less than sixteen years old and
females less than eighteen years old. At a Family Court hearing, Patricia was
adjudicated a PINS and put on probation.3 On appeal she challenged the PINS
statute on both equal protection and vagueness4 grounds. The appellate divi-
sion upheld the family court adjudication without opinion but the New York
Court of Appeals reversed holding that section 712 (b) irrationally discriminated
on the basis of sex in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.6 Patricia A. v. City of New York, 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432,
335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972).
Quasi-criminal statutes applicable only to women for the purpose of "protec-
tion" against criminal prosecution are neither new7 nor unique to New York
1. The petition alleged that Patricia had engaged in various anti-social conduct--she
had played hooky, associated with suspected drug users, stayed out after curfew, and
finally left home to live with an aunt. Brief for Appellant at 3, Patricia A. v. City of New
York, 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972).
2. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972) defines a person in need of
supervision as "a male less than sixteen years of age and a female less than eighteen years
of age who does not attend school in accord with the provisions of part one of article sixty-
five of the education law or who is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and
beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority.' Id.
3. After a PINS adjudication, the family court has the power to discharge the respon-
dent with a warning, suspend judgment, put the respondent on probation, or place the
respondent in a suitable home or state institution for an initial period of 18 months. N.Y.
Family CL Act §§ 754-57 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
4. Appellant contended that the PINS statute was too vague in that it failed to give
potential offenders notice of the proscribed conduct and it failed to provide adequate stan-
dards for judicial application. 31 N.Y.2d at 86, 286 N.E.2d at 433, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 35
(1972).
5. 39 App. Div. 2d 648, 332 N.Y.S.2d 375 (2d Dep't), rev'd, 31 N.Y.d 83, 286 N.E.2d
432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972).
6. The court disposed of the vagueness claim in a conclusory fashion, stating that the
terms defining PINS are easily understood and citing in support of its conclusion decisions
in other jurisdictions upholding equally broad language in juvenile statutes. See, e.g., In re
S., 10 Cal. App. 3d 944, 89 Cal. Rptr. 685 (4th Dist. 1970); State in the Interest of L.N.,
109 N.J. Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150 (App. Div.), aftd, 57 N.J. 165, 270 A.2d 409 (1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 1009 (1971); E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970). But see Comment, California's Predelinquency Statute:
A Case Study and Suggested Alternatives, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 1163, 1194-95 (1972). The
Supreme Court has declined to review the court's conclusion as to vagueness. Tomasita
N. v. City of New York, 30 N.Y.2d 927, 287 N.E.2d 377, 335 N.Y.S.2d 683, appeal dismissed,
41 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1972) (No. 72-5529).
7. In New York, as early as 1910 a separate night court for women was established where
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State.8 In 1951 the New York State legislature passed the Girls' Term Court Act0
which established a special term of the New York City Civil Court with exclu-
sive jurisdiction over girls between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one. Because
criminal liability attached at sixteen10 for both men and women in New York
State, the Girls' Term jurisdiction was an adjunct to, and did not replace, the
jurisdiction of the criminal courts over women aged sixteen to twenty-one.
Therefore, despite the fact that the Act's purpose 1 was to protect delinquent
girls from the stigma attached to prosecution in the criminal courts, its effect
was to incarcerate women for non-criminal conduct,' 2 that, if committed by a
male would not be censured.13 Although the state was concerned with the effect
of the girl's behavior on society,14 nowhere in the Act or the legislative history
was there any indication that immoral, non-criminal conduct on the part of
girls was more prevalent or more dangerous to society than that of boys the
same age.' 5
When the New York State court system was reorganized10 in 1962, the Family
Court was established to replace the Girls' Term, the New York City Domestic
Relations Court, and the County Children's Courts. The purpose 17 of this con-
the younger and less hardened women criminals (presumably prostitutes) were separated
from the more experienced women criminals. Law of June 25, 1910, ch. 659, § 77, [19101
N.Y. Laws 1795-96 (repealed 1962).
8. Many other states have laws similar in purpose. See, e.g., the statutes and cases in
other jurisdictions discussed in notes 39-43 infra and accompanying text.
9. Law of Apr. 11, 1951, ch. 716, [1951] N.Y. Laws 1655 (repealed 1962).
10. See N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00 (McKinney 1967). This 1967 revision of the penal law
reenacted in substance the prior law of New York.
11. Law of Apr. 11, 1951, ch. 716, § 1, [19511 N.Y. Laws 1655 (repealed 1962).
12. In 1962 the Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization, in its appraisal of
the Girls' Term Court, found that "[tjhe basis for the adjudication with few exceptions
is not prostitution. With only isolated exceptions, it is not the commission of any crime."
Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization, No. 2-The Family Court
Act, 1962 N.Y. Sess. Laws 3428, 3439 [hereinafter cited as Committee Report].
13. If, as in some states, the protective statute actually did give girls favored treatment,
juvenile boys would be denied equal protection of the laws. For example, an Oklahoma law
that set the age of criminal responsibility at eighteen for females and at sixteen for males
was recently overturned in Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972).
14. Law of Apr. 11, 1951, ch. 716, § 1, [1951] N.Y. Laws 1655 (repealed 1962). "A
specialized girl's court term . . . is deemed necessary and desirable for the purpose of alle-
viating and correcting conditions which threaten, and in many instances actually jeopardizo
the health, safety, welfare and security of the people of the state." Id.
15. On the contrary, research indicates that delinquency is primarily a boys' problem.
See W. Lunden, Statistics on Delinquents and Delinquency 70 (1964); President's Comm'n on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 56
(1967); Gold, Equal Protection for Juvenile Girls in Need of Supervision in New York
State, 17 N.Y.L.F. 570, 580-89 (1971).
16. The reorganization was completed pursuant to N.Y. Coast. art. VI which was adopted
by state-wide vote in November of 1961.
17. See Dembitz, Ferment and Experiment in New York: Juvenile Cases in the New
Family Court, 48 Cornell L.Q. 499 (1963).
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solidation was to place in one court jurisdiction over the variety of actions
rooted in family relationships--such as adoptions, paternity, support, child
custody, and juvenile proceedings-that, traditionally, had been divided among
a number of civil and criminal courts.
In conjunction with the establishment of a new court structure, the substantive
law of juvenile delinquency was also revised, with section 712 of the Family
Court Act defining the categories of juveniles over whom the court would have
jurisdiction. In addition to the traditional juvenile delinquency category, cover-
ing criminal conduct committed by minors under the age of sixteen,' 8 the new
Persons in Need of Supervision (PINS) category was established to cover anti-
social but non-criminal conduct committed by males younger than sixteen and
females younger than eighteen.' 8
The new PINS category, like the former Girls' Term jurisdiction, was intended
to protect juveniles who had not committed crimes, but who were nevertheless
found to be in need of supervision, from the stigma of a juvenile delinquency
determination.20 Women were granted this "protection" for two years longer
than men. Yet, despite the fact that the PINS definition discriminated on the
basis of sex, the Committee that drafted the legislation viewed it as an improve-
ment of the Girls' Term Court Act that preceded it because it reduced the
maximum jurisdictional age for women from twenty-one to eighteen.m
Although the Committee's aim was to make the old law more equitable, it did
not rationalize the need for the different treatment of male and female juveniles.
There was no research to determine whether female juveniles actually needed
more reform, rehabilitation, or supervision than males, - nor did the Committee
give any reason for the state's interest in restricting the liberty of females
longer than that of males.P This is especially surprising since the Committee had
18. N.Y. Family Court Act § 712(a) (McKinney 1963). "' Juvenile delinquent' means a
person over seven and less than sixteen years of age who does any act which, if done by an
adult, would constitute a crime." Id.
19. N.Y. Family Court Act § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972). For the text of § 712(b)
see note 2 supra.
20. Committee Report 3434-35. The Committee found that "'Juvenile Delinquent' is now
a term of disapproval. The judges ... are aware of this and are also aware that govern-
ment officials and private employers often learn of an adjudication of delinquency.
The Committee therefore proposes to retain, but redefine, the category of juvenile delin-
quency and add the new category of person in need of supervision. Though there is no
certainty about these judgments, the Committee expects that this pattern will reduce the
instances of stigma. .. ." Id.
21. Committee Report 3440. The Committee stated that "under the laws of New York
State, 18 is the age of consent. This pattern reflects a legislative determination that a young
woman should be free to exercise a considerable discretion in shaping her life so long as she
complies with the law of the land. If she does not comply with the law, she should be
treated accordingly." Id.
22. See note 15 supra.
23. The traditional reason, and the one advanced by the city in the noted case, was the
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found that few if any of the adjudications in the Girls' Term had been for
criminal conduct. 24 Thus, the justification for sex discriminatory "protective"
legislation seemed unfounded. In short, the legislative reform that resulted in
the Family Court Act made only superficial improvements in the law and did
not deal with the practical problems, much less the constitutional questions
raised by the differing treatment of male and female juveniles.
This failure to deal with the sex discrimination problem is consistent with the
historical interpretation of the equal protection clause as applied to women. Al-
though the equal protection clause does not deny the states the power to treat
different classes of persons in different waysY2 it does require, at the very least,)2 0
that the discrimination be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
[state action] .. 2.7. In other words, the classification must have a rational
basis.
However, until recently, the application of this "rational basis test" had in-
variably resulted in the conclusion that sex-based discrimination is rational.
Until 1971, the Supreme Court had never overturned a statute that discriminated
against women on equal protection grounds. In fact, earlier Supreme Court
decisions seemed to convey the idea that discrimination between the sexes was
rational per se.
In Bradwell v. Illinois,2 8 the first case construing women's rights under the
newly passed fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court, in affirming an Illinois
decision barring women from the practice of law, gave a clear example of the
fear of sexual promiscuity and pregnancy in female juveniles. 31 N.Y.2d at 88, 286 N.E.2d
at 435, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
24. See note 12 supra.
25. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
26. Since the state statute enjoys a presumption of validity, the burden of showing Ir-
rationality is generally on the party alleging unconstitutionality. However, the Warren
Court developed a "new equal protection" where the burden of proof was reversed and the
state had to show not merely rationality, but a compelling state interest when the statute
involved either a suspect classification, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alien-
age); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimacy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin); or a funda-
mental right, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate). Although a state court has declared
that sex is a suspect category thereby invoking the stricter test, Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5
Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971), the Supreme Court has never so held. It
has been suggested that this two-tiered approach to equal protection is now being modified
by the Burger Court. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv.
L. Rev. 1 (1972).
27. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
28. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
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traditional view which extolled the rationality and even divine purpose of dis-
crimination between the sexes:
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil
society must be adapted to the general constitution of things .... [I]n view of the
peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission of woman, it is within the province of
the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings shall be filled and dis-
charged by men .... 29
The belief that women must be especially protected because of their "unique
destiny" was accepted by the Court for many years, culminating in the landmark
decisionsP° during the early 1900's that permitted state regulation of the labor
contract. Although these cases certainly furthered needed reforms in the field of
labor relations, they implied that because of the physical differences between the
sexes, sex-based discrimination was rational per se.
For example, in Muller v. Oregon,31 the Court upheld a maximum work hours
statute for women,32 basing its decision on the physical differences between the
sexes: "as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-
being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to pre-
serve the strength and vigor of the race."33s The Court's ruling that the physical
difference between the sexes "justifies a difference in legislation" seemed to
imply that sex discrimination is always rational and has been used by many
courts as a rule of thumb to uphold a wide variety of sexually discriminatory
laws that were unrelated to physical endurance. 5
However, despite this precedent, there has recently been some movement in
the state and lower federal courts towards expansion of women's rights under the
equal protection clause, especially in the criminal area. The gains for women in
29. Id. at 14142 (concurring opinion). Since this case was decided one day after the
Supreme Court had limited the scope of the fourteenth amendment to the newly freed
slaves in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), it was inevitable that a
woman's claim under the privileges and immunities clause would fail. Nevertheless Justice
Bradley's famous concurring opinion is often cited as an example of the Court's early view
towards women's rights.
30. See e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 US. 379 (1937); Radce v. New York,
264 U.S. 292 (1924); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915); Muller v. Oregon, 203
U.S. 412 (1908).
31. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
32. A similar statute applicable to both male and female employees had been held uncon-
stitutional three years earlier in Lochner v. New York, 198 US. 45 (1905).
33. 208 U.S. at 421.
34. Id. at 423.
35. See, e.g., Quong Wimg v. Kirkendall 223 US. 59, 63 (1912) (licensing of occupa-
tions); Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 414, 177 N.E. 656, 664 (1931), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 684 (1932) (jury exclusion); People v. Case, 153 Mich. 98, 101, 116 N.W.
558, 560 (1908); State v. Hunter, 208 Ore. 282, 288, 300 P.2d 455, 458 (1956) (licensing
of occupations); Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 517 (1960); Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tea. CL Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 230 (1959) (exclusion of women from a state supported college).
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this area probably result from the influence of In re Gault,30 a due process case
involving a male juvenile. Although there was no equal protection claim asserted
by Gault, the Court had to destroy many of the myths concerning protective
statutes in order to reach Gault's claim. The Court found that the* concept of
parens patriae, i.e., the notion that the state should act like a parent to protect
minors and those incapable of taking care of themselves, presumably including
women,3 7 was not a valid reason to deprive minors of their constitutional rights. 8
Once parens patriae had been rejected as far as minors were concerned, it would
be difficult to resurrect the concept as far as women were concerned.
Several months after Gault was decided, two courts found that protective
statutes in the criminal sentencing process that discriminated on the basis of
sex violated the equal protection clause. In Commonwealth v. Daniel,80 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned a state law40 which mandated that
women convicts be sentenced to confinement in the State Industrial School for
an indefinite term. The judge, under this law, had no discretion, as he did with
men, to set a maximum sentence that was less than the statutory maximum for
each crime. The court found that such discrimination had no rational basis.
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Robinson v. York,41 a federal district court
found that a Connecticut law which provided that women be sent to the State
Farm, a so-called reformatory, for indefinite terms that might last longer than
those imposed on men, was unconstitutional. Relying on Gault, the court rejected
the idea that because the institution was called a "farm" or "reformatory" and
because its aim was rehabilitation, the state could "protect" women by imprison-
ing them for longer periods of time than men. 42 Several months later, the Robin-
son court held that the statute as applied to a juvenile girl involved the same
denial of equal protection.43
Though these cases provided the New York Court of Appeals with precedent
which challenged the "rationality" of protective statutes, the most important
impetus to the court's decision in Patricia appears to have been a trio of recent
equal protection cases- Reed v. Reed,44 Stanley v. Illinois," and Eisenstadt v.
Baird4 ---handed down by the Supreme Court several months before Patricia
was decided.
36. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
37. For a discussion of the theory behind the married woman's legal disabilities at com-
mon law see L. Kanowitz, Women and the Law, The Unfinished Revolution 35-38 (1969).
38. "The Latin phrase [parens patriael proved to be a great help to those who sought
to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but Its meaning is
murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance." 387 U.S. at 16.
39. 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
40. The Muncy Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 566 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
41. 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
42. Id. at 15.
43. United States ex rel. Sumrell v. York, 288 F. Supp. 955 (D. Conn. 1968).
44. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
45. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
46. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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In Reed, the Court overruled an Idaho law 47 which gave men preference over
women in administering decedents' estates. Since this was the first time the high
Court had overturned a sex-based statute on equal protection grounds, there was
an immediate reaction from the press concluding that Reed, the "women's rights
case," was a landmark.48 However, the opinion itself was very narrowly drawn.
Plaintiff's counsel and numerous amid curiae had urged the Court to declare
that sex was a suspect category thereby invoking the "strict scrutiny" tesL49
However, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a unanimous Court, chose to exer-
cise restraint; the Court refrained from deciding whether sex discrimination is
suspect since the statute in question was arbitrary and unconstitutional on tra-
ditional rational basis groundsY0°
This holding, although it certainly was a "first" for women's rights, made no
radical change in the law. Since the statute was not a "protective" one, the
Court did not have to confront a controversial challenge to woman's traditional
role. In overturning a statute that discriminated against women for no other
reason than governmental expediency,' the Court was merely upholding the
traditional view that a discriminatory classification must serve some legitimate
state purpose.
Moreover, the fact that the Court refrained from dealing with the question of
sex as a suspect category led many legal commentators to the conclusion that
Reed was a conservative opinion that would not be used to expand women's
rights.5 2 However, this early apprehension appears to have been unfounded.
Four months later, in the Eisenstadt and Stanley cases, the Court did deal with
equal protection challenges to traditional sexual and moral roles. In Eisenstadt,
the Court overturned a Massachusetts law that prohibited the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons, finding that the deterrence of premarital
sex could not be a reasonable basis for the statuteZP In Stanley, an Illinois
law which excluded unwed fathers, but included unwed mothers, from its defi-
nition of "parents" for the purpose of child custody proceedings was declared
unconstitutional. Many lower courts 4 have seized upon these decisions, in con-
47. Idaho Code Ann. § 15-314 (1947) ch. 111, § 5, (1971] Idaho Laws (repealed effective
July 1, 1972) which provided that "[ohf several persons claiming and equally entitled to
administer, males must be preferred to females... .'
48. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1971, at 1, col. 7.
49. See note 26 supra.
50. 404 U.S. at 77.
51. The state had argued that the purpose of the statute was to reduce the workload
on its probate courts by resolving an issue that would otherwise require a hearing on the
merits. Id. at 76.
52. See, e.g., Hoades, A Disgruntled Look at Reed v. Reed From the Vantage Point of
the Nineteenth Amendment, Women's Rights L. Rep. 9 (Spring 1972); 25 Vand. L. Rev.
412, 416 (1972); 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 626, 632-33.
53. The Court found "that the deterrence of premarital sex may [not] reasonably be
regarded as the purpose of the Massachusetts law.
It would be plainly unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has prescribed pregnancy
and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment for fornication ... :' 405 US. at 448.
54. See, e.g., Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972)
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junction with Reed, to expand equal protection arguments against sex discrimina-
tion, as exemplified in the Patricia case.
In Patricia, the government had argued that
discrimination against females on the basis of age is justified because of the obvious
danger of pregnancy in an immature girl and because of out-of-wedlock births which
add to the welfare relief burdens of the State and city ..... 5
Thus, according to the government's view, the statute was rational since, as
distinguished from the statute in Reed, it dealt with woman's unique physical
characteristics. However, the court rejected this argument on two grounds. First,
rather than accept the legislative purpose at face value according it a presumption
of validity, the court examined whether control of sexual conduct could have been
the actual purpose for the statute.r6 It concluded that such a purpose could
not have been intended because it would make the statute overbroad-since it
covered "far more than acts of sexual misconduct.""7 Second, even assuming that
the legislation had been prompted by such considerations, the court found that
there would have been no rational basis for exempting, from the PINS definition, the
16 and 17-year-old boy responsible for the girl's pregnancy or the out-of-wedlock
birth. As it is, the conclusion seems inescapable that lurking behind the discrimination
is the imputation that females who engage in misconduct, sexual or otherwise, ought
more to be censured, and their conduct subject to greater control and regulation, than
males.58
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Stanley and Eisenstadt wherein
"similar moral presumptions had been squarely rejected as a basis or excuse for
sexually discriminatory legislation." 9 However, it seems that this conclusion
must rest, if at all, on a very loose reading of Stanley and Eisenstadt. Although
the Court in Eisenstadt did reject a moral presumption as the basis for a dis-
(motion for preliminary injunction granted); Williams v. Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp.
438 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (motion for preliminary injunction granted); Commonwealth Alcoholic
Beverage Control Bd. v. Burke, 481 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972); Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Comm'n on Human Relations, 4 Pa. Commw. 448, 287 A.2d 161, cert. granted, U.S.L.W.
3312 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1972) (No. 72-419); J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lacey, 6 Wash.
App. 43, 492 P.2d 600 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972).
55. 31 N.Y.2d at 88, 286 N.E.2d at 435, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
56. This type of scrutiny into the legislative purpose is inconsistent with the traditional
rational basis test that accepted without inquiry any "valid legislative purpose" put for-
ward by the government. It suggests a new approach to equal protection problems. See
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972).
Professor Gunther argues that the Burger Court had used this type of "means-scrutiny" as
an avoidance technique to overturn legislation despite the traditional presumption of legislative
validity. When the legislative purpose is found to be over or underinclusive, the Court has
relied on this narrow ground to avoid the necessity of considering extending the strict
scrutiny test to new areas.
57. 31 N.Y.2d at 88, 286 N.E.2d at 435, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
58. Id. at 88-89, 286 N.E.2d at 435, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
59. Id. at 89, 286 N.E.2d at 435, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
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criminatory regulation,60 the discrimination was not sex-based. Whereas in
Stanley, the Court was clearly faced with a controversial challenge to accepted
sexual roles--.e., whether it is rational for a state to discriminate between unwed
parents on the basis of sex.6' However, the Court avoided analysis of the ques-
tion by finding a due process violation and fitting it into an equal protection
rubric. First, the Stanley Court found that all parents were entitled to a hearing
on their fitness under the due process clause. 2 Then, it reasoned, the "failure
to afford [Stanley] a hearing on his parental qualifications while extending it to
other parents denied him equal protection of the laws.!' 0 This distorted reasoning
process4 makes Stanley questionable equal protection precedent for future
women's rights cases. Nevertheless, the Patricia court seized on its holding to
find that the PINS discrimination was irrational. Thus, the New York Court of
Appeals has interpreted the recent Supreme Court equal protection cases in a
liberal light as far as sex discrimination is concerned.
Therefore, Patrica should be a consolation to those who were disappointed
with the Reed65 decision. Although it appears that few courts will be willing to
declare sex a suspect category after Reed,00 adoption of the strict scrutiny test
60. The Eisenstadt Court rejected the idea that unmarried persons had no right to use
contraceptives: "If under Griswold [381 U.S. 479 (1965)] the distribution of contraceptives
to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would
be equally impermissible .... If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion Into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis omitted).
61. Chief Justice Burger's dissent met the question squarely, concluding that the dis-
crimination was rational: "Illinois' different treatment of [unwed fathers and unwed mothers]
is part of that State's statutory scheme for protecting the welfare of illegitimate children.
In almost all cases, the unwed mother is readily identifiable .... Unwed fathers, as a class,
are not traditionally quite so easy to identify and locate. Many of them either deny all
responsibility or exhibit no interest in the child or its welfare ....
... I believe that a State is fully justified in concluding, on the basis of common human
experience, that the biological role of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates
stronger bonds between her and the child than the bonds resulting from the male's often
casual encounter." 405 U.S. at 665.
62. Id. at 657-58.
63. Id. at 658.
64. Chief Justice Burger was highly critical of this reasoning. He said that "[t]his
'method of analysis' is, of course, no more or less than the use of the Equal Protection
Clause as a shorthand condensation of the entire Constitution: a State may not deny any
constitutional right to some of its citizens without violating the Equal Protection Clause
through its failure to deny such rights to all of its citizens." Id. at 660 (emphasis omitted).
65. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
66. Appellant's counsel had half-heartedly urged the court to find a suspect classification
in the instant case but the court found this unnecessary. Other courts have shown con-
siderable confusion in applying the correct test in sex discrimination cases since Reed. Al-
though they have not openly stated that sex is a suspect category, they have often employed
the terminology of the strict scrutiny test. See, e.g., Wark v. Robbins, 458 F.2d 1295 (Ist Cir.
1972); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Comnmn on Human Relations, 4 Pa. Commw. 448, 287 Aid
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may not be essential for progress in combatting sex discrimination. Furthermore,
there are indications that the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger may
be modifying the two-tiered equal protection approach developed by the Warren
Court.67 While refusing to extend the strict scrutiny test to new areas, the Court
during its last term has shown an unprecedented willingness to overturn dis-
criminatory legislation using the rational basis test 08
In Patricia, the New York Court of Appeals has followed this new method of
analysis and applied it to a controversial area. First, the Patricia court, like the
Supreme Court in Eisenstadt, questioned the legitimacy of the legislative purpose
advanced by the government despite the presumption of legislative validity.00
Second, although declining to consider whether the stricter test was necessary, it
found that a regulation designed to discriminate against women in order to
protect them from sexual activity -a subject that the Supreme Court has not
yet dared to consider-was unconstitutional on traditional grounds.
This new approach, although not what the women's movement had hoped for,
should result in decisions favorable to women's rights. Since the legislative pur-
pose is now open to investigation and the physical differences between the sexes,
as emphasized in cases like Muller,7° are no longer enough to sustain discrimina-
tory legislation, the state must now give convincing data to support its discrimina-
tion.71 In Patricia, the New York Court of Appeals was unimpressed with the
conventional wisdom that young women more than young men should be pro-
tected from sexual activity. By labeling this truism irrational, the court has
recognized the sexual equality of male and female juveniles and in so doing has
given encouragement, as well as precedent, for future women's rights cases in
New York.
Constitutional Law-Immunity Statutes-Statute Granting Use and De-
rivative Use Immunity Sufficiently Broad to Compel Testimony.-Peti-
tioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United States grand jury. Believing
that the petitioners were likely to assert their fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination,' the Government applied to the district court for an order which
161 cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3312 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1972) (No. 72-419); J.S.K. Enterprlscs,
Inc. v. City of Lacey, 6 Wash. App. 43, 492 P.2d 600 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972).
67. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1
(1972).
68. See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
69. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
70. 208 US. 412 (1908).
71. This amounts to a shift in the burden of proof in sex discrimination cases; see, e.g.,
Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972).
1. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ... ." U.S. Const. amend. V.
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would compel such testimony under a grant of immunity pursuant to the Federal
Witness Immunity Act.2 Petitioners refused to testify, claiming that the scope
of the immunity provided by the statute3 was not coextensive with the protection
afforded by the privilege against self-incrimination.4 The district court rejected
this contention, and ordered the petitioners to testify. Upon continued refusal
to testify, petitioners were adjudicated in contempt of court.5 The holding was
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.6 The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute, which provides a witness with
"use" and "derivative use" immunity was sufficiently broad to compel testimony.
In so holding, the Court stated that transactional immunity, the former standard,
"afford[ed] the witness considerably broader protection than [required by] the
Fifth Amendment .... 'IT Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
Though the power of the government to compel testimony is firmly rooted in
Anglo-American jurisprudence,8 it is not absolute. There are a number of excep-
tions, the most important of which is the privilege against self-incrimination.0
However, when the legislature extends to the witness a grant of immunity which
is coextensive with that required by the Constitution, testimony concerning self-
incriminating matters may be elicited.10 Until the eighteenth century there were
no immunity statutes which afforded the sovereign the power to compel testimony
over the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. During this period
governments had little occasion to compel private disclosures, since the regulatory
2. 18 US.C. §§ 6001-05 (1970).
3. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that a witness "may not refuse to comply
with the order [to testify] on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the
witness in any criminal case .... ." Id. § 6002.
4. If the immunity granted is not as comprehensive as the protection afforded by the
privilege, the refusal to testify is justified. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 42 (1924).
5. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 442 (1972). The contempt order was issued
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970).
6. Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971), afPd sub nom. Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
7. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 453 (1972).
8. Id. at 443. It has been said that "Ea]mong the necessary and most important of the
powers of the States as well as the Federal Government to assure the effective functioning of
government in an ordered society is the broad power to compel residents to testify in
court or before grand juries or agencies." Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 US. 52, 93-94
(1964) (White, J., concurring). See also 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2190-93 (J. McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Wigmorel; Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental
Agencies to Compel Testimony, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 694, 694-95 (1926).
9. See note 1 supra.
10. The privilege may be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, admin trative
or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
The privilege protects against any disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could
be used, either directly or indirectly, in a future criminal prosecution against him. Hoffman
v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365
(1917); see Blau v. United States, 340 US. 159, 161 (1950).
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problems prior to the industrial era were relatively simple." With the rise of the
industrial era and the corresponding governmental regulation of business, fuller
powers to compel disclosure became necessary.1 2 Accordingly, the first American
immunity statute was passed in 1857.Pa To secure needed testimony which other-
wise could have been withheld under the protection of the privilege against self-
incrimination, Congress immunized any witness "before either House of Congress
or any committee of either House" as to "any fact or act touching which he shall
be required to testify. '14 However, the broad language of the act led to its
exploitation by the guilty since its effect was to provide "immunity baths" for
all witnesses before congressional committees.15 This abuse led to the passage
of further legislation-the 1862 Act' and the 1868 Act 7-which limited a
witness' protection to the exclusion of the actual testimony given, rather than
the complete barring of prosecution based on that testimony.18
The Supreme Court first reviewed this legislation in the landmark case of
Counselman v. Hitchcock."9 In that case, the petitioner, asserting his fifth amend-
ment privilege, declined to answer certain questions concerning an alleged Inter-
state Commerce Commission violation, notwithstanding a grant of immunity
under the 1868 Act.20 The Supreme Court reversed the contempt conviction,2 '
11. Lilienthal, supra note 8, at 695-96.
12. See G. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission v (1924).
13. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155. England had passed a limited version of
an immunity statute in 1562. Statute of Elizabeth, 5 Eliz. 1, c. 9, § 12, at 192 (1562).
However, this apparently applied only to civil cases. Wigmore § 2190, at 67. The right was
later extended to include criminal cases. See Statute of 1695-96, 7 & 8 Will. III, c. 3, § 7.
14. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 155, 156.
15. All a witness had to do to gain complete protection was to speak before a committee
and confess his crimes. One such incident was largely responsible for the eventual reform
movement. Messrs. Russell and Floyd, two clerks at the Department of the Interior,
embezzled $2,000,000 in government bonds, and, after arranging to testify before a House
committee, disclosed their misdeed. When the government attempted to prosecute, it was
held that they had gained immunity. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1862).
16. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333. Law enforcement officials could base
their investigation on the testimony given, and the prosecution could use any new evidence
which was the "fruit" of any investigation. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sem. 429 (1862).
17. Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37. See note 20 infra for text of statute.
18. This immunity was held sufficient to permit the compulsion of testimony in several
lower federal courts. See United States v. McCarthy, 18 F. 87, 89 (S.f.N.Y. 1883); United
States v. Williams, 28 F. Cas. 670 (No. 16,717) (C.C. S.D. Ohio 1872); United States v.
Brown, 24 F. Cas. 1273 (No. 14,671) (D. Ore. 1871); In re Phillips, 19 F. Cas. 506 (No.
11,097) (D. Va. 1869). But see Commonwealth v. Emery, 107 Mass. 172 (1871).
19. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
20. The statute provided in pertinent part that "no answer . . . from any . . . witness
... shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against such party or witness, or his
property... in any court of the United States . . . in respect to any crime, or for the
enforcement of... any act or omission of such ... witness .... ." Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch.
13, 15 Stat. 37.
21. Petitioner was adjudicated in contempt and was taken into custody until he would
answer. In re Counselman, 44 F. 268 (C.C. N.D. Ill. 1890), rev'd sub nom. Counselman v.
Hitchock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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holding that a federal immunity statute is valid only if the protection it provides
is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.ns The
premise that the immunity granted must be "coextensive" with the privilege23
was interpreted by the Court to bar any future prosecution for the offense to
which the compelled testimony related.24 The Court stated:
We are dearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject
to prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the
effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States.
[The immunity statute under consideration] does not supply a complete protection
from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard,
and is not a full substitute for that prohibition. In view of the constitutional pro-
hibition, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against
future prosecution for the offence to which the question relates.25
The protection afforded by the statute was dearly narrower than this standard
required, and was therefore held invalid.26 However, the Court did suggest that
an immunity statute, if properly framed, would be valid.7 The overly broad
language in Counsemnan is in a great way responsible for the subsequent con-
fusion as to the necessary breadth required by the Constitution for enactment
of a valid immunity statute.28
In response to the Counselman decision, Congress hastily drafted legislation
which provided for compulsory immunity from penal sanctions based upon
evidence given by a witness before the Interstate Commerce Commission or in
proceedings under the Interstate Commerce Act. - The constitutionality of this
statute, which provided that "no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, con-
22. 142 US. at 585. The "coextensive" requirement is predicated on the theory that if
the immunity statute removes the harm which the privilege is meant to protect, then there
is no need for the privilege. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
23. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 US. 52, 54, 78 (1964); United States
v. Wlliams, 28 F. Cas. 670, 671 (No. 16,717) (C.C. S.D. Ohio 1872).
24. 142 US. at 586.
25. Id. at 585-86.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 586.
28. See text accompanying note 25 supra where the Court stated that only transactional
immunity can supplant the fifth amendment privilege. This statement has generally been
cited as the holding of the case. See, e.g., Adams v. Maryland, 347 US. 179, 182 (1954);
United States v. Bryan, 339 US. 323, 335-37 (1950); United States v. Murdock 284 U.S.
141, 149 (1931); Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 141 (1911). However, earlier in
Counselman, the Court, in giving its reasons for striking down the statute, stated that
it "could not, and would not, prevent the use of [the witnesses'] testimony to search out
other testimony to be used in evidence against him... 2" 142 US. at 564. This would seem
to indicate that use and derivative use immunity would comply with the constitutional
mandate, since the act in question was invalidated for its failure to prohibit the use,
against the witness, of evidence obtained from his compelled testimony.
29. Counselman was handed down on Jan. 11, 1892; the act in question was passed on
Jan. 27, 1892. 23 Cong. Rec. 573 (1892).
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cerning which he may testify,"8 0 was upheld by the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Walker."1 However, the Court specifically limited the privilege so that it would
only protect a witness from being compelled to furnish evidence that could result
in his subjection to criminal sanctions.82
In Brown, the Court noted that the fifth amendment to the Constitution is
susceptible of two interpretations: literal and practical.83 To interpret the protec-
tion against self-incrimination clause literally would permit a witness to refuse
to disclose any fact which might tend to disgrace or embarrass him.3 4 This inter-
pretation would, in effect, prohibit any compelled testimony, for the witness
alone would be the judge as to whether his answers would have that tendency.8 0
A practical interpretation, however, would "secure the witness against a criminal
prosecution, which might be aided directly or indirectly by his disclosure .... ,,s
The Court chose the latter interpretation, basing its decision in part on the
need of such legislation to effectively enforce the Interstate Commerce Act.87
Thus, it was presumed after Counselman and Brown that the validity of an
immunity statute would be upheld only if the statute provided transactional im-
munity-the proscription of any future prosecutions for the offense or trans-
action to which the compelled testimony related.18 The Supreme Court first cast
30. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443, 444, repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 245,
84 Stat. 931. It has been suggested that this statute was an overreaction to the Counselman
decision. Comment on Immunity Provisions, Working Papers of the Nat'l Comm'n of
Reform of Fed. Crim. Laws 1405, 1412 (1970).
31. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
32. Id. at 595.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The dissenters implied that the privilege could not be replaced by anything less
than repeal of the amendment, since they interpreted the protection to extend to the effects
of disgrace and abhorrence. Id. at 620-21, 628. Accord, United States v. James, 60 F. 257, 264
(ND. I3. 1894). Some coinientators argue that the penalties and forfeitures contemplated
by the privilege against self-incrimination include social consequences such as "expulsion
from labor unions, loss of employment, discrimination in housing and schooling, and public
opprobrium." Boudin, The Immunity Bill, 42 Geo. L.J. 497, 519 (1954) (footnote omitted).
However, the privilege has traditionally been limited to criminal sanctions. See, e.g., Brown
v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896), wherein the Court stated that the design of the con-
stitutional privilege is not to aid the witness in vindicating his character, but to protect him
against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a criminal charge. If he can
secure legal immunity from prosecution, the possible impairment of his good name is a pen-
alty which it is reasonable he should be compelled to pay for the common good. Accord,
Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 147 (1949).
36. 161 U.S. at 595.
37. This conclusion is based in part on the following language of the Brown Court: "If
..witnesses standing in Brown's position were at liberty to set up an immunity from
testifying, the enforcement of the Interstate Commerce law or other analogous acts ...
would become impossible . . . ." 161 U.S. at 610. See also Note, The Federal Witness
Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L.J.
1568, 1574 (1963).
38. "The 1893 statute has become part of our constitutional fabric." Ullmann v. United
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doubt upon this presumption in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission.0 The major
holding of the Court in Murphy was that the federal government could not,
absent an immunity provision, compel a witness to give testimony which might
incriminate him under the laws of another jurisdiction °
But the Murphy Court went beyond this, to consider whether the fifth amend-
ment required an absolute bar to any future prosecutions, as Counselian and
Brown had apparently held, or whether it was sufficient to merely prohibit the
use of the compelled testimony or its fruits.4 ' Narrowly construing Counselman,
the Murphy Court held that a grant of immunity was sufficiently broad if it
prohibited use of the compelled testimony and its fruits.P The majority of cases
decided after Murphy appeared to support this narrow construction. 3 However,
there has also been some recent language which appears to require the broader
Counselinan and Brown standard."
States, 350 US. 422, 438 (1956). It has been included "in substantially the same terms, in
virtually all of the major regulatory enactments of the Federal Government." Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1, 6 (1948) (footnote omitted).
39. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
40. Id. at 79. This decision overruled a long line of cases which had held that "full and
complete immunity against prosecution by the government compelling the witness to anmver
is equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule against compulsory self-incrimination."
United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931); accord, Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S.
371, 379-80 (1958); Hale v. Henkel, 201 US. 43, 69 (1906).
41. The "fruits" of testimony refers to information gained as a result of using the
compelled testimony. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 US. 385 (1920),
which held that any information gained from inadmissible evidence is likewise inadmissible.
42. Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking for the majority, quoted extensively from passages
in Counselman which suggested that an exclusionary rule is sufficient. 378 U.S. at 78-79.
Any reference to the passages in Counselman which appear to require absolute immunity
were omitted. But see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White. Id. at 106-07.
It has been suggested that the Court viewed Counselman as stating no more than "a
preclusionary rule of evidence.' 33 Fordham L. Rev. 77, 80 (1964). Another reason advanced
is that since the Court has extended the fifth amendment privilege to the states, Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 US. 1 (1964), an expansive reading of the privilege could have a far more
serious impact than was true in the days of Counselman. Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.. 234,
250 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring).
43. See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 US. 273, 276 (1968): "Our decisions establish be-
yond dispute the breadth of the privilege to refuse to respond to questions when the result
may be self-incriminatory, and the need fully to implement its guaranty.... Answers may be
compelled regardless of the privilege if there is immunity from federal and state use of the
compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution against the
person testifying." (citations omitted). This has been interpreted as permitting subsequent
state or federal prosecutions on independent evidence after the witness had received federal
immunity. Comment on Immunity Provisions, supra note 30, at 1431.
44. See, e.g., Stevens v. Marks, 383 US. 234, 244-45 (1966); Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 382 US. 70, 80 (1965). The limited restriction has also been held
inapplicable on statutory grounds. See, e.g., Haynes v. United States, 390 US. 85 (1968)
(the Gun Registration Case); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v.
United States, 390 US. 39 (1968) (the Bookie Tax Cases).
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In Kastigar v. United States,45 the Supreme Court was faced with the problem
of resolving this long-standing confusion, and squarely determining the breadth
necessary to enact a valid immunity statute.40 The petitioners in Kastigar, ap-
pearing before a United States grand jury, refused to answer questions, notwith-
standing a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970.47 The Act provided for "use" and "derivative use" immunity.48 It
prohibited the use of the compelled testimony and evidence derived directly or
indirectly therefrom, but would permit a subsequent prosecution based on inde-
pendent evidence.
The petitioners alleged that such a statute was not sufficiently broad to compel
testimony.49 They argued that an immunity statute50 must, as a minimum, grant
full transactional immunity, i.e., prohibit all future prosecutions for offenses to
which the compelled testimony related.5 ' In support of this proposition, the
petitioners relied heavily on the broad language of the Counselman decision, 2
which had arguably dictated the necessity of transactional immunity.50 Mr.
45. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
46. See note 28 supra.
47. See 406 U.S. at 442.
48. See note 3 supra.
49. See note 4 supra. The scope that immunity statutes must have to be constitutional
was a question that the Supreme Court had never squarely entertained. 406 U.S. at 457-58.
Most of the post-Counseman statutes which the Court had passed on fell into two categories:
they either followed the 1893 Act in providing transactional immunity (See, e.g., Ullmann
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949);
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943)), or they were deficient for failing to prevent the
use of all the evidence obtained from the compelled testimony (See, e.g., Albertson v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 80 (1965); Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S.
71, 73 (1920)). This is not to say, however, that the Court had not previously had the
opportunity to resolve the question of the necessary scope of immunity statutes. They
specifically skirted the issue in Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971) (per curiam),
over the dissents of Justices Douglas, Marshall, Brennan and Black. The issue was also left
unresolved in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 606 n.11 (1971), and Stevens v. Marks,
383 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1966).
50. Petitioners' initial assertion that no immunity statute, however drawn, could furnish
a lawful basis for compelling incriminating testimony was summarily rejected by the Court.
406 U.S. at 448. It is, however, the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas that "the framers put
it beyond the power of Congress to compel anyone to confess his crimes." Id. at 467 (dis-
senting opinion) (emphasis omitted). See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 440 (1956)
(dissenting opinion). Accordingly, he feels that Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), and
other cases upholding immunity statutes, should be overruled. 350 U.S. at 440, 455 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
51. Transactional immunity may be illustrated as follows: An individual testifying before
a grand jury investigating narcotics acknowledges the murder of an Informant. If the
individual had been given transaction immunity, subsequent prosecution of that witness for
murder could not be undertaken, even if there were other wholly independent evidence.
See note 67 infra.
52. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
53. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
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Justice Powell, for the majority, rejected the contention of the petitioners and
chose to construe Counselman narrowly, as had the Court in Murphy v. Water-
front Commission. The broad language of Counselman was, in the Court's
view, "unnecessary" to that decision, and could not be considered binding
authority. 55 Accordingly, the Kastigar Court felt that "both the reasoning...
in Murphy and the result reached compel the conclusion that use and derivative
use immunity is constitutionally sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of
the privilege." 56
The Court expressly stated that its decision was consistent with the conceptual
basis of Counselman.57 The deficiency in the Counselman statute, the present
Court noted, was its failure to prohibit the use, against the witness, of evidence
which was obtained from his compelled testimony. The Counselman Court
repeatedly stated that the statute "could not, and would not, prevent the use
of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against
him or his property, in a criminal proceeding .... ."58 Since that statute "failed
to protect a witness from future prosecution based on knowledge and sources
of information obtained from the compelled testimony,' 'r 9 it was invalid.
Since the goal of an immunity statute is to leave the witness and prosecutor
in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his fifth amend-
ment privilege, °0 the Court felt it necessary to answer the petitioners' allegations
that use and derivative use immunity would not bar the use of the compelled
testimony as an "investigatory lead;"'0 1 for example, the prosecution may obtain
54. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). Mir. Justice Douglas suggested that Counselman was overruled,
sub silentio, by Murphy. 406 U.S. at 463 (dissenting opinion).
55. 406 U.S. at 455. Whether this language is the dictum of Counselman is uncertain. It
has traditionally been thought that Counselmnan held that transactional immunity is
required by the Constitution. See, e.g., Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 182 (1954);
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 428 (1943); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141,
149 (1931). However, later cases have interpreted this statement as merely the dictum of
Counsehnan, and would interpret it narrowly. Cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 US. 273, 276
(1968); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1963).
Professor Dixon, who was instrumental in the drafting of the new statute, is in agreement
with the later interpretation. He has stated that "the essence of Counslmman is its use
restriction language, and not the additional loose statement from which the absolute immunity
has been derived." Comment on Immunity Provisions, supra note 30, at 1430.
56. 406 U.S. at 458. Murphy had prohibited the use of the compelled testimony and its
fruits by federal officials after two states had given the witness immunity. 378 US. at 79.
However, this would not preclude a subsequent federal prosecution, but the federal
authorities would have the burden of showing that their evidence was not tainted by the
previous testimony. Id. n.18. If transactional immunity had been deemed necessary, this
would have precluded any subsequent federal prosecution. Mr. Justice Douglas felt that
Murphy was irrelevant to the present case, inasmuch as no interjurisdictional problems
presented themselves. 406 U.S. at 464 (dissenting opinion).
57. 406 U.S. at 453.
58. 142 US. at 564. Similar statements are found at 564 and 586. See also 406 U.S. at 454.
59. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 437 (1956).
60. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 US. 52, 79 (1964).
61. See, e.g., Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 80 (1965).
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"leads, names of witnesses, or other information not otherwise available that
might result in a prosecution. 62
Relying on Murphy,63 the Court stated that the prosecution has the "affir-
mative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use [in the subsequent
prosecution] is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the com-
pelled testimony." 64 Thus, Kastigar specifically holds what the Court had re-
cently expressed by way of dictum,0 5 and what commentators had for a long time
argued 0-that transactional immunity which grants full immunity from prose-
cution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates 7 is considerably
broader than the protection guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
However, a closer examination of this opinion reveals that while it does resolve
the problem of the necessary breadth required for valid immunity legislation, it
also leaves some questions in this area unresolved, or answers them in an un-
persuasive manner.
The majority opinion stated that, in the event of an attempted subsequent
prosecution, the government will have the burden of proving that the evidence
to be used is in no way derived from the compelled testimony. 8 However, as
Mr. Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent, this burden may rest, in actuality,
on the defendant. 0 The prosecution will have no difficulty in meeting its burden
of proof by mere assertions if the witness is unable to produce contrary evi-
62. 406 U.S. at 459.
63. 378 U.S. at 79 n.18. There have been other federal cases supporting the shift of the
burden to the prosecution. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 59 (1968); United
States v. Pappadio, 235 F. Supp. 887, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 346 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965),
vacated sub nom. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966). See also United States
v. Wallack, 231 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). This rule is analogous to that used to
regulate violations of wiretap acts; once an improper act on the part of the government Is
proved (here a compulsion to testify), the burden shifts to it to prove that all or the re-
mainder of its evidence has not been derived from the improper act. United States v.
Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485, 488 (2d
Cir. 1941), aff'd on other grounds, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
64. 406 U.S. at 460.
65. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
66. Wigmore states: "Immunity statutes providing against 'use' of the compelled testi-
mony could easily and properly be construed to proscribe not only direct use of the evi-
dence, but indirect use as well. That is, they could be construed to proscribe use of the
'fruit of the tree,' a doctrine suffcing in the areas of search and seizure and wiretap. Such
a construction would render the statutes valid, the immunity being as broad as, but not
wastefully broader than, the privilege." Wigmore § 2283 at 524-25 (footnotes omitted) (em.
phasis omitted). Accord, C. McCormick, Evidence § 135 at 285-86 (1954).
67. Under transactional immunity, a witness obtains immunity for those crimes to which
his testimony relates, not for all crimes of which he may be guilty at the time he is com.
pelled to testify. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 935-36 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 860 (1949).
68. 406 U.S. at 461-62.
69. See 406 U.S. at 468-69 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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denceY° Since the question of taint is solely within the knowledge of the
prosecution, a witness who believes that his compelled testimony served as the
catalyst for future investigations and/or prosecutions "will be hard pressed in-
deed to ferret out the evidence necessary to prove it."71 Accordingly, when a sub-
sequent prosecution is attempted, "[t]he good faith of the prosecuting authori-
ties [could represent] the sole safeguard of the witness' rights."72 While some
commentators believe that the good faith of the prosecutor offers the witness
sufficient protection,73 even a prosecutor acting in the best of faith cannot be
certain that somewhere during the investigation there was not some prohibited
use of compelled testimony.74 Thus, placing the burden of proof on the govern-
ment may be merely illusory.
Assuming that the "affirmative duty" imposed on the prosecution to prove
that the evidence it intends to use in a subsequent prosecution originated from
a source "wholly independent of the compelled testimony"73 affords the defen-
dant real, not merely illusory protection, the Court made no mention of the
degree of proof required to discharge the prosecutions burden. The question re-
mains whether this burden will be met by a preponderance of evidence, clear and
convincing evidence, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt. While lower federal
courts have stated that clear and convincing evidence is required, this question
cannot be considered resolved.7 6
Finally, one must examine the practical effects of a holding which permits sub-
sequent prosecutions based upon independently obtained evidence. It is reason-
able to expect a court to find that any evidence discovered after compelled testi-
mony is the fruit of the compelled testimony; 7 7 it would thus appear that it is
virtually impossible for the prosecution to discharge the burden of showing that
the previous testimony did not, in some manner, aid in the subsequent investiga-
70. Id. at 469.
71. Id. See 61 Nw. U.. Rev. 654, 663-64 (1966).
72. 406 U.S. at 469.
73. See 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 654, 666 (1966).
74. See 406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. Giglio v. United States, 405 US.
150 (1972); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
75. 406 U.S. at 460.
76. In United States v. Pappadio, 235 F. Supp. 887, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), afl'd, 346 Fad
5 (2d Cir. 1965), vacated sub nom. Shillitani v. United States, 384 US. 364 (1966), the
court stated: "Should the Government try the witness under the pending indictment, the
burden would be on the Government to prove, dearly and convincingly, that all of its
proof is derived from sources completely independent of the witness's grand jury testimony,
and any dues or leads derived from such testimony." This standard was cited with approval
in United States v. Birrell, 269 F. Supp. 716, 725 n.13 (Sf.N.Y. 1967).
77. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951), where the Court stated
that "t]he privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support
a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant... ." Accord, United
States v. Trigilio, 255 F2d 385 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Costello, 222 F2d 656
(2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Doto, 205 F.d 416 (2d Cir. 1953).
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tion.78 While it has been suggested that the only situation in which this burden
could be discharged is one in which the evidence has been acquired before the
witness testified,79 some writers feel that even this situation would not permit
the prosecutor to sustain his burden of proof.80
A careful reading of both Kastigar and Counselman must also lead one to
question whether the present decision is consistent with the conceptual basis
of Counselman, as was asserted by the majority of the Court,8' or whether the
present case too easily concluded that Counselman did not intend to fix a rule
of transactional immunity. If one is to read Counselman for the proposition that
an immunity statute must protect the witness to the same extent that a claim
of the privilege would protect him, then the conceptual harmony of Kastigar
and Counselman can be preserved. However, if one interprets Counselman, as
the Supreme Court has, as espousing that "nothing short of absolute immunity
would justify compelling the witness to testify if he claimed his privilege,"' 2
then it is indeed difficult to see how Kastigar can stand consistent with Coun-
selman.
It would appear that Kastigar's impact will be more theoretical than practical.
While the decision is correct in principle, it appears to be highly unworkable.80
Nevertheless, "[t]he fact that there is only a slight possibility that a jurisdiction
would be able to prosecute a witness without the use of such [compelled] testi-
mony or its fruits should not force that possibility to be ignored." 84 Only time
will determine how real that possibility is.
Constitutional Law-Right to Counsel-Rationale of Gideon v. Wain-
wright Extended to All Criminal Prosecutions at Which Accused Is
Deprived of His Liberty.--Petitioner, an indigent, was charged with carry-
ing a concealed weapon, an offense punishable under Florida law by up to six
months imprisonment and a $1,000 fine.' After a non-jury trial, at which
petitioner was not represented by counsel, he was convicted and sentenced to
90 days in jail. He then brought a habeas corpus action in the Florida Supreme
Court alleging that, as an indigent layman without counsel, he had been un-
able to properly present an adequate defense to the charge. Following logic
78. Comment, Self-Incrimination and the States: Restriking the Balance, 73 Yale L.J.
1491, 1495 (1964)
79. 33 Fordham L. Rev. 77, 80 (1964). See United States v. Keilly, 445 F.2d 1285, 1287
n.1 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 962 (1972)
80. Comment, Self-Incrimination and the States: Restriking the Balance, 73 Yale L.J.
1491, 1495 (1964).
81. 406 U.S. at 453.
82. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 428 (1943).
83. See Comment, Self Incrimination and the States: Restriking the Balance, 73 Yale L.J.
1491, 1495 (1964).
84. 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 654, 662 (1966) (footnote omitted). See 378 U.S. at 106 (con-
curring opinion).
1. Law of July 5, 1969, cl. 69-30b, § 2, [1969] Fla. Laws 1106.
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which had been applied in Duncan v. Louisiana2 to the jury trial guarantee,
the Florida Supreme Court dismissed the writ. It held that the right to court-
appointed counsel extends only to trials "for non-petty offenses punishable by
more than six months imprisonment." 3 After granting certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court unanimously reversed, rejecting the analogy to Duncan
and holding that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony,
unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."4 Argersinger v. Hamilin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972).
The question to what extent the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment 5 requires that in state criminal prosecutions an indigent accused
be afforded counsel, unless waived, is one which has long perplexed the federal
courts. In the 1932 case of Powell v. Alabamac the Supreme Court decided,
in the context of an appeal from death sentences imposed at the infamous trial
of the "Scottsboro Boys," that failure to assign effective counsel had been a
denial of "a necessary requisite of due process of law."7 Recognizing the im-
portance to a defendant of representation by counsel the Court remarked:
2. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In Duncan the Supreme Court had found that due process re-
quires availability of the jury trial option in prosecutions for serious offenses and that, with-
out drawing a specific line between serious and petty offenses, the facts before it (a sentence
of two years imprisonment) indicated that a serious and not petty offense had been charged.
Id. at 161-62. Thereafter, in Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969), the Court made
clearer its conception of what is a petty offense by applying the definition of "petty
offense" enacted by Congress-iLe., any misdemeanor the penalty for which does not exceed
six months imprisonment, a fine of not more than $500, or both. The Court held that
defendant, who had been given a suspended jail sentence and probation upon conviction
for criminal contempt had not been deprived of a constitutional right by being tried with-
out a jury. 395 U.S. at 150-52. See also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 US. 194 (1968); Cheff v.
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
3. State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin 236 So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla. 1970), rev'd 407 US. 2S
(1972).
4. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
S. The fourteenth amendment provides in part that "No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . .. ." US. Const. amend.
XIV, § L The sixth amendment provides in part that "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." US.
Const. amend. VL While the sixth amendment does not directly apply to state criminal
prosecutions (and there is no similarly worded provision that does), the "due process"
clause of the fourteenth amendment has been used as a vehicle for achieving that effect
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-67 (1932). Initially, the test was that enunciated in
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); i.e., that due process guaranteed only those
rights, otherwise found in the Bill of Rights, which were of a "fundamental" nature. Id. at
106; see 287 U.S. at 67. Later, however, it became accepted that what the sixth amendment
guaranteed as regards right to counsel is coterminous with the requirements of due process.
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), noted in 32 Fordham L. Rev. 388 (1963).
6. 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see 13 B.U.L. Rev. 92 (1933); 32 Colum. L. Rev. 1430 (1932);
31 Mich. L. Rev. 245 (1932).
7. 287 US. at 71.
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The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . . He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish
his innocence.2
Despite this rather broad language the Court in Powell limited its holding at
least to capital cases,9 explicitly reserving decision as to whether the right
granted would be recognized "in other criminal prosecutions. 10
A decade later, in Betts v. Brady," the Court declined to extend the rationale
of Powell to non-capital cases. In Betts, it was held that the absence of counsel
was not necessarily a denial of the "fundamental fairness" required by due
process and that therefore the fourteenth amendment did not inexorably bind
the states to provide counsel in all criminal prosecutions. 12 The Court noted:
"Every [state] court has power, if it deems proper, to appoint counsel where
that course seems to be required in the interest of fairness."' 3 The conviction
of Betts, who had struggled to present his own defense in a Maryland criminal
court at his trial for robbery, was affirmed.' 4
In 1963 another defendant, Clarence Earl Gideon, whose situation was re-
markably similar to that of Betts, was confronted with the same problem which
had vexed Betts 20-odd years before. Like Betts, Gideon had been convicted
of a state felony charge before a court which had refused his request for the
8. Id. at 68-69.
9. Id. at 71. The Court declared: "[In a capital case, where the defendant is unable
to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of
ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether
requested or not, to assign counsel . . . ." Id. Literally, it seems that what the court's
holding required for appointment of counsel was a capital case and some sort of disability
on the part of the defendant.
10. Id. at 71. The Court stated: "Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecu-
tions, or under other circumstances, we need not determine." Id.
11. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see 21 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 107 (1942) ; 17 Tul. L. Rev. 306 (1942); Wis. L. Rev. 118 (1943).
12. 316 U.S. at 473. Said the Court: "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the con-
viction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental
ideas of fairness and right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may result In a
conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the Amendment embodies
an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted
and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel." Id.
13. Id. at 471-72 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 472-73. Qualifying factors, perhaps, were the Court's further notation that
defendant was "not helpless, but was a man forty-three years old, of ordinary intelligence,
and ability to take care of his own interests on the trial of that narrow issue (the truth
of his alibi]" and its assurance that "in Maryland, if the situation had been otherwise
and it had appeared that the petitioner was, for any reason, at a serious disadvantage by
reason of the lack of counsel, a refusal to appoint would have resulted in the reversal of a
judgment of conviction." Id.
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appointment of counsel. Like Betts, Gideon maintained that he had been
deprived of a constitutional right.15 In the interim, however, things had changed.
More states had come to recognize the importance of counsel, whether by
legislative guarantee or by actual practice; 6 and the rule of Betts had become
eroded through the application of a "special circumstances" exception which
through the years had become more and more enlarged.17
In Gideon v. Wainwright,1 8 the Supreme Court reconsidered its holding in
Betts v. Brady and specifically overruled it. Declaring Betts "an abrupt break
with its own well-considered precedents"' 9 as well as a departure "from the
sound wisdom upon which the Court's holding in Powell v. Alabama rested," -
the Court stated in Gideon that "any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him '21
The Gideon decision provided the impetus for a great broadening of the
protections afforded defendants in a variety of state criminal proceedings.
In particular, the Court mandated the presence of counsel, unless waived
after appraisal of the right thereto, in custodial interrogationsm line-upsp
preliminary hearings, 4 probation revocation hearings,25 on appeal,20 and, in
15. The colloquy which took place between the court and the defendant, as reproduced
in part in the Supreme Court's decision, was as follows: "'The Court: Mr. Gideon, I am
sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in this case. Under the laws of the
State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant
is when that person is charged with a capital offense....
The Defendant: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented by
Counsel.'" Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963).
16. See A. Lewis, Gideon's Trumpet 132 (1964); Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and
the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "the Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused,
30 U. ChL L. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1962).
17. See 372 U.S. at 350 (Harlan, J., concurring); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.. 506
(1962); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 US. 697 (1960); Pennsylvania ex rel Herman v.
Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956).
18. 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 103
(1963); 16 Vand. L. Rev. 1228 (1963).
19. 372 U.S. at 344. The Court noted: "Twenty-two States, as friends of the Court,
argue that Betts was 'an anachronism when handed down' and that it should now be
overruled. We agree." Id. at 345.
20. Id. at 345.
21. Id. at 344.
22. M randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in which the Court ruled that "the right
to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment privilege . . . ." Id. at 469. See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
23. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967). In these cases the Court based its decision on sixth amendment grounds as made
applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. The Wade-Gilbert rule has recently
been limited to post-indictment line-ups, and held not applicable to pre-indictment con-
frontations. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
24. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 US. 1 (1970) (sixth amendment grounds).
25. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (sixth amendment grounds).
26. Douglas v. California, 372 US. 353 (1963) (fourteenth amendment due process and
equal protection grounds).
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the case of minors, delinquency proceedings. 27 With respect to the right to
counsel at trial, however, the Court in Gideon did not make explicit to which
classes of cases its holding applied.28 The question whether due process re-
quired that counsel be provided in the trial of non-felony cases was left open;
and it was not to be answered by the Court in the 1960's.20
In 1963, in Patterson v. Warden,8 0 the Court did apply the Gideon rule to
misdemeanors punishable by felony-length imprisonment. Subsequent cases,
however, in which certiorari was denied, seemed to indicate a reluctance on
the part of the Court to provide a broader solution.81 In 1971 the issue ap-
peared to be resolved with the promulgation by the Court of rules of procedure "
which suggested strongly that no right to assigned counsel existed for petty federal
offenses. 8 Though the term "petty offenses" was not defined in these rules,
presumably the Court was adopting the federal statutory definition:84 viz.,
"Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a
period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both .... ,,35
The above rules were barely in force when the Court granted certiorari80
to review the case of State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin.37 In Argersinger, the
Florida Supreme Court had held that an indigent defendant charged with a
misdemeanor was entitled to assigned counsel only where there existed the
27. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (fourteenth amendment due process grounds).
28. One commentator noted: "The Court left unanswered, however, the question of
whether the holding is applicable to all criminal cases, or, as Mr. justice Harlan in his
concurring opinion intimated, to cases which 'carry the responsibility of a substantial
prison term.'" 32 Fordham L. Rev. 358, 361-62 (1963).
29. See L. Hall, Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & 3. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 112-13
(3d ed. 1969); Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 Wash. L. Rev.
685 (1968), in id. at 114-16.
30. 372 U.S. 776 (1963) (per curiam). The Court remanded the case back to the lower
courts "for further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wainwright." Id. Cf. The Council of
State Governments, Increased Rights for Defendants in State Criminal Prosecutions 30
(1963).
31. Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907
(1966); State v. Heller, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 174, 228 A.2d 815 (1966), appeal denied, 154 Conn.
743, 226 A.2d 521, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 902 (1967); State v. DeJoseph, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct.
624, 222 A.2d 752, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 982 (1966).
32. Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Minor Offenses Before United States Magistrates,
in 400 U.S. 1037-42 (1971).
33. 400 U.S. at 1031-34 (Black, 3., dissenting). justice Black concluded from analysis
of Rules 2 and 3 that no right to assigned counsel for petty offenses existed. Rule 2
provides that a defendant charged with other than a petty offense must be advised "'of
his right to retain counsel, of his right to request the assignment of counsel if he is unable
to obtain counsel.'" Id. at 1032. Rule 3 provides that a defendant accused of a petty offense
shall be informed merely of his "'right to counsel.'" Id.
34. Newell v. State, 277 A.2d 731, 736-38 (Me. 1971); see 400 U.S. at 1032 (dissenting
opinion).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1970).
36. 401 U.S. 908 (1971).
37. 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970), rev'd, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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possibility of a penalty of more than six months imprisonmenL3 8 The Supreme
Court of the United States reversed, holding that "absent a knowing and
intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel
at his trial." 39 In reaching its conclusion the Court, speaking through Justice
Douglas, commenced by disposing of the argument that since the right to trial
by jury had been limited by Duncan v. Louisiana to trials where punishment
of imprisonment for six months or more impended,40 the same limitation should
apply with respect to the right to counsel. While both the jury trial and counsel
guarantees derive from the sixth amendment, still other guarantees in the same
amendment-e.g., public trial, confrontation of witnesses, compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses41-had not been limited "to felonies or to lesser but
serious offenses."142 Furthermore the rights to trial by jury and representation
of counsel were separate and independent in their development and in the
historical commitments which had been made to them.43 The Court therefore
rejected the premise "that since prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprison-
ment for less than six months may be tried without a jury, they may also be
tried without a lawyer." 4
More importantly the Court found, harking back to the Powell and Gideon
decisions, that "assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence
of a fair trial"45 and that in fact "[t]he requirement of counsel may well be
necessary for a fair trial even in a petty-offense prosecution."" Such prosecu-
tions present, often enough, legal and constitutional issues no less complex
than those arising where stiffer penalties might be imposed.47 And the potential
38. 236 So. 2d at 443.
39. 407 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added).
40. 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968). See note 2 supra.
41. See 407 U.S. 28-29. As the Court noted, the sixth amendment "provides specified
standards for 'all criminal prosecutions. " Id. at 27. Thus in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948), it had held that the right to a "public trial" obtained In a state proceeding even
though a sentence of only 60-days imprisonment was involved. See also Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses in one's favor);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 US. 400 (1965) (right of confrontation); District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 US. 617 (1937) (right of cross-examination).
42. 407 U.S. at 28.
43. Id. at 29-30. The Court observed that "there is historical support for limiting the 'deep
commitment' to trial by jury to 'serious criminal cases' .. . ." Id. at 30, citing Frankfurter
& Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39
Harv. L. Rev. 917, 980-82 (1926) and James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 331-32 (Sth Cir.
1969); cf. Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. ChL L. Rev. 245 (1959). The
Court also noted, however, that "there is no such support for a similar limitation on the
right to assistance of counsel." 407 U.S. at 30, citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60,
64-65 (1932). See also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
44. 407 US. at 30-31.
45. Id. at 31.
46. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
47. Id., citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Powell v.
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for injustice is, if anything, greater, given the "obsession for speedy disposi-
tions" which tends to develop from the sheer volume of misdemeanor cases-
"far greater in number than felony prosecutions." 4 Thus the Court adopted
the imprisonment-in-fact standard previously announced by the Supreme
Court of Oregon, which, in Stevenson v. Holzman,49 had ruled that: "'The
denial of the assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of a jail
sentence.' "50
One of the major arguments against this expansion of the right to counsel is
the increased burden which it will place upon the legal profession. 51 As the Chief
Justice pointed out in his concurring opinion in Argersinger:
This will mean not only that more defense counsel must be provided, but also addi-
tional prosecutors and better facilities for securing information about the accused as
it bears on the probability of a decision to confine.0 2
While concern for this burden was shared by all of the Justices-judging from
the majority opinion and concurrences-there was distinct disagreement as to
its gravity. Certainly the six Justices who joined in the opinion of the Court
appear to believe that implementation of the rule announced will not exceed the
"Nation's legal resources." 53 The feeling of Justice Powell, joined by Justiceo
Rehnquist, was, however, to the contrary. 4 In their view at least a substantial
possibility exists of "short-term 'chaos'" and "long-term adverse effects." 0
Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
48. 407 U.S. at 34. See The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 128 (1967); Helersteln, The
Importance of the Misdemeanor Case on Trial and Appeal, 28 The Legal Aid Briefcase
151, 152 (1970); Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L.
Rev. 1249, 1261 (1970).
49. 254 Ore. 94, 458 P.2d 414 (1969).
50. 407 U.S. at 38, quoting Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. at 102, 458 P.2d at 418;
accord, State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967); cf. In re Smiley, 66 Cal.
2d 606, 427 P.2d 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967) (denial of counsel precludes substantial
jail sentence). Other jurisdictions have statutorily foreclosed imprisonment where an accused
is denied counsel. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 113-3(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
See generally Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 685, 734
(1968).
51. See Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D.
389, 392-94 (1966); 1 L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in American
State Courts 123-26 (1965).
52. 407 U.S. at 43 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
53. Id. at 37 n.7. As expressed in the opinion of the Court: "We do not share Mr.
Justice Powell's doubt that the Nation's legal resources are insufficient to implement the
rule we announce today. It has been estimated that between 1,575 and 2,300 full-time
counsel would be required to represent all indigent misdemeanants, excluding traffic of-
fenders. . . . These figures are relatively insignificant when compared to the estimated
355,200 attorneys in the United States . . . , a number which is projected to double by
the year 1985." Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
54. See id. at 56-60 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring).
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In part this view rests upon the prognosis that "although the new rule
is extended today only to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's opinion
foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophylactic rule applicable to all petty
offenses." 56 The argument is not without merit. As was aptly pointed out
by Justice Powell's concurrence, the Argersinger majority, similar to that in
Gideon and Powell, did not foreclose extension of its ruling beyond the facts
before it. Recalling perhaps the words of the majority that "[w] e need not con-
sider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right to counsel
where loss of liberty is not involved," 57 Justice Powell reasoned that "[t]he
logic ... advance[d] for extending the right to counsel to all cases in which the
penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies equally well to cases in which
other penalties may be imposed.",56
The Powell-Rehnquist concurrence bolstered its misgivings as to the effect of
the Argersinger holding with doubts as to its judicial sensibleness,W5 if not as to
its constitutionality.60 As an alternative to the "new inflexible rule" the exercise
of discretion "on a case-by-case basis" in petty offense prosecutions was offered.° *
The case-by-case approach, however, is itself not without difficulty. For one
thing, it may place too much discretion in the hands of the trial judge. Further-
more, if it does (as it seems to) constitute an answer to the "burden on legal
resources" problem envisioned in the majority rule, then it can only be viewed
56. Id. at 52 (Powell, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 37.
58. Id. at 52 (Powell, J., concurring). According to this concurrence, "[the rule adopted
today does not go all the way. It is limited to petty offense cases in which the sentence
is some imprisonment. The thrust of the Court's position indicates, however, that when
the decision must be made, the rule will be extended to all petty offense cases except
perhaps the most minor traffic violations. If the Court rejects on constitutional grounds,
as it has today, the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need for counsel if a jail
sentence is imposed, one must assume a similar rejection of discretion in other petty offense
cases. It would be illogical-and without discernible support in the Constitution-to hold
that no discretion may ever be exercised where a nominal jail sentence is contemplated
and at the same time endorse the legitimacy of discretion in 'non-jail' petty offense cases
which may result in far more serious consequences than a few hours or days of incarcera-
tion." Id. at 51.
59. Id. at 52-54 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. The Powell concurrence raised the possibility that the Court's ruling might result
in equal protection problems. Specifically, "[there may well be an unfair and unequal
treatment of individual defendants, depending on whether the individual judge has deter-
mined in advance to leave open the option of imprisonment." Id. at 54. A different sort of
discrimination was foreseen, moreover, in cases where a judge predetermines that no sentence
of imprisonment will be imposed and the statute under which the defendant is being tried
prescribes alternative punishment of sentence or fine. Here, the concurrence insists, the
non-indigent defendant will be disadvantaged for, able to pay, he will suffer his punish-
ment-in contrast to the indigent defendant who in effect will be let off. Id.
61. Id. at 63-66 (Powell, J., concurring). Factors considered significant in making a case-
by-case determination were: the complexity of the offense charged; probable sentence if
conviction ensues; and peculiarities of each case, such as the competency of the individual
defendant to defend himself. Id. at 54-55.
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as contemplating the appointment of counsel in far fewer instances. Implicit
within the approach is thus a very different conception of the necessity for counsel
in non-felony cases-and one which the majority has presumably rejected on
"fairness" grounds.62
Of the other approaches which have been suggested, the "petty offense-serious
offense" standard for appointment of counsel is considered the least viable, given
among other things the disparities in offense classification from state to state.08
The "imprisonment-in-law" approach, which would allow counsel where the
statutory provision under which a defendant is being tried provides for a jail
sentence,64 would seem even more burdensome than the rule announced by the
Court in Argersinger, for at least in the latter case a judge may determine that,
although imprisonment may be imposed, it will not be.
The most cogent criticism of the Argersinger holding is that it does, in effect,
require a judge to make a pre-trial determination regarding sentence: appoint-
ment of counsel at that time being a precondition for the imposition of a jail
term.6 5 Can a judge effectively separate determinations of guilt and sentence?
To put it another way, can he, having decided upon sentence, approach the
question of guilt without prejudice?
The Argersinger case certainly represents a landmark expansion of the Gideon
rationale that due process requires the presence of an attorney where an accused
stands to suffer a substantial deprivation. The Court in Argersinger has deter-
mined that any deprivation of liberty is sufficiently substantial. It only remains
to be seen what effect this holding will have on our criminal justice system. The
next few years will provide the answer.
Parole-Sentencing Fixing Sentence at the Statutory Maximum and
Refusing to Consider Future Parole, Solely Because of the Nature of the
Crime Involved, Held an Abuse of Discretion but not Violative of Due
Process.-The petitioner, Norman Minnis, was convicted of possession of
restricted dangerous drugs for sale' and was sentenced to an indeterminate period
62. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
63. See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings
and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 65 (1963); Comment, Continuing
Echoes of Gideon's Trumpet-The Indigent Defendant and the Misdemeanor, 10 S. Teax.
LJ. 222, 241 (1968). Some jurisdictions classify offenses as either felonies, misdemeanors,
or violations. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 10.00 (McKinney 1967). Other jurisdictions
categorize as felonies, gross misdemeanors, or petty misdemeanors. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 609.02 (1964), (Supp. 1973). Furthermore, what is classified in one state as a felony may
in another state be regarded as a misdemeanor or as no crime at all. See generally Note,
Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. at 1253.
64. See Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 685,
709 (1968).
65. See 407 U.S. at 53 (Powell, J., concurring).
1. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11911 (West Supp. 1972).
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of from six months to three years.2 The Adult Authority3 fixed his sentence at
the three year maximum and further stipulated that "future applications for
fixing petitioner's term at less than maximum or for parole would not be con-
sidered." 4 The petitioner contended that the Adult Authority's decision was based
solely on the nature of his crime and was not the result of an individual evalu-
ation of the petitioner, which amounted to a violation of his rights to due process
and an abuse of that agency's discretion.5 The California Supreme Court held
that the Adult Authority had abused its discretion by its arbitrary action and
ordered the agency to reconsider its decision in conformity with legislative intent.
The court, however, denied petitioner's due process argument. In re Minnis, 7
Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972).
In California, as in many other states,6 an indeterminate sentencing system
was enacted to eliminate the rigidity of traditional sentencing procedures.7 The
California system limits the sentencing power of the trial judge by requiring him
to impose only an indeterminate period of imprisonment as prescribed by statute
for the crime committed8 Subsequent determinations concerning the actual term
of imprisonment are made by the Adult Authority, a non-judicial administrative
agency which oversees both the indeterminate sentencing system and the parole
system.9 The agency fixes the exact length of time to be served within the in-
determinate period and sets the minimum duration of imprisonment before
parole eligibility1 0 Notwithstanding the seriousness of these decisions, the
2. In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 642, 498 P.2d 997, 999, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749, 751 (1972).
3. The Adult Authority is the administrative agency which fixes sentences and grants
parole under California's indeterminate sentencing laws. Cal. Penal Code § 5077 (West
1970). See note 10 infra and accompanying text.
4. 7 Cal. 3d at 642, 498 P.2d at 999, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
s. Id.
6. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-35 (1972); N.J. Stat. Ann. 30:4-123.40
(1964); N.Y. Penal Law § 70.00 (McKinney 1967); WVis. Stat. Ann. § 973.01 (1971). See
also Model Penal Code § 6.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
7. See In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 171 P. 958 (1918) wherein the court stated: "They [the
indeterminate sentence laws] seek to make the punishment fit the criminal rather than the
crime." Id. at 692, 171 P. at 959.
8. Cal. Penal Code § 1168 (West 1970) provides in pertinent part: "Every person
convicted of a public offense, for which imprisonment in any reformatory or state prison
is now prescribed by law shall, unless such convicted person be placed on probation, a new
trial granted, or the imposing of sentence suspended, be sentenced to be imprisoned in a
state prison, but the court in imposing the sentence shall not fix the term or duration
of the period of imprisonment." The constitutionality of this provision was upheld in
In re Collins, 198 Cal. 508, 245 P. 1089 (1926).
9. Cal. Penal Code § 3020 (West 1970) provides: "(Tlhe Adult Authority may
determine and redetermine, after the actual commencement of imprisonment, what length
of time, if any, such person shall be imprisoned . . . 21 For a discussion of the power of
the Authority under this section see Johnson, Multiple Punishment and Consecutive
Sentences: Reflections On the Neal Doctrine, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 357, 379-89 (1970).
10. Cal. Penal Code § 5077 (West 1970) provides: "The granting and revocation
of parole and the fixing of sentences shall be determined by the Adult Authority; provided,
that the Adult Authority or one member thereof shall interview each prisoner at least
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California legislature did not promulgate specific guidelines for the Authority's
determinations. As a result, the decisions are primarily committed to Agency
discretion."
The type of discretionary powers given California's Adult Authority are not
unique to that jurisdiction;' 2 parole boards, the Authority's counterpart in
other states, generally enjoy a good deal of liberty in making determinations
concerning the freedom of those incarcerated.' 8 The justification for permitting
such agencies wide discretionary power is based on several theories of parole,
all of which conclude that the prospective parolee has no preexisting right to a
parole release. 14 Courts also lend support to the theory that parole is not a right,
but merely a privilege, and for that reason refuse to apply due process standards
to the procedures for granting parole.15
Although the due process rights of the accused in the criminal justice system
have been greatly increased in the last decade,'0 those seeking parole release
have not been affected to the same extent by the extension of these rights.17
Having concluded that prospective parolees are not entitled to the same due
once before the Adult Authority determines his sentence." This procedure was held to be
sufficient in People v. Kostal, 159 Cal. App. 2d 444, 323 P.2d 1020 (2d Dist, 1958).
11. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 381. "The Penal Code provides no standards to guide
the Adult Authority in exercising its vast discretion to release a prisoner or to confine
him indefinitely." Id.
12. See note 6 supra.
13. For a more detailed discussion see Moreland, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Proba-
tion and Parole, 57 Ky. L.J. 51 (1968); Comment, Due Process: The Right to Counsel
in Parole Release Hearings, 54 Iowa L. Rev. 497 (1968); Comment, Parole: A New
Approach, 18 Loyola L. Rev. 87 (1971-72); Comment, Rights Versus Results: Quo Vadis
Due Process for Parolees, 1 Pacific L.J. 321 (1970); Comment, The Parole System, 120
U. Pa. L. Rev. 282 (1971).
14. There are five generally accepted theories behind the concept of parole: grace,
contract, custody, exhausted rights, and parens patriae. For a discussion of these theories
see Comment, The Parole System, supra note 13, at 286-300. But cf. Biddle v. Perovich,
274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) wherein the Court stated that a pardon "is not a private act of
grace." Id.
15. See, e.g., Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1023 (1971); Ott v. Ciccone, 326 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Bell v. Oswald, 305
F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
16. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to trial by jury); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to counsel guaranteed at critical confrontations
before trial); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (counsel required in a juvenile proceeding);
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (right to counsel and a hearing at sentencing);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (warnings required concerning right to counsel
at interrogation prior to trial) ; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (right to freedom
from self-incrimination).
17. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. But cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972); United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d
Cir.), vacated, 404 U.S. 879 (1971).
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process protections as the criminally accused," the decision making procedures
have been delegated to non-judicial agencies. 9
In Hannah v. Larche20 Chief Justice Warren subscribed to a due process
standard for the procedures of non-judicial governmental agencies, stating:
[W]hen governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which di-
rectly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use
the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process. 2
In 1969, the Supreme Court applied the Hannah rationale in Jenkins v.
McKeithen22 and held that since the state's Labor-Management Commission
made binding determinations, it had to insure that individuals subject to those
determinations were afforded due process protectionP
Despite the rulings by the Supreme Court in Hannah-McKeithen situations,
the courts have thus far refused to grant prospective parolees due process pro-
tections at the release stage.4 This position has been severely criticized by legal
writers, who have argued that the parole release determination is binding, rather
than investigative, and under the reasoning of Hannah-McKeithen persons
subject to those decisions should be afforded due process protectionP  However,
this theory has not received judicial recognition.
In support of the position that individuals subject to parole release determi-
18. See, e.g., In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, cert. denied,
400 U.S. 851 (1970), wherein the court stated: "Although we recognize, of course, that such
evidence would not be admissible in a court of law, we believe that an agency whose delicate
duty is to decide when a convicted offender can be safely allowed to return to and remain
in society is in a different posture than the court which decides his original guilt" Id. at 650,
463 P.2d at 740, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 388, and 59 Am. Jur. 2d Pardon and Parole § 79 (1971):
"Parole is not a constitutional right; it is a right bestowed by legislative grace, and the
subject of parole is within the legislative authority given by a state constitution to the
legislature." Id. (footnote omitted). See notes 14 & 15 supra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 6 & 9 supra and accompanying text. It may be argued that the simple
denial of a judicial hearing to prospective parolees is, in itself, a deprivation of due promr.s
rights.
20. 363 US. 420 (1960).
21. Id. at 442.
22. 395 US. 411 (1969).
23. Id. at 427. The agency in McKeithen had the power to make binding criminal
determinations in a non-judicial setting. Id. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) in which the Court noted that in reaching the
determination whether due process must be granted, there is a need to balance the
particular governmental function with the private interest affected.
24. See note 15 supra.
25. See, e.g., Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View From
Mempa v. Rhay, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1968); Comment, Constitutional Law: Parole Status
and the Privilege Concept, 1969 Duke L.J. 139; Comment, Due Process: The Right to
Counsel in Parole Release Hearings, 54 Iowa L. Rev. 497 (1968); Comment, Rights Versus
Results: Quo Vadis Due Process for Parolees, 1 Pacific L.J. 321 (1970); Comment, The
Parole System, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 282 (1971).
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nations are not entitled to due process protections, reliance may be placed on
decisions such as Menechino v. Oswald,28 which view parole as a privilege rather
than a right.27 The Menechino majority distinguished parole release from parole
revocation and conceded that there may be due process requirements in the
latter.28
A year later, in United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Board of
Parole,2 9 the Second Circuit formally concluded that parole revocation hearings
require the observance of minimal due process standards.8 0 The Bey court
distinguished parole revocation from parole release by stating:
It is not sophistic to attach greater importance to a person's justifiable reliance in
maintaining his conditional freedom so long as he abides by the conditions of his
release, than to his mere anticipation or hope of freedom.8'
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court was faced with the same question
in Morrissey v. Brewer,82 and accepted the Bey rationale. In support of its con-
clusion, the Court said:
We see, therefore, that the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many
of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a "grievous loss"
on the parolee and often on others. It is hardly useful any longer to try to deal with
this problem in terms of whether the parolee's liberty is a "right" or a "privilege." By
whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination calls for some orderly process, however
informal.88
The Court modified the impact of this holding by declaring that the rights
afforded a parolee in a revocation proceeding are not as great as those possessed
by a defendant in a criminal prosecution.8 4
26. 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
27. Id. at 408-09. "It is questionable whether a Board of Parole is even required to hold
a hearing on the question of whether a prisoner should be released on parole." Id. at 409
(footnote omitted).
28. Id. "[Tlhe [parole release] determination to be made differs from revocation of
parole, where plausible reasons might be advanced in favor of minimum procedural due
process. It may be argued that a parolee, having been released, enjoys a liberty akin to a
private interest, and that the Board is seeking to deprive him of that liberty . . . ." Id.
29. 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), vacated, 404 U.S. 879 (1971).
30. Id. "Unlike a prisoner being considered for parole release, a parolee faring relm-
prisonment stands to lose a 'presently enjoyed' interest in his conditional freedom ... "
Id. at 1086.
31. Id. at 1086.
32. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
33. Id. at 482. It is important to note that the Court, in reaching its conclusion, stated
that the traditional view of parole being a "privilege" would not operate to limit a
parolee's right to limited due process in the parole revocation situation. This departure
from the traditional view may well serve as a basis for an argument to grant similar rights to
those seeking a parole release.
34. Id. at 480. The Court enumerated the procedural requirements: "They Include
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence
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Attempts to secure similar due process protections for persons seeking parole
release have been unsuccessful. 35 One argument for the application of due process
standards to parole release procedures is based on a view of parole as an extension
of the sentencing procedure.3 6 Proponents of this argument rely on those deci-
sions which have held that sentencing is a "critical stage" of the criminal process
and, at such a stage, the adjudicatory body must afford the convicted person
certain due process guarantees.3 7 Mempa v. Rhay. 8 in which the Supreme Court
held that a person subjected to sentencing following probation revocation is en-
titled to representation by counsel,3 9 has been cited in support of applying these
standards to the parole release procedures. 0 However, this theory was dismissed
in Menechino; the court stating:
We do not accept [the] contention that a parole release determination is simply a
continuation or deferment of sentencing. The prisoner's sentence has already been
finally decreed by the court and cannot be changed. A parole Board's determination
as to release, on the other hand, is not final and may be reviewed and changed at any
time in the Board's discretion.4 '
In a strong dissent, Judge Feinberg took exception to the majority's reason-
ing.42 He noted that there has been a decrease in responsibility on the part of the
trial judge in the sentencing procedure, while the parole board's responsibility
has increased.43 If the actual term of the sentence was decided at the trial stage,
as it traditionally was, the accused would be granted the full spectrum of due
process rights; however, this determination is now delayed to a post-conviction
against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and docu-
mentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless
the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral
and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not
be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the fact finders as to the
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parol." Id. at 489.
35. See note 15 supra. See also Walker v. Oswald, 449 F2d 481 (2d Cir. 1971).
36. See Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023
(1971) where the petitioners attempted unsuccessfully to use this argument. For an in
depth discussion of the argument see Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the
Peno-Correctional Process, 45 linn. L. Rev. 803 (1961).
37. See, e.g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) in which the Supreme Court
held that the petitioner was entitled to fourteenth amendment due process protection which
included right to counsel, right to confront witnesses against him, and the right to offer
evidence when sentence was being considered; Townsend v. Burke, 334 US. 736 (1948)
wherein the Court held that sentencing the petitioner in the absence of counsel amounted
to a due process violation. See also note 34 supra. But see Comment, The Right to Counsel
in Parole Release Hearings, 54 Iowa L. Rev. 497 (1968).
38. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
39. Id. at 137.
40. See, e.g., Walker v. Oswald, 449 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1971); Menechino v. Oswald, 430
F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
41. 430 F.2d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 1970).
42. Id. at 412-19.
43. Id. at 414.
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proceeding where these due process protections are not available. The dissent
concluded that a prisoner is entitled to the same due process protections in parole
release proceedings as in sentencing proceedings. 44 Judge Feinberg's view of the
post-conviction status of prisoners is illustrated by his statement that "[t]he
criminal process does not end abruptly with the clang of the prison gate; society
has a pervading interest in what happens to the prisoner thereafter.Y45
The extension of sentencing contention raised by the petitioner in Menechino
appears more tenable when applied to California's indeterminate sentencing
system. The procedures of the Adult Authority, unlike those in a traditional
parole system, are quite similar to the procedures discussed in Mempa. The trial
judges in Mempa, as in California, were bound by statutory law to fix a prescribed
sentence. 46 Pursuant to the procedures in Mempa and those of California, an
administrative agency makes the actual sentencing determination based on its
own investigation and the recommendations of the trial judge and prosecutor.4 7
In Mempa, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to repre-
sentation by counsel when his probation was revoked and sentence imposed. 48
In support of its holding the Court stated:
[W]e do not question the authority of the State ... to provide for a deferred sen-
tencing procedure coupled with its probation provisions. . . .All we decide here is
that a lawyer must be afforded at this proceeding whether it be labeled a revocation
of probation or a deferred sentencing.49
Although the California courts have not been confronted with this precise issue,
there is a line of cases involving due process and the indeterminate sentence laws
which shed light on the direction in which California might go. It was held in
In re McLain59 that a prisoner had no due process right to a hearing when his
sentence was redetermined to a greater length by the Adult Authority because of
the prisoner's alleged misconduct during imprisonment. 1 The court stated:
The provisions for determining or redetermining sentence and for granting, suspending
or revoking parole do not violate due process because of the absence of a requirement
for notice or hearing. The notice of a hearing was given and required to be given in
the proceedings which resulted in the original conviction. Those proceedings resulted
in a conviction and the imposition of a sentence that was indeterminate, and until
fixed, amounted to a maximum sentence provided for the crime in question. When the
44. Id. Judge Feinberg went on to state, "[flor the defendant before ... the Parole Board,
the stakes are exactly the same: on the one hand, freedom to remain in or to return to
society and on the other, incarceration . " Id.
45. Id. at 413 (footnote omitted).
46. 389 U.S. at 135. For a discussion of California's system see notes 8-11 supra and
accompanying text.
47. 389 U.S. at 135.
48. Id. at 137.
49. Id.
50. 55 Cal. 2d 78, 357 P.2d 1080, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1960).
51. Id.
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Authority reduces a maximum sentence, its action, in the very nature of things, is
tentative and may be changed for cause.52
In Sturm v. Calijornia Adult Authority,15 3 a federal court confronted with a
McLain-type issue was not persuaded by petitioner's arguments that the Adult
Authority's action was a denial of due process." The majority simply reiterated
the position taken by the California Supreme Court in McLain.55 In a concurring
opinion, Judge Browning agreed that the Adult Authority had the power to
redetermine a prisoner's sentence, but maintained that the redetermination
procedures must provide some due process protection for the prisoner.50
Sturm was distinguished in Hester v. Craven,5 7 in which the Adult Authority
was ordered to grant the petitioner a hearing with respect to the redetermination
of his sentence in lieu of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 8 The Hester
court relied heavily on Judge Browning's concurrence in Sturm and concluded
that the petitioner was denied due process under the fourteenth amendment since
he was not permitted to confront and cross-examine witnesses.5 9
In California, the due process requirements which were stated by Judge
Browning and by the Hester court for redetermination of sentences have not
been extended to the initial sentence determination by the Adult Authority.
Although this initial determination is dearly "state action" as required by the
fourteenth amendment, the courts have yet to construe it as a "deprivation of
liberty."' 0  The California Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to
52. Id. at 85, 357 P.2d at 1085, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 829 (citations omitted).
53. 395 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969). In Sturm, the
Adult Authority redetermined the prisoner's sentence from 6 years to OYI years without a
hearing based on charges that the prisoner had broken prison rules.
54. Id. at 448-49.
55. Id. at 448.
56. Id. at 449. Judge Browning argued: "When the California Adult Authority entered
its order of July 3, 1962, refixing appellant's sentence at ten and one-half years, it sub-
stantially extended the prison term which appellant would be required to serve. Appel-
lant's challenge to the constitutionality of that order cannot be answered by pretending that
nothing really occurred, merely because a State court, five years earlier, had entered an order
fixing appellant's maximum term at life. The action of the Board was State action. It
deprived appellant of liberty; if it did so 'without due process of law,' or denied appellant
'the equal protection of the laws,' it offended the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
57. 322 F. Supp. 1256 (CD. Cal. 1971).
58. Id. at 1266. Sturm was distinguished on the ground that the court was not
confronted with the issue of due process. Id. at 1260.
59. Id. at 1265-66. In Hester the petitioner had been on parole and his parole revocation
and sentence redetermination were based on conduct outside of prison. The Adult
Authority had denied him the opportunity to confront witnesses that had testified against
him. Id.
60. See note 46 supra. US. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part: "... nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.,
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consider this question when a due process challenge to the Adult Authority's
initial sentencing procedures was put forth in In re Minnis.01
The petitioner in Minnis challenged the Adult Authority's determination that
he would have to remain incarcerated for the statutory maximum and would not
be considered for parole at any time during his term of imprisonment.02 The
petitioner maintained that the determination was the result of the Adult Au-
thority's "'policy' that prisoners who have sold drugs or narcotics 'purely for
profit' should be retained in prison for the maximum term permissible. '08 The
Adult Authority's action was attacked both as a denial of due process and as an
abuse of discretion. 4 The court ordered the Adult Authority to reconsider peti-
tioner's application for parole and to determine if his sentence should be fixed
at less than the maximum. 5 The court stated:
Although we reject petitioner's contentions based upon claims of constitutional in-
firmities, we agree that the Authority did abuse its discretion in the present case.00
The Minnis court examined the purposes of the indeterminate sentence laws
as construed by past decisions0 7 and concluded that the Adult Authority was
created to provide prisoners with individualized treatment.0 8 The court em-
phasized that the indeterminate sentence laws, in conjunction with the parole
system, have as their main purpose and object the rehabilitation and reform of
the prisoner. 9 The court found the Authority's action in this case repugnant
to those purposes.7°
61. 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972).
62. Id. at 642, 498 P.2d at 999, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 651, 498 P.2d at 1005, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
66. Id. at 642, 498 P.2d at 999, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
67. Id. at 644, 498 P.2d at 1000, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 752. The court cited In rc Lee, 177
Cal. 690, 171 P. 958 (1918), in which it was held that the indeterminate sentence laws were
enacted to reform the criminal justice system by making "the punishment fit the criminal
rather than the crime." This decision was also relied on to illustrate the emphasis on
reformation of the prisoner. Id. at 692, 171 P. at 959. The court also cited People v. Morse,
60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964), wherein the legislative Intent for the
indeterminate sentence laws was described: "In the general field of criminal law the Legisla-
tre has abandoned the ancient notion of catagorical punishment, the infliction of fixed
terms for certain crimes, and substituted the indeterminate sentence, leaving to the Adult
Authority the judgment of the period of incarceration. The Authority does not fix that
period pursuant to a formula of punishment, but in accordance with the adjustment and
social rehabilitation of the individual analyzed as a human composite of intellectual,
emotional and genetic factors." Id. at 642-43, 388 P.2d at 39-40, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 207-08
(footnotes omitted).
68. 7 Cal. 3d at 644-45, 498 P.2d at 1000, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
69. Id. at 644, 498 P.2d at 1000-01, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 752. The court relied on Roberts v.
Duffy, 167 Cal. 629, 140 P. 260 (1914) which held: "The purpose and object of a parole
system is to mitigate the rigor of the old, and while requiring the punishment of a prisoner
by actual confinement for a fixed period of his term of sentence, still to provide a more
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The Minnis court noted that the Authority's unilateral policy that all persons
convicted of "selling narcotics for profit" would be incarcerated for the maximum
statutory period and denied review for parole directly affronted the legislative
intent for the Authority's creation and amounted to an abuse of discretion. n The
decision stated that the Authority erroneously disregarded the prisoner's conduct
while incarcerated."2 The categorical refusal on the part of the Authority to
consider the petitioner's conduct while incarcerated was viewed by the court
as a flagrant disregard of the State's interest to encourage prisoners to strive for
rehabilitation and to maintain good conductY3
Several cases were cited by the court as illustrative of its long standing positions
favoring compliance with legislative intent and opposing arbitrary action by
governmental agencies. In re M.Y4 was mentioned as an example of the court's
policy to discourage actions in defiance of legislative purposes."r In that case a
juvenile court's decision to detain a minor because of the nature of the offense
charged was reversed because it had not examined the merits of the individual
case as mandated by the legislature.76 The court manifested its disfavor with
arbitrary action in parole cases, noting Roberts v. Duffy, 7 which had ordered
the board of prison authorities to abandon its policy of not reviewing applications
for parole until the prisoner served half of his term of sentence. 8
The Adult Authority's "refusal in advance to consider future applications"
humane management and prison discipline under which there is extended to those who may
show a disposition to reform and whose reformation may reasonably be expected, a hope
and prospect of liberation from the prison walls under the restrictions and conditions of a
parole." Id. at 634, 140 P. 261-62.
70. 7 Cal. 3d at 645, 498 P.2d at 1001, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The court cited Johnson, supra note 9, at 382, wherein the author outlined the
objectives of the Adult Authority: "First, it reduces inconsistency in sentencing. Although
the Authority may be and is inconsistent itself, it is unlikely that a single administrative
agency could ever approach the spectacular disharmony inevitable if sentences were imposed
by hundreds of judges spread over a vast state. Second, the system obviously puts enormous
pressure upon inmates hopeful of release to behave themselves and to take advantage of
such rehabilitational programs as are offered. Third, it does allow early release for the
rehabilitated and indefinite confinement for the unrehabilitated, within the usually broad
statutory limits." Id. (footnote omitted). See note 81 infra and accompanying text.
74. 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970).
75. 7 Cal. 3d at 645-46, 498 P.2d at 1001-02, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 753-54.
76. 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970), wherein the court stated: "The
decision to take a minor away from his home, his parents, and his friends in (sic] fraught with
such grave consequences that the juvenile court cannot establish mechanical 'policies' for
automatic detention. The Legislature has indicated that children should be released except
under certain specific conditions of 'immediate and urgent necessity." Id. at 30-31, 473
P.2d at 747-48, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44 (footnote omitted).
77. 167 Cal. 629, 140 P. 260 (1914).
78. Id. The petitioner in Roberts was a "first termer" and complained that the board
of prison authorities should review his application for parole at the end of one year of
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filed by Minnis was considered arbitrary since the legislature had enacted an
indeterminate sentence for the crime in question rather than a "fixed" sentence."0
This action was construed as defeating the purpose of the indeterminate sentence
law.80 The court pointed out that the arbitrariness and disregard for legislative
intent was further indicated by the unique character of the petitioner.8' The
court, however, insisted that the Adult Authority could have legitimately fixed
petitioner's sentence at the maximum in light of the report submitted by the
district attorney; in any event, Minnis was entitled to have his parole application
"duly considered."82
Having concluded that the Adult Authority abused its discretion, the court
turned to constitutional issues raised by the petitioner. Notwithstanding the
court's initial statement that its decision was not based on the constitutional
infirmities complained of by the petitioner, the court stated:
Although a prisoner may not have a right to be released on parole, parole cannot be
withheld unless by means consonant with due process.8s
What the court meant by "consonant with due process" is not ascertainable;
it merely cited the leading Supreme Court decisions dealing with due process in
administrative governmental determinations.84
The petitioner had contended that section 1203.1 of California's Penal Code
was violative of due process, since it permits the district attorney to file a state-
ment which is taken into consideration when the Adult Authority makes its
sentencing and parole determinations.85 In dismissing this contention, the court
enunciated that the section was not violative of due process because the in-
incarceration. The court granted this request but denied petitioner's claim that he was
entitled to parole as a matter of "right." Id.
79. 7 Cal. 3d at 646-47, 498 P.2d at 1002, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
80. Id. at 648, 498 P.2d at 1003, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
81. Id. at 643, 498 P.2d at 999, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 751. The court stated: "Furthermore,
the record supports an inference that petitioner's application did not receive individualized
consideration. He has not suffered any prior convictions. Before his arrest, he frequently
participated in and assisted with charitable activities. Since his imprisonment, he has been
in minimum security institutions. The record is devoid of any suggestions that he has been
a disciplinary problem and the administrator of a prison camp where petitioner spent
several months has stated that petitioner 'does have a lot to offer.'" Id. (emphasis omitted).
82. Id. at 646-50, 498 P.2d at 1002-04, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 754-56. In his report, the
District Attorney stated that the petitioner sold large quantities of drugs though he himself
was a non-user of narcotics and was well educated. Id. at 649 n.10, 498 P.2d at 1004 n.10, 102
Cal. Rptr. at 756 n.10.
83. Id. at 648, 498 P.2d at 1004, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 756 (emphasis added).
84. Id. The court cited Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886 (1961), Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), and Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) in support of its declaration that some due process require-
ments are present in parole release proceedings. Id.
85. Id. at 649-50, 498 P.2d at 1003-04, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 755-66. For a summary of the
District Attorney's report see note 82 supra.
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formation in the district attorney's statement served a legitimate purpose.80 The
court concluded that the procedures accompanying the statement were adequate,
and stated:
Under the terms of the statute, copies of the district attorney's statement are sent to
the defendant and the defense counsel. The defense counsel can immediately reply
in writing to the opinions of counsel for the People and the defendant can respond in
writing or orally at the pre-term-fixing interview .... 87
The petitioner also challenged the sentencing and parole procedures as a denial
of due process.88 He based his charge on the fact that he was not provided with
counsel and on his belief that the subsequent sentencing determination by the
Adult Authority violated the proscription against double jeopardy.P The court
discarded these contentions as being without substance because they were
predicated on the petitioner's erroneous view of the Adult Authority's proceedings
as a trialY0 The Adult Authority's activities were described by the court as
administrative rather than judicial0 ' and the court concluded that "due process
takes on a different significance in evaluating that agency's determination on
term-fixing and parole-granting than it had at trial."92 Though the court never
clarified the "different significance" due process takes on in the Adult Authority's
proceedings, it did, however, specifically exclude the right to counsel in such
proceedingsY93
The Minnis court distinguished Morrissey v. Brewer" since that case had
dealt with parole revocation and not parole release.95 The Morrissey court had
reversed a state parole board determination and enumerated specific due process
86. 7 Cal. 3d at 650, 498 P.2d at 1004-O5, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 756-57.
87. Id. The interview is mandated by § 5077 of the California Penal Code. See note
10 supra.
88. 7 Cal. 3d at 650, 498 P.2d at 1005, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
89. Id.
90. Id. "[Djudicial proceedings terminate when conviction is announced and sentence,
albeit for an indeterminate period, is imposed." Id. In support of this conclusion the court
cited In re Sandel, 64 Cal. 2d 412, 412 P.2d 806, 50 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1966), in which it was
stated: "Upon conviction it is the duty of the court to pass sentence on the defendant and
impose the punishment prescribed. Under our indeterminate sentence law, of course, the
Adult Authority is empowered to determine as an administrative matter 'what length of
time' a person sentenced to prison shall serve; but the actual imposition of that sentence
for the term prescribed by law remains a judicial function which can be performed only
by a court." Id. at 415, 412 P.2d at 809, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 465 (emphasis omitted) (citations
omitted).
91. 7 Cal. 3d at 650, 498 P.2d at 1005, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 757. In a prior decision, In re
Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 425 P.2d 200, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1967), the court stated:
"[P]roceedings of the Adult Authority are wholly administrative in nature, and that
agency's determination of length of sentence or conditions of parole is not a judicial act2 Id.
at 304, 425 P.2d at 206, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
92. 7 Cal. 3d at 650, 498 P.2d at 1005, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
93. Id.
94. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
95. 7 Cal. 3d at 650 n.12, 498 P.2d at 1005 n.12, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 757 n.12.
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procedural guarantees which must be afforded individuals. 0 Unfortunately, the
Minnis court failed to enumerate similar standards, therefore limiting the impact
of its decision.
It is clear that the Minnis court, although fashioning a remedy for the inequity
at hand, avoided the attendant constitutional issues. The formulation of a viable
due process argument that states must enact parole procedures for all crimes
punishable by imprisonment is presently improbable. Nevertheless, once a state
enacts parole procedures for a given crime, it will probably be necessary for it to
execute those procedures in conformity with federal due process requirements.
Securities-Merger Proposals-Naked Allegations of Unfairness in Merger
Ratios Present No Cognizable Federal Claim Under Section 10(b) or
Rule Iob-5 Where There is Full Disclosure.-Plaintiff, a stockholder in
Bell Intercontinental Corporation, commenced a derivative action to enjoin the
proposed merger of Bell and its two subsidiaries into The Equity Corporation,
the majority stockholder in Bell.' Plaintiff alleged the merger ratios were unfair
to the minority stockholders of Bell. Although there had been complete disclo-
sure of the merger terms,2 he contended that Equity and various of its officers
96. See note 34 supra.
1. Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972). Equity owned 51.7% of Bell's common
stock. Bell, in turn, as a holding company owned 66.1% of the common stock of Frye
Industries and approximately 81% of the voting stock of The Wheelabrator Corporation.
Bell and its two subsidiaries were Delaware corporations, as is Equity. Id. at 716.
2. The complaint alleged no misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Plaintiff did not contend
that the proxy statement (issued after the suit was initiated) was in any way misleading.
Before the district court he did assert one material misrepresentation had been made, but
he argued, for the purposes of the summary judgment motion only, that there had been
full and fair disclosure. In his brief on appeal, plaintiff inserted allegations that the proxy
statement was false and misleading. Brief for Appellant at 30-32; see Popkin v. Bishop,
464 F-2d at 718 n.9. The appeals court dismissed the contentions of the brief, noting there
had been a concession below, no pressing of the issue and no parallel allegation in the
complaint. 464 F.2d at 718 n.9.
The court of appeals decided the case on June 29, 1972. On August 8, 1972, plaintiff filed
a new complaint. Popkin v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., Civil No. 72-3354 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug.
8, 1972). In the revised complaint, Popkin alleged violations of § 10(b) as before, but
added numerous charges of failure to disclose material information pursuant to the dictates
of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (1970), the proxy
provision. Thus, plaintiff alleged trading in the Bell shares was "distorted in anticipation
of the Merger" which, he said, Equity manipulated at "grossly unfair" terms. Civil No.
72-3354, at 3. He also said Equity caused the members of the boards of directors of the
other three corporations to enter into the agreement. Id. at 6. Furthermore, plaintiff con-
tended Equity forced Dillon Reed, the independent firm that evaluated the exchange ratio,
to acquiesce in its (Equity's) proposal, even though Dillon Reed's valuation study was
inconsistent with that proposal. Id. at 17. The complaint was replete with charges of proxy
violations. Id. at 7-18. Finally, the plaintiff brought a charge of violation of fiduciary duties
on the part of the corporate officers under a pendant jurisdiction theory. Id. at 18.
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had breached fiduciary duties by proposing the allegedly unfair ratios, thereby
entitling plaintiff and other minority stockholders to injunctive relief under
rule l0b-5. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 19343 or rule lob-S4 promulgated thereunder, on the basis of a prior
state proceeding5 that had approved the merger ratios as fair and reasonable as
to Bell and its stockholders. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed, holding that, once a plaintiff admits full and fair disclosure,
claims for injunctive relief under section 10(b) must fail Popkin V. Bishop,
464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was only a small part-
and one of the least controversial 7-of the remedial legislative package which
culminated more than two years of extensive investigation into the securities
exchanges. Although evidence is scant,8 what there is supports the view that its
drafters designed section 10(b) as an expansive antifraud device.0 The Act was
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange ... (b) To use or employ in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors."
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972) provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."
5. See note 1 supra.
6. However, the court specifically stated that its holding was reached without determin-
ing whether Popkin would be collaterally estopped from litigating the fairness of the merger
exchange ratios in state courts. 464 F.2d at 720-21. A prior state proceeding had found
the ratios fair and had ordered the merger. See id. at 716, citing Kaufman v. Jeffords,
Index No. 01615-67 (Sup. Ct 1967).
7. A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud-SEC Rule 10b-S, § 2.2, at 22.2 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Bromberg].
8. Id. at 22.2-.3. "Of nearly a thousand pages of hearings in the House, the combined
references to § 10(b) (then § 9(c)) would scarcely fill a page. Much the same is true in
the Senate.
"The several committee Reports merely paraphrase the language of the several bills and
add little or nothing to the evidence on intent ...
"The floor debates are no more enlightening." Id.
9. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Inter-
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aimed at the "single seamless web" comprised of "[s]peculation, manipulation,
faulty credit control, investors' ignorance, and disregard of trust relationships
by those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries."10
Though actions based on the section 10(b) provisions abound, the Supreme
Court did not consider a section 10(b) case until 1969.11 Since then, in one of
its rare pronouncements on such a case, the Court has stated that Congress in-
tended the courts to construe the securities regulations "not technically and
restrictively," but flexibly to effectuate their remedial purposes. 12
To avoid an unmanageable amount of rule 10ob-5 litigation, the federal district
and circuit courts have developed a number of qualifications on the use of the
federal securities provisions.' 3 For years, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 14
presented the primary hurdle for plaintiffs seeking redress under section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5. In Birnbaum, minority shareholders contended that the defen.
dant directors violated section 10(b) when they made alleged misrepresentations
while negotiating the sale of a controlling interest in the corporation. 15 The
court held that the section protected only sellers and purchasers of securities
and that it could not be invoked to redress mere "fraudulent mismanagement of
state and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1934), for testimony of Thomas G.
Corcoran explaining that the section was intended to prevent "any other cunning devices."
Bromberg has termed the section an "acknowledged catchall." Bromberg 22.4.
10. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934) (emphasis added). The House
Committee indicated it hoped the disclosure provision would "encourage the voluntary
maintenance of proper fiduciary standards." Id. at 13. Moreover, the legislation was intended
merely as a skeletal framework within which administrative discretion would work to fill
the gaps expectable in so complex a system as the marketplace. Id. at 6-7. See also Bloomen-
thai, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act and Self-Aggrandizement, 15
N.Y.L.F. 332, 334 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bloomenthall. See generally S. Rep. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. Rep.
No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
11. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 US. 453, 465 (1969). Perhaps the dearth of
Supreme Court rulings in the area, and the consequent lack of guidance to the lower federal
courts, is at least in part responsible for the confused state of the law in the field. On the
other hand, it is arguable that the Court tacitly has approved the mushrooming development
of the 10b-5 action by declining to grant certiorari in almost all cases, except where rule
lob-5 relief has been denied.
12. Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission has said that in "considering (the elements
of the antifraud provisions] we are not to be circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid
classifications." Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
13. The courts have considered the federal securities regulations as a complement to,
rather than a preemption of, state business corporation laws. However, where state laws
tend to impede the congressional purpose of the federal regulations, the former must accede.
See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.,
374 F.2d 627, 635-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) ; Fleischer, "Federal Cor-
poration Law": An Assessment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1146, 1168-70 (1965).
14. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
15. Id. at 462.
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corporate affairs. 1 6 Thus, the narrow construction of the section 10(b) provi-
sions in Birnbaum established a two-fold test: plaintiff had to be a purchaser or
seller of securities and to have been defrauded.
Although it is now settled that a shareholder in a corporation subject to a
merger does qualify under the rule; 17 nevertheless, a plaintiff in a court strictly
applying what is left of Birnbaum would still be denied 10b-5 recovery unless he
could prove he had been defrauded. Since the Birnbaum court did not define the
"fraud" requisite for standing, to avoid an unconscionable result, courts have
variously drawn fraud categories to fit a plaintiff's case. The erosion of the sec-
ond Birnbaum test has not, however, been a one-way process and today there is
no clear-cut rule as to the extent to which rule 10b-S allows redress for cor-
porate mismanagement.18
The Sixth Circuit, as early as 1954, held, in Seagrave Corp. v. Mount,'0 that
minority stockholders could sue derivatively to enjoin a proposed purchase of
stock where the personal interests of the controlling directors of the corporation
interfered with the fair judgment to which the plaintiffs were entitled. The court
noted that a dominant or controlling shareholder, like a director, is a fiduciary.20
Furthermore, where good faith and full disclosure eliminate the question of ac-
tual fraud, the court ruled "equity will still act to enforce the fiduciary obliga-
tion under circumstances amounting to constructive fraud.""
16. Id. at 464.
17. Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967); see Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d at 718 n.8. The process of chiseling away at the
purchaser-seller rule in other areas as well has been an arduous one. See, e.g., Crane Co. V.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 798 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 US. 822
(1970); Knauff v. Utah Constr. & Minping Co., 408 F.2d 938, 961 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 831 (1969); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Rule: An Archaic Tool for Deter-
mining Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 56 Geo. L.J. 1177 (1968), especially at 1179 n.18, wherein
it is stated that the Securities and Exchange Commission had urged rejection of the rule
as "too narrow."
In Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 US. 977
(1967), the court discussed the Act's use of the word "sale" and summed up the position
saying: "[Aln acquisition or disposition of securities in exchange for other securities falls
within the statutory definitions and ... this reasoning applies to a case of merger....
[T~he legislative history and the purpose of the securities laws indicate that an exchange of
securities incidental to a merger is subject to their antifraud protections." 380 F.2d at 266.
See also id. at 269 (Fairchild & Cummings, J, concurring), wherein it was pointed out that
the SEC urged the rejection of the Birnbaum rule as to shareholders affected by a merger.
18. Part of the problem revolves around the confusion of common law "fraud" concepts
and those embodied in the securities regulations. See 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation, 1430-44
(2d ed. 1961). For discussion of the evolution of the fraud concept relative to rule 10b-5
actions, see generally 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation, 3631-45 (Supp. 1969); Bloomenthal;
Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 Va. L.
Rev. 268 (1968); Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal
Corporation Law, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1103 (1969).
19. 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954).
20. Id. at 396.
21. Id. at 397 (emphasis added). The court defined constructive fraud as "acts which
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By way of dictum, the Third Circuit appears to have adopted this more ex-
pansive view of the section 10(b) provisions. In McClure v. Borne Chemical
Company22 the court stated: "Section 10(b) imposes broad fiduciary duties on
management vis-&-vis the corporation and its individual stockholders. As imple-
mented by Rule 10b-5 ... Section 10(b) provides stockholders with a potent
weapon for enforcement of many fiduciary duties." 23
On the other hand, the United States District Court for the District of Min-
nesota adopted a contrary position in the 1961 case of Honigman v. The Green
Giant Co.24 There, the court refused a claim which alleged that a recapitalization
plan was unfair, stating that in the absence of actual fraud, misleading state-
ments or omission of statements of material facts, there was no cognizable fed-
eral claim. 2
5
Thus, there appear to be at least two disparate views of the scope of section
10(b). The one allows invocation of the rules to redress breaches of fiduciary
duty and to combat constructive fraud; the narrower view dictates quiescence
of the provisions absent a clear allegation of fraud, deception, misrepresentation
or nondisclosure of material facts.
Beginning in 1964 the Second Circuit, the source of much section 10(b) case
law, decided a number of seemingly inconsistent cases. The first, Ruckle v.
Roto American Corp.,26 held that any failure by directors to disclose information
pertaining to a proposed issuance of stock, even where the nondisclosure was
only as to other directors, constituted a fraud upon the corporation and rendered
section 10(b) provisions applicable."7 Twenty-five days thereafter, however, a
panel from the same court held in O'Neill v. Maytag28 that no federally cogniz-
able claim under section 10(b) was presented in the absence of allegations of
deception, misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Plaintiff in O'Neill was a share-
holder in National Airlines who claimed that the defendants had violated fiduci-
ary duties (thereby giving rise to a section 10(b) claim) in using $1.8 million
of the airline's assets to acquire a more favorable control position for themselves
in a series of stock exchanges with Pan American World Airways. The court
rejected the federal claim, notwithstanding the dictum in Ruckle,29 stating that
a plaintiff could sue in state courts on a theory of common law breach of fidu-
may have been done in good faith, with no purpose to harm the corporation, but which
are done by one who has placed himself in a position of conflict between a fiduciary ob-
ligation and his own private interests." Id.
22. 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
23. Id. at 834.
24. 208 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 941 (1963).
25. Id. at 766.
26. 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
27. Id. Notably, the court also stated in dictum that it was possible for "even the entlre
board of directors" to defraud the corporation. Id. at 29.
28. 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964). The lone dissenter was judge Hays who filed a one
sentence statement.
29. See note 27 supra.
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ciary dutyYo In so holding, the court also rejected specifically the dictum in
McClure31 and the amicus curiae position taken by the Securities and Exchange
Commission,32 preferring instead the rationale that a corporation could only be
deceived through its officers or agents who constituted its personality and that,
if they were not deceived, the corporation was not.a
Though courts in the Second Circuit initially followed O'Neill,"4 it was not
long before discomfiture with the decision became evident. In a string of cases,
culminating in the en banc reversal of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, the New
York federal courts reevaluated the positions asserted in the earlier cases and,
by implication at least, overruled many of them.30 The onslaught began with
A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow 7 There, plaintiff, a stockbroker, sought damages
under section 10(b) for the defendant's fraudulent failure to pay for securities.
Citing the Supreme Court decision in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc.,38 the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, stating:
We believe that § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a garden
30. 339 Fad at 767.
31. Id. at 768. See note 22 supra and accompanying teat.
32. Id. The Commission had urged that a claim under rule lob-5 is stated by allegations
that controlling directors cause a corporation to acquire a large block of its own stock
at an excessive price for the purpose of removing the threat to the directors' control. Id.
33. Id. It is noteworthy that the O'Neill court relied on Birnbaum. Id. Professor
Loss tries to harmonize Ruckle and O'Neill in opining that the "pendulum began to swing
back." 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 3637 (Supp. 1969). Query: does the pendulum
swing so wide in 25 days?
34. See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D-N.Y. 1967) (denying section 10(b) relief
for failure to allege deception and reliance); Schoenbaum v. Firsthrook, 268 F. Supp. 385
(SLD.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Cohen
v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (stating that a section 10(b) claim must allege
more than breach of general fiduciary duty); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766
(SJ).N.Y. 1965) (elaborating O'Neill in holding minority shareholders in a 73% controlled
corporation had no section 10(b) claim since they could not prove the alleged deception
caused their injury.) In 1965 the Delaware district court served notice that, in a proper case,
it would pay obeisance only to the O'Neill line of cases. Voege v. American Sumatra
Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965). By convoluted reasoning the court managed
to find fraud, causation and reliance, thereby enabling plaintiff to proceed. Id. at 375-76.
35. 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
36. See text accompanying note 42 infra. But see Loeb v. Whittaker Corp, 333 F. Supp.
484, 487 (Sf.DN.Y. 1971), where it was stated that there is some debate within the Second
Circuit as to whether Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook overruled the Barnett v. Anaconda Co.
analysis discussed at note 34 supra.
37. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). Two weeks earlier in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.,
374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967), the court had chipped away at
the ONeill inspired requirement of reliance, saying such an element of proof was not needed
where "no volitional act is required and the result of a forced sale is exactly that intended
by the wrongdoer." 375 F2d at 635.
38. 375 US. 180 (1963).
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type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception. Novel or atypical methods
should not provide immunity from the securities laws.89
With this language, the court seemed to be adopting the more expansive view of
rule 10b-5 while paying lip service to the O'Neill position that actual fraud was
required.
Soon thereafter, Judge Bonsai in the Southern District of New York felt com-
pelled to reconsider and reverse his decision in Entel v. Allen.40 Initially, he
relied on O'Neill and Birnbaum41 to find no federally cognizable claim, though
the facts established a state cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. On re-
argument, he reversed, stating: "Since the court's decision, the Court of Appeals
has handed down two decisions reversing this court [Vine and Brod], which
seriously challenge, if not overrule, its decisions in Birnbaum and O'Neill."4
While the court expressed a reluctance to expand the scope of rule 10b-5, it
concluded: "If an undisclosed scheme to breach State contract law is encom-
passed by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, then an undisclosed scheme to breach
State corporate fiduciary law must also be covered." 43
While district courts within the Second Circuit continued to wrestle with the
various theories of section 10(b) fraud, the court of appeals, sitting en banc,
decided the landmark case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.44 Most significant
about the case was, of course, its holding that anyone possessing material inside
information might be deemed an "insider" and subjected to statutory sanctions
for trading in a particular security without prior disclosure. However, in reach-
ing this result, the court examined the purposes of section 10(b), noting that a
primary purpose was to protect the public from fraud. The Second Circuit thus
paved the way for the expansion of the use of rule 10b-5 into the area of cor-
porate mismanagement, stating: "[I]t would seem elementary that the Com-
mission has a duty to police management so as to prevent corporate practices
which are reasonably likely fraudulently to injure investors."4
Though the district courts did not immediately seize upon Texas Gulf Sul-
39. 375 F.2d at 397. It is noteworthy that in reaching this conclusion, the court stated
that the rules and regulations were promulgated by the commission both for the public
interest and the protection of investors. Id. at 396. See also the text of section 10(b) at
note 3 supra.
40. 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
41. Id. at 64-65.
42. Id. at 69 (italics added).
43. Id. at 70. The court stated that while this SEC-urged position was apparently re-
jected in O'Neill, it seemed to have been adopted in Brod. Id.
About this time, the Third Circuit took a middle ground in Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d
865 (3d Cir. 1968). The court there upheld a rule lob-5 claim where plaintiffs alleged the
sale of corporate stock at far below its contemporaneous value constituted a fraud, stating
that while "deception" was a necessary element of proof the "definition of 'deception' may
vary with the circumstances." Id. at 869.
44. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
45. Id. at 861 (emphasis added). But see Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) (discussed at note 16 supra and
accompanying text).
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phur,46 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals tarried little in asserting that sec-
tion 10(b) provisions were to be expanded to new areas. In Schoenbaum v. First-
brook47 plaintiff sued derivatively to recover under section 10(b) for damages
resulting from sales in Canada of Banff Oil Ltd. treasury stock to defendants
Aquitaine of Canada, Ltd., and Paribas Corporation. Defendants, it was main-
tained, had violated the section 10(b) provisions by causing Banff to issue shares
of stock to them at the then current market price knowing that the undisclosed
news of the oil find would greatly enhance the value of the stock. Initially, a
divided panel affirmed dismissal of the complaint because it alleged only a breach
of fiduciary duty, rather than fraud. 8 Judge Hays dissented,4 citing Hooper v.
Mountain States Securities CorporationP0 for the proposition that section 10(b)
was aimed at all fraudulent schemes, tricks, devices and forms of manipulation.
There was no reason, he said, to distinguish the fiduciary breach from fraud
since "such a breach of fiduciary duty as is here alleged dearly constitutes
fraud."5' judge Hays went on to indicate that it would be sufficient to show the
majority shareholders had deceived others by withholding from them informa-
tion which would have revealed the true worth of the treasury stock, and con-
cluded:
What we have here then is a scheme by which the directors of Banff gave to the
controlling stockholder and an affiliated corporation some millions of dollars worth of
the corporation's property. A plainer case of fraud would be hard to find.52
Thus, while the majority seemed preoccupied with nondisclosure, Judge Hays
was concerned with the "fraud" perpetrated by the controlling shareholders.
After Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit reconsidered en banc, and re-
versed Schoenbaun. Judge Hays, writing for the majority, had several decisional
alternativesm but he chose to go beyond his dissenting opinion in the three-
46. See, e.g., Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (denying section
10(b) relief to minority shareholders who protested the granting of a premium to con-
trolling shareholders). In Christophides, the court reasserted the requirement for fraud, de-
ception or manipulation, stating that a section 10(b) action did not lie to remedy a breach
of fiduciary relationship. Id. at 405. On rehearing, Judge Pollack said, inter alia, that Texas
Gulf Sulphur did not help the plaintiffs. Id. at 407.
47. 405 F.2d 200, revd en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
906 (1969).
48. 405 F.2d at 211.
49. Id. at 214. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. As in O'Neill, Chief Judge
Lumbard wrote the majority opinion. With him was Judge Medina, who had written the
majority opinion in Ruckle.
50. 282 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
51. 405 F.2d at 214.
52. Id. at 215 (footnote omitted).
53. Bloomenthal 346-47, wherein it is said: "The court had five ways it could have gone
in Schoenbaum: (1) Adopt the Friendly suggestion that this was an area effectively regu-
lated by state corporate law and hold Rule lob-5 inapplicable. This would have been a
repudiation of Ruckle and Hooper. (2) Adopt the position of the original majority opinion
that there may be both a violation of fiduciary duties and Rule 10b-S, but the latter is
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judge panel. Citing Ruckle and Hooper, while relying on subsection (c) of rule
l0b-5," he stated:
[I]t is alleged that Aquitaine exercised a controlling influence over the issuance to
it of treasury stock of Banff for a wholly inadequate consideration. If it is established
that the transaction took place as alleged it constituted a violation of Rule lob-5, sub-
division [(c)] because Aquitaine engaged in an "act, practice or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security."asr
To the consternation of those who would later apply his rule, however, Judge
Hays did not stop there, but continued: "Moreover, Aquitaine and the directors
of Banff were guilty of deceiving the stockholders of Banff (other than Aqui-
taine).""0 Thus, the crux of the decision, either the exercise of a controlling
influence over the issuance of stock for a wholly inadequate consideration or
nondisclosure, was unclear. The latter is consistent with the circuit's earlier de-
cisions narrowly interpreting the fraud requirement, while the former clearly
expands the bounds of rule 10b-5. The more logical reading, it is submitted, is
that the essential concern in the en banc decision was the exercise of controlling
influence to the detriment of minority stockholders. Such a conclusion is con-
sistent with the sequence of the court's considerations and with the use of the
transitional element "moreover," which suggests that the actual grounds for
the holding have preceded."T
Subsequently, in the Fifth Circuit, Judge Ainsworth decided a pair of con-
solidated cases which generously enlarged the scope of rule lob-5. Shell v.
Hensley and Love v. Hensley58 were cases in which minority stockholders in an
inapplicable if the transaction is approved by a disinterested majority of the directors.
(3) Adopt the position that the majority of the directors were not in reality disinterested
and on this basis find that the transaction was subject to ratification by shareholders, and
without an informed ratification the shareholders had been defrauded. (4) Adopt the posi-
tion of Hays' dissenting opinion that the corporate fiction should be disregarded and view
the transaction as a fraud on the shareholders. (5) Adopt the position that for a controlling
shareholder to cause the corporation to issue shares to it at an unfair price operated as a
fraud even in the absence of deception."
54. See note 4 supra.
55. 405 F.2d at 219-20.
56. Id. at 220 (citing to Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968), discussed at
note 43 supra).
57. This reading is reinforced by the apocalyptical statement in the dissent that: "What
this amounts to is giving carte blanche to every holder of a few shares in any corporation
whose stock is traded on the New York or American stock exchanges to give his imagination
full rein in the making of any sort of extravagant charges .... " 405 F.2d at 221 (Medina,
Lumbard & Moore, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). For other views of Schoenbaum
consistent with this reading, see Bloomenthal 347-48; Comment, Schoenbaumn v. Firstbrook:
The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1103, 1113-14 (1969).
58. 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970). At the same time, Judge Ainsworth decided the related
cases of Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970), and Herpich v. Wilder, 430
F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971). The issues presented In the
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Alabama corporation sought damages resulting from the purchase of control of
the Alabama National Life Insurance Company by an Arizona-based complex
of insurance companies. The court decided the extent to which proof of decep-
tion would be necessary to show violation of rule 10b-S.r9 The court first ad-
dressed itself to the argument advanced by the Second Circuit in O'Neill that
a corporation could be deceived only through its officers or agents. It rejected
this approach, declaring that in effectuating the broad remedial purposes of
section 10(b), the "[c]onceptual analysis of corporate relationships must bow"
to the purposes of the section 10(b) provisions.10 In place of the O'Neill rule,
the court formulated the following:
When the other party to the securities transaction controls the judgment of all the
corporation's board members or conspires with them or the one controlling them to
profit mutually at the expense of the corporation, the corporation is no less disabled
from availing itself of an informed judgment than if the outsider had simply lied to
the board. In both situations the determination of the corporation's choice of action
in the transaction in question is not made as a reasonable man would make it if pos-
sessed of all the material information known to the other party to the transaction.s
The court thus seems to have adopted a rule that if securities transactions are
orchestrated by a controlling stockholder, to the detriment of the minority stock-
holders, a fortiori, the latter cannot have had the benefit of full disclosure as
mandated by the section and may, therefore, have redress under section 10(b).
In this analysis, causal deceit ceases to be the rule; rather, it is replaced by a
query as to whether the minority stockholders have been harmed by the exercise
of a controlling influence. Given the broad remedial purposes of the Act, such a
test would appear reasonable.
The Supreme Court has given its approval to the Hensley cases by its decision
in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty CoP There, the
Courts reversed the Second Circuit's affirmance" of the district court's dismis-
sal of a complaint for failure to state a claim.05 In so doing, the Court rejected
Herpich cases were similar, but the opinions dealt primarily with the purchaser-seller re-
quirement.
59. 430 F.2d at 821.
60. Id. at 827. This approach parallels the intermediate position urged by Judge Hays
in his dissent in the three-judge opinion in Schoenbaum. See text accompanying notes 51-52
supra.
61. 430 F.2d at 827.
62. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
63. The case was decided before Justices Powell and Rehnquist took their seats on the
Court.
64. 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 6 (1971). The court of appelah had
relied on Birnbaum. Id. at 360. Again, Judge Hays dissented, while Chief Judge Lumbard
was in the majority with the author, Judge Blumenfeld of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
Id. at 356. Citing Ruckle, Vine, Brod, Texas Gulf Sulphur and Schoenbaum, Judge Hays
chastised the majority for failing to interpret rule 10b-5 broadly so as to find a fraud "'in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Id. at 362 (dissenting opinion).
65. 300 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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the Second Circuit's premise that the Act was intended only to preserve the
integrity of the securities markets,"G noting that Congress had declared that
"disregard of trust relationships" by fiduciaries was to be regarded as a part
of the "single seamless web" that included manipulation. 7 While the Court
stated that "Congress... did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute
no more than internal corporate mismanagement,"08 it did not subscribe to the
Birnbaum view that rule 10b-5 could not be invoked to redress mere "Iraudulent
mismanagement of corporate affairs." 9 Instead it noted:
[W]e read § 10(b) to mean that Congress meant to bar deceptive devices and
contrivances in the purchase or sale of securities . . The controlling stockholder
owes the corporation a fiduciary obligation-one "designed for the protection of the
entire community of interests in the corporation .... "
The crux of the present case is that [plaintiff's predecessor in interest] suffered an
injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor.70
Consequently, the Court, acknowledging that rule 10b-5 includes within its
breadth the protection of fiduciary relationships, held that rule 10b-5 relief was
appropriate,7 1 at least in so far as a trial on the merits was ordered.
Against this background of judicial uncertainty-an atmosphere replete with
inconsistent holdings and dicta from various circuits and a noteworthy paucity
of Supreme Court precedent-Irwin Popkin's challenge reached the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. The principal elements of Popkin's complaint
were: (1) that the merger exchange ratio proposed by Equity was unfair; 72
66. See 430 F.2d at 360-61.
67. 404 U.S. at 11-12; see note 10 supra and accompanying text.
68. 404 U.S. at 12.
69. 193 F.2d at 464 (emphasis added).
70. 404 U.S. at 12-13 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
71. The Second Circuit reversed its original holding in Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d
722, 736 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc), after the Supreme Court handed down Bankers Life. The
three-judge Drachman panel, in affirming dismissal, relied on the circuit's similar handling
of Bankers Life and referred approvingly to the Birnbaum line of cases. See, e.g., id. at 730
n.41. The en banc opinion cited Schoenbaum and Hooper. Id. at 737. While this emphasis
might lead one to suspect that the court was recognizing the demise of Birnbaum, the
opinion specifically declined the opportunity either to overrule the old case or to review
the "present limits of Birnbaum or Schoenbaum or the nature or extent of relief which
the facts as developed may require." Id. at 738. Thus, the full bench in Drachman set the
stage for a later court to set the permissible bounds for rule lob-S actions.
72. Plaintiff contended: "[E]quality of treatment was exactly what Equity Corp. did
not want. By establishing an exchange ratio whereby only three shares of Equity Corp.
were given to the public shareholders of Bell, Equity Corp. so structured the transaction
as to retain for itself, at the expense of Bell's public stockholders, a grossly disproportionate
share of Bell's assets." Brief for Appellant at 9, Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir.
1972). See also id. at 10 (chart). Defendant countered by stating that plaintiff's attack
was a "mere exercise in mathematics entirely unrelated to the realities of the merger itself."
Brief for Appellee at 41, Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
At least two circuit courts have adjudicated the fairness of merger exchange ratios in the
context of rule lob-S complaints. See Levin v. Great Western Sugar Co., 406 F.2d 1112
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(2) that by proposing the unfair ratio, Equity and various officers and directors
of Bell breached fiduciary duties; (3) that Equity was in a position to orches-
trate the merger, and (4) that the combination of these factors entitled plaintiff
to rule 10b-5 relief, despite defendant's full disclosure. 5
The court stipulated that it was willing to assume Popkin's allegation of un-
fairness was correct.74 Moreover, the court stated that Equity's controlling
position75 -mathematically eliminating any possibility of causation--could not
in itself defeat plaintiff's federal claim. Yet the court found appellant's action
was properly dismissed as there was no contention 76 of "any misrepresentation
by defendants or of a failure on their part to disclose any material fact in con-
nection with the merger proposal." 77 The court in so holding rejected plaintiff's
contention that minority shareholders were entitled to rule lob-5 protection
"against overreaching by majority shareholders and directors '[w]hether the
facts remain hidden from the minority or are ultimately revealed in a Proxy
statement.' 217
To arrive at this conclusion, the court held that disclosure was the essence of
rule 10b-5. 79 The court acknowledged that in decisions such as Schoenbaum,
Vine and Ruckle, it had construed rule 10b-5 to extend beyond traditional stock
transactions and into corporate board rooms.80 However, the court chose to dis-
tinguish those cases on the ground that state law did not demand prior stock-
holder approval of such corporate self-dealing and therefore, as a practical
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 848 (1969) ; Knauff v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 403 F2d
958 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.. 831 (1969).
73. 464 F.2d at 716.
74. Id. at 717. On an appeal from a dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim
on which relief may be given, the court views the allegations as true. See, e.g., Walker Process
Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174-75 (1965); Coffee v. Permi
Corp., 434 F.2d 383, 384 (5th Cir. 1970).
75. See note 1 supra.
76. At least there was no contention of nondisclosure appropriately pressed as an issue
throughout the proceedings. See note 2 supra.
77. 464 F.2d at 718.
78. Id. Plaintiff had argued that the section 10(b) provisions vere sweeping antifraud
devices. He pointed to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) that securities regulations be flexibly construed
and stated that the Court had accepted as a definition of the fraud the securities legislation
sought to combat "'all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal or
equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by
which an undue and unconscientious [sic] advantage is taken of another." 375 U.S. at 194
(footnote omitted).
Plaintiff then drew from Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co, 404
U.S. 6 (1971), A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), and Cady, Roberts
& Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Brief for Appellant at 20-22, Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714
(2d Cir. 1972).
79. The Second Circuit, per Judge Friendly, had left this question open in Rosenblatt
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 435 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1970).
80. 464 F.2d at 718.
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matter, full and fair disclosure would rarely occur in such instances. 81 The
Popkin court glossed over the Schoenbaum en banc holding that, regardless of
disclosure, exercise of a controlling influence over the issuance of stock for an
inadequate consideration violated rule 10b-5.8 2 Instead, the court quoted from
Judge Hays' less expansive dissenting opinion in the three-judge consideration
of the case,es and his curious addendum84 to the en banc holding, concluding
that "it seems clear that our emphasis on improper self-dealing did not eliminate
non-disclosure as a key issue in Rule 10b-5 cases."85, True, Schoenbaum did not
eliminate disclosure as a key element in rule 10b-5 cases. But to suggest that
Schoenbaum established full disclosure as the sole requisite of the rule, as the
Popkin court does, is a unique reading of the opinion.80 The court demonstrated
the incongruity of so limiting the breadth of the section 10(b) provisions by
ascribing to them as a principal purpose the imposition of the "duty to disclose
and inform rather than to become enmeshed in passing judgments on information
elicited."8s7 Clearly, the two provisions sought disclosure, but they were also in-
tended as broad anti-fraud devices 8 8 -heavy guns in Congress' attack on the
"single seamless web"89 that surrounded the securities markets to the detriment
of investors and the public interest. Consequently, if in order to combat fraud
it is necessary for a court to become enmeshed in judgments on disclosed infor-
mation, so be it.
The Popkin decision also is disturbing for the manner in which it accomplishes
the retrenchment of the "new fraud" action. The court began with the premise
that "[w]here Rule 10b-5 properly extends, it will be applied regardless of any
cause of action that may exist under state law."190 However, the court proceeded
to base its denial of relief on the rationale that a complaining minority share-
holder had available a state right of appraisal.9 1 Furthermore, the court failed
to discuss adequately the issues presented in the light of the legislative history
of the 1934 Act 92 or the case law under section 10(b) that spawned the "new
81. Id. at 719.
82. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
85. 464 F.2d at 719.
86. See note 57 supra.
87. 464 F.2d at 719-20. Indeed, one is struck by the analogousness of this contention to
the circuit's erroneous construction of the purposes of the section 10(b) provisions, an
analysis the Supreme Court rejected in Bankers Life. See notes 66-71 supra and accompany-
ing text.
88. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
89. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934) ; see note 10 supra and accompany-
ing text. See also Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-12
(1971) (as discussed at note 67 supra and accompanying text).
90. 464 F.2d at 718.
91. Id. at 720 n.16. In the Popkin case, Delaware law governed, as all four corporations
were incorporated in that state. Id. at 716; see note 1 supra. Therefore, shareholders opposing
a merger plan had a right to appraisal. See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus.,
Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (DeL Ch. 1971).
92. Discussion of the section 10(b) provisions' intent is limited to a single sentence.
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fraud" action. Despite its assumption that the merger ratio was unfair, the court
denied the existence of a proper claim-choosing to disregard the adjudication
of similar issues in two other circuits.93 Similarly, the court failed to mention
the finding in Bankers Life that the disregard of trust relationships was within
the ambit of rule 10b-5.9
As a practical matter9 5 the retrenchment achieved by the Popkin court may
be deemed a desirable result. However, until the Supreme Court in the fullness
of time delineates the proper limits of the "new fraud" action under rule 10b-5,
such restrictions on that growth preferably should be accomplished only within
the contours of thorough discussion of the design of section 10(b) provisions
and the decisional law thereunder. While the slice of the "new fraud" action
that the Popkin court chose to eliminate was admittedly small,"" the decision
leaves minority shareholders in a controlled corporation who are confronted with
a proposed merger at unfair exchange ratios without federal recourse if the
majority shareholders make full disclosure. The decision misinterprets the Second
Circuit's own handling of Schoenbaum, is against the weight of decisions in the
Third and Fifth Circuits, and appears contrary to the inclinations expressed by
the Supreme Court in Bankers Life.97
464 F.2d at 719-20. But see Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co, 404
U.S. 6, 9-12 (1971). See also notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
93. See note 72 supra.
94. See note 67 supra and accompanying text. It is also noteworthy that the Court
concluded its discussion of the broad purposes of the provisions, saying: "Since there was a
'sale' of a security and since fraud was used 'in connection with' it, there is redress under
§ 10(b), whatever might be available as a remedy under state law?' 404 U.S. at 12. The
Popkin court chose to ignore this sweeping language, choosing instead to distinguish the
two cases on the basis of the particularity of the fraud alleged in the Bankers Life cace.
464 F.2d at 718.
95. The court took notice of the proliferation of section 10(b) cases and waved the
red flag of the floodgates argument, stating: "[W]hen there has been such disclosure of a
merger's terms, it seems unwise to invoke federal injunctive power, particularly since doing
so might well encourage resort to the federal courts by any shareholder dissatisfied with a
corporate merger." 464 F.2d at 720.
96. See 464 F.2d at 720 where the court states: "We realize that cases based upon Rule
lob-5 in which a court can properly find full and fair disclosure may not be frequent since
self-dealing schemes and transactions are by nature secretive. Certainly, concessions by
plaintiffs that defendants made such disclosure will be even rarer." The court also left open
the question whether plaintiff could litigate the fairness of the exchange ratios in state
courts, notwithstanding the previous state court proceedings. See note 6 supra.
97. Popkin was before the court of appeals following the dismissal of a complaint. Since
the exchange of shares during a merger has been deemed within the statutory definition of
a sale, and in light of the allegations in the complaint which the court should view as true
given the posture of the case, it would seem that the case should have fallen within the
bounds of the Bankers Life rle; to wit, that one might invoke rule 10b-S if he suffered
an injury as the result of a deceptive practice touching the sale of securities. The court
might well have found the injury in the inadequate exchange ratio, the deceptive practice
in the orchestration of the merger by Equity in furtherance of retaining a disproportionate
share, and the "sale" of securities in the exchange pursuant to the merger.
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